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In a column in today’s  New York Times, Steven Rattner attacks Trump’s tax plan for being unrealistic. Since I also think the proposal isn’t very plausible, I’m not overly bothered by that message. However, Rattner tries to bolster his case by making very inaccurate and/or misleading claims about the Reagan tax cuts.

Given my admiration for the Gipper, those assertions cry out for correction. Starting with his straw man claim that the tax cuts were supposed to pay for themselves.

…four decades ago…the rollout of what proved to be among our country’s greatest economic follies — the alchemistic belief that huge tax cuts can pay for themselves by unleashing faster economic growth.

Neither Reagan nor his administration claimed that the tax cuts would be self-financing.

Instead, they simply pointed out that the economy would grow faster and that this would generate some level of revenue feedback.

Which is exactly what happened. Heck, even leftists agree that there’s a Laffer Curve. The only disagreement is the point where tax receipts are maximized (and I don’t care which side is right on that issue since I don’t want to enable bigger government).

Anyhow, Rattner also wants us to believe the tax cuts hurt the economy.

…the plan immediately made a bad economy worse.

This is remarkable blindness and/or bias. The double dip recession of 1980-1982 was the result of economic distortions caused by bad monetary policy (by the way, Reagan deserves immense credit for having the moral courage to wean the country from easy-money policy).

But even if one wants to ignore the impact of monetary policy, how can you blame the second dip of the recession, which began in July 1981, on a tax cut that was signed into law in August 1981?!?

Moreover, while Reagan’s tax cut was adopted in 1981, it was phased in over several years. And because of previously legislated tax increases, as well as inflation-driven bracket creep (prior to 1985, households were pushed into higher tax brackets by inflation even though their real income did not rise), the economy did not enjoy a tax cut until 1983. Not coincidentally, that’s when the economy began to boom.

Rattner even wants us to believe the Reagan tax plan caused higher interest rates.

…the Reagan tax cut increased the budget deficit, helping elevate interest rates over 20 percent, which in turn contributed to the double-dip recession that ensued. The stock market fell by more than 20 percent.

The deficit jumped mostly because of the double-dip recession, just as red ink always climbs when there is an economic downturn.

And interest rates were high largely because inflation was so high (lenders don’t like to deliberately lose money).

But the most amazing part of the above excerpt is that Rattner wants us to believe the Reagan tax cuts caused the part of the double-dip recession that occurred in 1980, when Jimmy Carter was still president.

That’s sort of like Paul Krugman trying to imply that Estonia’s 2008 recession was caused by spending cuts that took place in 2009!

You also won’t be surprised to learn that Rattner selectively likes Keynesianism.

Big deficits can sometimes be advisable, as they were in aiding recovery from the 2009 recession.

I guess he wants us the applaud Obama’s so-called stimulus and be impressed by the very anemic recovery that followed.

But we’re supposed to overlook the booming economy of the Reagan years.

Last but not least, it’s noteworthy that Rattner - in spite of his bias - endorses part of the Trump tax plan.

I understand our need to lower the corporate tax rate to compete with other countries and adjust other provisions to keep companies and jobs here. Critics are correct that our business-tax structure encourages companies to ship jobs and even themselves overseas.

And when even folks like Rattner realize that the current corporate tax system is indefensible, that explains why I’m semi-hopeful that we’ll get a lower rate at some point in the near future.

Now let’s look at broader lessons from the Reagan tax cuts.

Lesson #1: Lower Tax Rates Can Boost Growth

We can draw some conclusions by looking at how low-tax economies such as Singapore and Hong Kong outperform the United States. Or we can compare growth in the United States with the economic stagnation in high-tax Europe.

We can also compare growth during the Reagan years with the economic malaise of the 1970s.

Moreover, there’s lots of academic evidence showing that lower tax rates lead to better economic performance

The bottom line is that people respond to incentives. When tax rates climb, there’s more “deadweight loss” in the economy. So when tax rates fall, output increases.

Lesson #2: Some Tax Cuts “Pay for Themselves”

The key insight of the Laffer Curve is not that tax cuts are self-financing. Instead, the lesson is simply that certain tax cuts (i.e., lower marginal rates on productive behavior) lead to more economic activity. Which is another way of saying that certain tax cuts lead to more taxable income.

