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President Trump’s arrival in Japan on November 5th will mark the start of a nine-day visit to Asia where trade and other economic issues, along with security concerns regarding North Korea, stand to figure prominently. Those hoping for the unveiling of any new bold trade initiatives, however, will almost surely find themselves disappointed. More probable is that the trip will serve as a bitter reminder of Trump’s ill-advised move only days after taking office to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)—a decision whose reverberations are likely to be felt during many of his stops. The following is a closer look at some of the issues the president will likely encounter:

Japan: Had Trump used his political capital as a newly-elected president to push the TPP through a Republican-held Congress, his visit to Tokyo could have been an occasion to celebrate the agreement’s ratification in both countries (Japan has already done so). Instead, his trade discussions with Prime Minister Abe are likely to mirror those held between Vice President Pence and Deputy Prime Minister Aso last month, where Pence is said to have expressed “strong interest” in a U.S.-Japan bilateral trade deal while senior Japanese officials grumbled over U.S. withdrawal from the TPP. Given this disparity in views, it was no surprise when the two sides settled for a list of deliverables whose highlights included an agreement to lift U.S. restrictions on the import of Japanese persimmons and for Japan to allow imports of Idaho potatoes.

Like Pence, Trump may once again push for Japan to start negotiations on a bilateral free trade agreement. If so, it is doubtful he will receive the commitment he’s looking for, with Japan likely to prefer focusing on other aspects of a busy trade agenda which includes the finalizing of agreements with the TPP’s eleven remaining members and the European Union. Rather, any trade deliverables reached are likely to focus on more minor issues such as Japan’s decision in August to raise tariffs on imports of frozen beef from the United States and other countries from 38.5% to 50% as part of a “safeguard” mechanism to protect domestic farmers.

South Korea: Under a TPP passage scenario, Trump’s stop in Seoul could have been an opportunity to discuss South Korea’s accession to the agreement. Indeed, the country had previously made clear its interest in becoming the thirteenth TPP member, and the addition of the world’s eleventh-largest economy certainly would have increased the TPP’s benefits to its members. Instead, trade discussions between U.S. and South Korean officials are sure to center around a renegotiation of the U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) demanded by President Trump which remains in its early stages. Indeed, just this week the renegotiation’s stakes were raised when South Korea’s trade minister is reported to have requested authority to terminate KORUS if he determines that the renegotiation’s result harm national interests.

It is worth pointing out that had Trump secured TPP ratification, South Korea’s accession could have served as a de facto renegotiation, thus eliminating what has become a noted sore point in bilateral ties. 

China: The atmospherics around Trump’s visit to Beijing appear inauspicious, with recent days featuring talk from the U.S. side about “predatory” trade practices by China—an apparent reference to long-standing irritants such as alleged forced technology transfers and intellectual property theft—and Chinese anger over the U.S. refusal this week to classify China as a market economy for anti-dumping purposes. Chinese officials will also no doubt take an interest in developments regarding the section 232 investigation into foreign steel imports initiated by the Trump administration and its section 301 investigation specifically directed at China.

While there is much the two sides have to talk about, it is unclear how the “significant outcomes on the economic and trade fronts” recently promised by China’s U.S. ambassador will be achieved. Given Trump’s comments this week about the “horrible” bilateral trade deficit with China, as well as other remarks by China’s ambassador that the country “do[es] not want a trade surplus” which “in the long run, will not help China’s economy,” a statement including vague promises to bring the trade relationship more into balance seems a likely outcome. Regardless, we are certainly a long way from the waning days of the Obama administration when the conclusion of a bilateral investment treaty appeared to be within sight

Vietnam/APEC: Stopping in Da Nang, Vietnam for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders’ Meeting, President Trump will deliver a speech at the gathering’s CEO Summit. Had the United States passed the TPP this stop could have effectively been a victory lap for the president, and a chance to receive accolades for his leadership and ability to deliver on such a key trade initiative. Indeed, APEC would have been an ideal venue to begin discussions around the agreement’s enlargement or even to serve as the basis of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific.

Based on a State Department briefing this week, we are instead likely to be treated to cliché and self-contradictory calls for “free and fair trade” and a misguided insistence on balanced trade which can only be managed through significant government intervention—all the while insisting that openness and market principles serve as guiding principles for APEC members. The ghost of TPP is once again sure to lurk in the background, with any talk regarding open economies and free trade surely undermined by the action of Trump’s withdrawal from the Asia-Pacific trade deal. Sadly, the leader of a country typically known for its free trade leadership will arrive at APEC will little moral authority on the subject.

We will find out what happens soon enough. Initial signs, however, provide little reason for encouragement.

The Federal Communications Commission, at least under previous chairmen, desperately wanted to control the internet. To further this objective, the FCC reversed its prior determination that providing broadband internet access was an “information service,” rather than a “telecommunications service,” under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, thereby granting itself more power. The commission also determined that Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 constituted an independent grant of regulatory authority over the internet. Relying on both these interpretations, the FCC then sought to outlaw paid prioritization—to institute “net neutrality”—by issuing a new policy cloaked in an Orwellian title; the “Open Internet Order.”