It’s then an empirical issue to assess the level of revenue feedback.

In the vast majority of the cases, the revenue feedback caused by more taxable income isn’t enough to offset the revenue loss associated with lower tax rates. However, we do have very strong evidence that upper-income taxpayers actually paid more to the IRS because of the Reagan tax cuts.

This is presumably because wealthier taxpayers have much greater ability to control the timing, level, and composition of their income.

Lesson #3:Reagan Put the United States on a Path to Fiscal Balance

I already explained above why it is wrong to blame the Reagan tax cuts for the recession-driven deficits of the early 1980s. Indeed, I suspect most leftists privately agree with that assessment.

But there’s still a widespread belief that Reagan’s tax policy put the United States on an unsustainable fiscal path.

Yet the Congressional Budget Office, as Reagan left office in early 1989, projected that budget deficits, which had been consistently shrinking as a share of GDP, would continue to shrink if Reagan’s policies were left in place.

Moreover, the deficit was falling because government spending was projected to grow slower than the private sector, which is the key to good fiscal policy.

Lesson #4: Lower Tax Rates Are Just One Piece of a Larger Puzzle

Having just disgorged hundreds of words on the importance of lower tax rates, let’s close by noting that fiscal policy is just one of many factors that determines an economy’s performance.

Indeed, tax and budget issues only account for 20 percent of a nation’s economic performance according to Economic Freedom of the World.

So it’s quite possible for a nation to be relatively free even with a bad tax system, and it’s also possible for a country to be economically repressed if it has a good tax system.

And this explains why economic freedom increased in America during the Clinton years, notwithstanding the 1993 tax hike. Simply stated, it’s the overall policy mix that matters.

I’ll conclude by noting that aggregate economic freedom in America increased during the Reagan years.

And the biggest reason for the increase was better fiscal policy.

It’s possible that we may also get more economic freedom during the Trump years. Indeed, I gave him a decent score for his first 100 days.

But it takes a lot of political courage to consistently fight for economic liberty in a town that cheers statism. And even though there’s a strong case to be made that there are political benefits to good policy, I’m not overly optimistic that Trump will be another Reagan.

In a recent article for City Journal titled, “How Trump Can Help the Cops,” Heather MacDonald offers about a dozen recommendations to the White House.  In this post, I want to scrutinize a few of those proposals and some of the arguments behind them.

Let me begin, however, by saying that Heather MacDonald was recently threatened by a crowd of protestors (I use that term very loosely here) while visiting a college campus to deliver a lecture.  That was outrageous and inexcusable.   I have met Ms. MacDonald several times, and while we have some strong disagreements on certain subjects, she has always been friendly and courteous.  She holds strong views and makes forceful arguments, but her claims should be answered with better arguments, not intimidation.  As many others have already noted, it is a sad commentary on the state of our universities that such incidents keep happening.  (Thanks to Harvey Silverglate and his colleagues for what they do at FIRE).

Returning now to MacDonald’s article, she says “Sanctuary cities, counties, and states must be severely penalized. These scofflaw jurisdictions, numbering about 300, refuse to cooperate with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) efforts to deport convicted illegal-alien criminals.”  She continues, “Over just one week in late January 2017, ICE found 206 criminal aliens who had been released back to the streets in defiance of a detention request.”  Okay, so far this is the standard public safety argument against sanctuary cities.  But here’s the claim that is problematic: “Such disobedience of lawful federal requests undermines the constitutional system.”  This is very misleading.

Last week’s ruling, County of Santa Clara v. Donald J. Trump, summarized the law succinctly:

 

An ICE civil detainer request asks a local law enforcement agency to continue to hold an inmate who is in local jail because of actual or suspected violations of state criminal laws for up to 48 hours after his or her scheduled release so that ICE can determine if it wants to take that individual into custody. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7; Neusel Decl. ¶9; Marquez Decl., Ex. C at 3 (SC Dkt. No. 29-3). ICE civil detainer requests are voluntary and local governments are not required to honor them. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a); Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 643 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[S]ettled constitutional law clearly establishes that [immigration detainers] must be deemed requests” because any other interpretation would render them unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment). Several courts have held that it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for local jurisdictions to hold suspected or actual removable aliens subject to civil detainer requests because civil detainer requests are often not supported by an individualized determination of probable cause that a crime has been committed. See Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 215-217 (1st Cir. 2015); Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cnty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *9-11 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014). ICE does not reimburse local jurisdictions for the cost of detaining individuals in response to a civil detainer request and does not indemnify local jurisdictions for potential liability they could face for related Fourth Amendment violations. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(e); Marquez Decl. ¶¶ 21-15 & Exs. B-D.

By using the term “request,” MacDonald seems to concede that ICE detainers are not lawful orders.  The requests are voluntary.  And yet MacDonald uses the word “disobedience” to describe jurisdictions that choose to decline some requests from ICE.  Again, this is quite misleading.  Let’s say one of my neighbors knocked on my door and said he had changed his mind about hosting a party for his son’s soccer team and wanted to know if I would be willing to host the 30 players and their parents in my home instead.  Let’s say that I resisted the temptation to close the door in his face, but merely declined the peculiar, but lawful request.  Would anyone say that I was disobedient to my neighbor’s lawful request?  No—because disobedient means a refusal to obey a rule or lawful command.  If a homeless person asks you for $10 and you walk on by, would MacDonald say that you were “disobedient” to the homeless person’s lawful request?  I doubt it—and for the same reason it is wrong to say that sanctuary cities and counties are disobedient.  (MacDonald does not explain her additional claim that that by opting to decline an ICE request, cities would be “undermining our constitutional system.”  As the passage above notes, cities might well be violating the Constitution by keeping a person locked up without probable cause.)

Next, MacDonald writes that community members have an obligation to “obey police commands and not resist arrest.”  According to MacDonald, “the vast majority of questionable police shootings over the last several years, as well as the justified police shootings, were triggered by the noncompliance of the victims.”  There are several problems here.  First, noncompliance cannot excuse brutality.  If a shoplifter keeps running after a police officer yells “Halt!” the officer would not be justified in shooting the thief in the back.  When Eric Garner was accused of selling illegal cigarettes on the streets of New York City, he should have put his hands behind his back to be handcuffed, but his noncompliance did not justify the chokehold that led to his tragic death

Second, the police are trained to get people to waive their constitutional rights by blurring the distinction between a command and a request.  So if an officer says, impatiently, “Would you empty the contents of your purse on the hood of the car for me?”  We can’t know whether that is a request or a command.  The Courts say citizens have to assert their rights or they may be deemed waived. To assert our rights against self-incrimination and against consensual searches necessarily entails some degree of “noncompliance” with what the police want.  MacDonald ignores these very serious legal dynamics by telling us to “Comply now, Complain later.”   I hosted a book forum with author James Duane last year in which he lays these issues out in some detail.  Go here for his terrific talk.

MacDonald claims the “vast majority of questionable shootings over the past several years, as well as the justified police shootings, were triggered by the noncompliance of the victims.” This assertion is not supported by data, a reference to another work, or extended argument.  Recall that South Carolina Officer Sean Groubert ordered Levar Jones to produce identification.  When Jones moved to retrieve paperwork from his vehicle to comply, the officer shot him.  Recall also the case from Minnesota involving Philando Castile.  When Officer Jeronimo Yanez pulled over Castile’s girlfriend for a traffic stop, Castile, in the passenger seat, volunteered that he had a concealed firearm and had a lawful permit.  When Castile calmly explained that he wanted to produce his identification and permit, the officer shot at him seven times and killed him. 

Last week, Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor highlighted the case of Ricardo Salazar-Limon, who was pulled over by a Houston police officer for suspected DUI.  Salazar-Limon got out of his car, reluctantly, at the officer’s direction.  When the officer made a move to handcuff him, he started to walk away.  According to Salazar-Limon, within seconds of hearing the officer’s command to “halt,” he was shot.  All agree that police have every right to defend themselves, but we also know that police will be dealing with situations where people do not understand English, where people have hearing problems, where people like Salazar-Limon have had too much to drink.  We can’t have officers using deadly force against people when there is noncompliance with their orders.  As Sotomayor noted, Salazar-Limon’s claim of excessive force was dismissed prior to trial.  The officer may have prevailed at trial with his self-defense claim, but the jury should have been able to hear Salazar-Limon’s side of the story.  Instead a judge dismissed the brutality claim by granting the officer immunity. 

To be clear, I am sure there are shooting cases in which officers shouted instructions, such as “keep your hands where I can see them,” or “get down on the ground,” and the suspect did something else, which might have prompted a reasonable officer to fire in quickly unfolding circumstances.  However, the proposition is whether such scenarios are in fact the “vast majority,” as MacDonald claims.  The point here is that no support is offered for the claim.  We should have more information about police shootings than we do.  Thanks to the Washington Post and the Guardian, we are finally getting a better understanding of these cases.

Last, MacDonald claims that “drug enforcement play no role in disproportionate black incarceration rates.”  Another bold claim, but, again, misleading.  MacDonald draws the attention of readers to incarceration rates, but is that the only place to consider?  When the prisons are filled to capacity, the system starts backing up.  The river of drug cases has to be dealt with somehow.  Officials start scrambling.  Put 4 men in cells designed for 2.  Stack bunk beds in the cafeteria.  Use the county jail, instead of the state system.  Send some cases to drug court. Send more cases to the federal system.  Use supervised probation when necessary. 

The drug trade offers young minority men a chance to make some money.  The police are told to make drug busts.  These dynamics result in constant clashes between police units and young minority men.  Of course, they don’t go to state prison for the first offense of selling or transporting drugs—especially if they’re still in their teens—but the rap sheet starts growing.  After a while, bail will be denied.  If the young men don’t get killed in a turf dispute, they will eventually get a prison sentence.  The Manhattan Institute’s own John McWhorter has put it well: “If the War on Drugs were terminated, the main factor keeping race-based resentment a core element in the American social fabric would no longer exist.  America would be a better place for all.”   MacDonald misses this important insight as to how the drug war harms black Americans.

For related Cato work, go here, here, and here.

This Sunday, French voters will return to the polls to decide the country’s next president. Last month’s first-round vote reduced the field to two unconventional candidates: Emmanuel Macron, formerly a top official of the left-wing Parti Socialiste and now leader of the fledgling En Marche! party; and Marine Le Pen, until recently the leader of the nationalist-right Front National.

Both candidates are unconventional not just because their parties have never held political power, but because the candidates have fashioned themselves as populist/outsider champions of downtrodden workers. Granted, sans-colluttes appeals are standard fare in French politics, but they have renewed force in this election, following a half-decade of French unemployment hovering around 10% and with youth unemployment (under age 25) well above 20%.

French employment and the country’s overall economy have sagged before, of course. U.S. observers often attribute those downturns in part to France’s labor laws, which they say (with irony) protect current workers by discouraging employers from creating new jobs. But French employment and the country’s economy have also surged before; typically France is Europe’s 2nd largest economy, after Germany. The past several decades have heard many predictions that France has reached “the end of the road” (to borrow from Ronald Reagan in 1964) unless it reforms its labor, entitlements, and other domestic policies, but neither economic doom nor dramatic reform has occurred.

Université du Québec en Outaouais economist Pierre Lemieux explored this in last fall’s cover story for Regulation magazine. It’s a great read if you want to learn more about what has led to France’s current conditions and what may lie ahead.

Friday afternoon, US Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross announced a new White House Executive Order to study “violations and abuses” of US trade agreements. The EO itself is hardly remarkable – President Trump’s first 100 Days have featured numerous executive demands for studies, investigations and reports on various international trade issues (without any actual anti-trade actions, so far) – but what was remarkable was the substance of Ross’ speech itself, which appeared to be unaware of certain basic facts about US trade agreements. In this regard, Ross’ statements raise questions about not only the White House’s basic research competence, but also what they’ll eventually produce in their final “trade agreement abuses” report.

A full accounting of the errors and omissions in Ross’ press briefing is beyond the scope of this short blog post, but the four most basic are below. (My Cato colleague Simon Lester handles some of Ross’ confusion surrounding basic World Trade Organization rules and procedures in a separate blog post, so be sure to check that out too.)

ROSS: And as far as I can tell there has never been a systematic evaluation of what has been the impact of the WTO agreements on the country as an integrated whole.

Actually, the US government has produced dozens of studies on the impact of US trade agreements, including the WTO Agreements, over the last decade or so.  Indeed, just last year both the US International Trade Commission and Congressional Budget Office produced comprehensive reviews of how our trade agreements have affected the US economy as a whole, each finding that our trade agreements have produced small but significant net benefits for the US economy in terms of GDP, employment, wages and so forth.  Furthermore, the Government Accountability Office has repeatedly examined the specific issue of US trade agreement enforcement – see, for example: here, here and here – finding limited concerns, while the USDA has often examined the benefits of US trade agreements for the American farm sector.  I could go on, but I think you get the idea.

ROSS: But there are those problems that I mentioned, then there’s also the structural problem of the [WTO] dispute resolution mechanism.  Takes a very long time, and given the composition of the WTO panels, often we’re defeated when people come and appeal it.  Because if the people on the panel are mostly people who are doing the same thing as what you’re complaining about, it’s a little bit hard to get them to vote for you.

WTO dispute settlement does, indeed, suffer from delays – a problem brought about by high use and a staffing crunch – but it’s beyond a stretch to imply, as Ross does here, that it harbors some sort of institutional bias against the United States.  In fact, the United States is very successful in WTO dispute settlement –more so than most other Members.  As my colleague Dan Ikenson noted recently–

The “WTO” doesn’t file complaints at the WTO. WTO members do. And they do so when they are aggrieved and when they are as close as possible to 100% certain that they will prevail if the matter goes all the way through dispute settlement. As a result, complainants prevail almost all of the time – on 90% of adjudicated issues. When the United States has been a complainant (as it has in 114 of 522 WTO disputes over 22 years – more than any other WTO member) it has prevailed on 91% of adjudicated issues. When the United States is a respondent (as it has been in 129 cases – more than any other WTO member), it has lost on 89% of adjudicated issues.

Just as importantly, the United States’ win/loss records in dispute settlement are also good in comparison to other WTO Members.  According to a recent Bloomberg analysis, the United States actually wins more often than average and loses less often than average and has a far better “loss rate” (i.e., we successfully defend more often) than the EU, Japan and China.  Furthermore, the United States itself has a less-than-stellar record of non-compliance with the WTO Agreements and adverse WTO dispute settlement decisions.  How these hard numbers can possibly reflect, as Ross asserts, a “structural problem” with the WTO is beyond me.

ROSS: And I think that points out one of the issues with our current relationship with the World Trade, namely Mexico and others have had very big external tariffs on many, many goods.  U.S. is the least protectionist country.  Many goods come in totally free, and others have little, tiny tariffs, like 2.5 percent.  Countries like Mexico frequently have 15, 20 percent, even more than 20 percent tariffs.

By no conceivable measure is the United States “the least protectionist country” in the world. As I noted last fall, for example, “according to a recent analysis by Credit Suisse, when you add up all forms of trade barriers imposed between 1990 and 2013, the biggest protectionist in the world isn’t China or Mexico but none other than… the United States.”  This includes the 370+ protective duties – often over 100%! – through our trade remedy (antidumping and countervailing duty) laws and our “Buy American” rules for federal procurement – measures that the Trump administration has expressly targeted for expansion.  Even the United States’ basic tariff rates aren’t the world’s lowest – not even close, actually.  As Ramesh Ponnuru recently noted, “[t]he World Bank reports that we have higher average tariff rates than Canada, Israel, the European Union, Japan, and many other countries. Our average tariff level is just slightly below the developed-world average.”  (Using a different tariff metric, the WTO also finds that the United States is not the best.) We also are about average when it comes to restrictions on trade in services.

ROSS: What are some of the problems under WTO?  Its 160-some-odd countries are participants in the WTO, and the vast majority of those are countries that export to us, and in most cases, export more than they buy from us.

The Trump administration’s obsession with trade deficits and balanced trade is well-known at this point, so I won’t rehash all of that here.  Nevertheless, calling the US trade balance a “problem under the WTO” defies the most basic of economics.  In particular, I highly recommend this recent (very short!) explainer from the San Francisco Federal Reserve on what drives the US trade balance and whether trade deficits are really a “problem” per se.  (Spoiler: it’s not the WTO Agreements and no).

There are plenty of substantive questions surrounding the alleged “violation and abuse” of US trade agreements.  Of the top of my head: Are such violations and abuses really pervasive?  Do they actually harm the economy? Either way, what should we do about them? And, finally, is the United States really so innocent here? As such, an assessment of international trade agreement violations and abuses is, in theory, worthy of undertaking.  If the aforementioned errors are any indication, however, the result of the new US investigation won’t provide many good answers.

Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in 1938 to regulate certain employment practices between employers and employees. In order to put the law into effect, Congress delegated authority to the Department of Labor (DOL) to enforce the statute’s provisions. It’s a fundamental legal principle, however, that an executive-branch agency may only regulate those provisions that Congress has actually put into its authorizing statute. Where Congress has not address a certain practice, the agency has no authority to regulate and the practice is presumptively legal.

Fast forward almost 80 years. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Co. (better known as DuPont), following standard industry practice, paid their employees for otherwise noncompensable meal breaks, using that compensation as credit towards the time employees spent performing certain work duties (especially “donning and duffing” special clothing and gear) before and after their shifts. The employees sued DuPont in federal court, arguing that the FLSA forbids this type of crediting and that they must be paid overtime pay for the donning/duffing time.

The district court disagreed, finding that the statute was silent about the practice and so DuPont had done nothing illegal under the FLSA. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit invited DOL to file an amicus brief regarding whether DuPont had violated the law—essentially allowing it to regulate. DOL admitted in its brief that the FLSA was silent on the issue, but argue that the statute implicitly forbade the practice. The Third Circuit then adopted that view by granting DOL Skidmore deference (by which judges defer to agency interpretations according to their persuasiveness), and reversed the district court’s ruling.

Cato has now filed an amicus brief supporting DuPont’s petition for Supreme Court review. We argue that Third Circuit ignored the basic administrative-law and constitutional axiom that agencies can only exercise the powers delegated to them. Indeed, under Supreme Court separation-of-powers precedent, Congress must give executive agencies at least some “intelligible principle” to follow. The Third Circuit, however, would give any agency a virtually unlimited power to write any regulations it thinks a statute should cover, without any congressional authority.

Moreover, when the court accorded Skidmore deference to the DOL amicus brief, it violated DuPont’s due process rights for two reasons. First, this was the first time in the FLSA’s long history that DOL had ever interpreted the statute to forbid the practice at issue—and two other circuit courts had already ruled that the practice was legal—so DuPont was denied fair notice. Second, by inviting a nonparty government agency into the litigation and deferring to its view, the court decided the case with bias towards one of the parties before it.

The Supreme Court should take DuPont v. Smiley and explain that the Constitution’s separation of powers does not allow such judicial enabling of executive mischief. Administrative agencies simply cannot take it upon themselves to rewrite duly enacted legislation and then thrust their statutory revisions on private litigants for the first time in litigation.

Following Trump’s electoral success in rustbelt states, the spotlight has been on white, rural, post-industrial poverty. J.D. Vance, author of the now-famous memoir Hillbilly Elegy, discussed some possible explanations for rural poverty yesterday in a podcast. In the interview, he suggests that geographic (im)mobility is partly to blame for the erosion of areas like Appalachia: the poor simply aren’t migrating to jobs. 

Vance is right that Americans have limited interest in relocating, and are relocating less than before. According to calculations[1] using University of Chicago data, the proportion of individuals unwilling to relocate for work is high: 42% of Americans say they will not move within the United States for work, and 68% of Americans will not move outside the country for work. A full quarter (25%) of Americans would not consider traveling further for a job, even if the decision resulted in unemployment. Meanwhile, Census data suggests that relocation—whether inter-state, inter-county, or intra-county—is down (Figure 1). 2016 had the lowest relocation rate in seventy years (Figure 2).

Figure 1. Type of Move, 1948–2016

Figure 2: Number of Movers and Mover Rate, 1948–2016

 

Why are people relocating less than ever? One explanation Vance misses is that government policy gets in the way. For example, research provides evidence that land use regulations put pressure on housing prices in high-opportunity areas, which in turn eliminates the fiscal rewards of relocation for the poor and unskilled. Tragically, this means low-income Americans are trapped in job deserts with little in the way of opportunities, amenities, or hope.

You can listen to more of Vance’s interview regarding the causes of white, rural, post-industrial poverty, here.

[1] Author’s own.

Donald Trump’s first 100 days in office have set U.S. foreign policy on a dangerous course. Trump’s actions and rhetoric have raised the profile of America’s military power while weakening other sources of U.S. influence. Such an approach is in line with the “peace through strength” formula Trump espouses. However, the deepening militarization of U.S. foreign policy carries a host of risks and costs that may cause more headaches than victories.

The growing role of the military in U.S. foreign policy is not a new phenomenon. Barack Obama’s presidency was hardly peaceful. This was especially true in the Middle East, where the “light footprint” approach reduced the on-the-ground U.S. military presence but made extensive use of air power to conduct foreign policy by precision strike. However, Obama also spearheaded multilateral initiatives that relied on other sources of American power and influence, such as the Iran nuclear deal and the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). Not all of these initiatives were successful, but they demonstrate a foreign policy approach that places value on non-military tools.

Thus far into his presidency, Trump does not seem to share Obama’s appreciation for the value of non-military tools for dealing with foreign policy problems. One of Trump’s first executive orders withdrew the United States from the TPP, a key component of American economic engagement in East Asia. The TPP and a growing American military presence were the two key pillars of the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia,” with the TPP emblematic of the softer side of U.S. policy. Granted, the TPP was not yet in force when Trump withdrew from it, which mitigates the diplomatic downside of withdrawal. But the loss of economic and diplomatic influence associated with withdrawing from the TPP leaves military power as the primary means for the administration to implement U.S. policy in East Asia. 

Greater reliance on U.S. military power in East Asia is already evident in the Trump administration’s policy toward North Korea. The administration wants to apply “maximum pressure” to Pyongyang in order force them to negotiate on Washington’s terms. As former defense official Van Jackson points out, this theory of victory depends heavily on U.S. military signaling and is more aggressive than previous administrations. Jackson argues, “the Trump administration appears to be a much more permissive—even enabling—environment for such coercive beliefs” due to “the prominence of the Pentagon in President Trump’s national security policy to date.”

Staring down North Korea through displays of military might and rhetoric hinting at military action fits with “peace through strength,” but probably won’t stop North Korea from testing new missiles or accepting the maximal conditions the United States has placed on negotiations.

Relying heavily on U.S. military power in matters of foreign policy is by no means exclusive to East Asia. Trump’s cruise missile strike against Assadspecial forces raid in Yemen, and loosening of the rules of engagement for counterterrorism missions point to a growing role for the U.S. military in Middle East policy. Recently, Trump said that Iran was “not living up to the spirit” of the nuclear deal, despite the fact that the State Department confirmed that Iran is complying with the deal. What the administration will do with the Iran deal remains uncertain, but the deepening militarization of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East combined with a general hatred of the deal by President Trump point to growing tensions.

Fortunately there are things that Trump can do to rein in the militarization of U.S. foreign policy, if he is so inclined. Filling vacancies at State and Defense with civilian experts would provide additional, non-military voices in the policymaking process. These appointees may not be able to match the influence of the retired and active generals in Trump’s administration, but the current absence of civilian appointees ensures that the generals will heavily influence Trump’s foreign policy.

Congress could also fight back against the militarization of U.S. foreign policy through its control of the budget. Trump’s planned cuts to agencies like USAID and the State Department would devastate two non-military tools of U.S. influence. After the proposed cuts were announced, several prominent Republican senators spoke out in opposition. Congress could also demand that Trump obtain new authorizations for the use of military force if he wants to get the United States more directly involved in Yemen or Somalia.

The deepening militarization of U.S. foreign policy is Trump’s most worrisome “achievement” of his first 100 days. Valuing military power so highly over diplomatic and economic tools limits policy options and can make military conflict more likely, as peaceful avenues for resolution are shut down. Hopefully Trump will recognize that there are other tools at his disposal for conducting U.S. foreign policy, and the warlike first 100 days prove to be a fluke—and not the trend. 

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