Despite its label, the order actually had the practical effect of closing the internet to Daniel Berninger’s new start-up, Hello Digital, a social media platform designed to allow users to discuss issues featured on the site in real time. The website’s high-definition voice feature would require that its content be prioritized to function properly, so when the FCC’s order prevented Berninger from paying for that priority, he was left with little choice but to sue. In deciding the case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled for the commission after granting so-called Chevron deference to the FCC’s statutory interpretations. (Under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, if an agency is charged with administering an ambiguous statute, courts will defer to that agency’s interpretation as long as it is deemed a “permissible construction.”)

But when Congress passed the 1996 Act, it directed that only some of that law’s provisions be inserted into the FCC-administered Communications Act of 1934. One such addition was Section 230, which specifically said that “[i]t is the policy of the United States … to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” Section 706, however, was noticeably absent from congressional inclusion into the original 1934 Act. Furthermore, there’s no evidence that Congress meant to give the FCC regulatory authority over Section 706, a fact that the FCC itself recognized until 2010. Finally, the FCC’s purported limitations on its own regulatory authority under the provision are practically meaningless. These illusory limits basically amount to: (1) we will only regulate communications by radio or wire (but the internet uses wires); (2) we will only issue rules designed to encourage broadband deployment (but courts should just take our word for it when we claim this is our purpose); and (3) we will not create rules that conflict with the 1934 Act (even though Congress decided not to make Section 706 part of that law in the first place).

Because Section 706 was never meant to be administered by the FCC and the agency believes its authority is subject to virtually no practical constraints, Cato has joined the Competitive Enterprise Institute, Reason Foundation, and Individual Rights Foundation on an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to place the task of interpreting these statutory provisions where it rightfully belongs: in an independent judiciary. Or the new FCC could rescind its previous order and save the Court the trouble.

It sounds like school choice fans are pretty happy to see the GOP tax plan allowing up to $10,000 per year from tax-favored 529 savings plans to be used for elementary and secondary expenses (though the much smaller Coverdell would go away). Previously, 529 funds were just applicable to postsecondary education. But happy or not, for several reason this is probably bad policy. Here’s a quick list:

  1. Regulation: Current 529 plans allow earnings to be used tax free only if spent on accredited institutions. But accreditation has been a backdoor way through which the federal government has regulated colleges. We don’t want to see private K-12 schools similarly subjected to federal control, greatly constricting the extent to which they can be real choices.
  2. Complication: A complicated federal tax code is an efficiency drain on the economy, but wealthier people able to pay for financial advisors, or who have the time to become well versed in the code, can game the system. Ditto student aid. Not so much the poor or average person. The 529 thumb-on-the-scale for education would seem to favor the wealthy who already have choice. Much better would be to just get rid of this kind of distorting, complicating incentive.
  3. Price: The evidence is powerful that student aid programs—including, though not primarily, tax incentives—help to fuel extraordinary price inflation in higher education. Better to not have the feds inject this further into K-12 education.
  4. Constitution: Outside of prohibiting discrimination by state and local governments, the Constitution gives the federal government no authority to meddle in education. This includes through the tax code.

Worse things, certainly, could have come from Washington. School choice is, after all, generally a policy well worth pursuing. But so is federalism, and states have been doing pretty nice work expanding choice by themselves. Why introduce these unconstitutional dangers?  

The president just announced his pick to chair the Federal Reserve System. Subject to Senate confirmation, current Fed governor Jerome “Jay” Powell will succeed Janet Yellen as Fed chair in February 2018. Market reaction to this announcement has been sanguine, with commentators describing Powell as the “continuity candidate.”

It is perhaps strange that Powell should be so-described, when Janet Yellen was still in the running for a second term until very recently. The point, though, is that Powell’s views are much closer to Yellen’s than the other candidates interviewed by the president — former Fed governor Kevin Warsh and Stanford economist John B. Taylor — either of whom might have heralded a departure from the status quo.

Powell is often characterized as a moderate dove or neutral on the path of interest rates. He is seen to mirror Chair Yellen in many respects, having supported every move made by the Fed since his appointment to the Fed Board in 2012. What’s more, Powell has already been confirmed by the Senate twice: once to complete Frederic Mishkin’s term as Fed governor, and again in 2014 for his own 14-year term. This fact surely wasn’t lost on an administration desperate for policy wins: a twice-confirmed Fed governor, who is a Republican, is likely to face the easiest confirmation process.

As chair, it is unlikely that Powell will make significant changes to the Fed’s normalization plan. The Fed has been painstakingly deliberate in communicating its intentions about interest rates and the balance sheet; Powell, who supports “forward guidance” as a policy tool, will not want to disrupt that. And with historically low volatility in financial markets right now, Powell won’t want to risk another “Taper Tantrum” that would mar the beginning of his tenure as Fed chair.

None of this means there won’t be any changes at the Fed once Powell is in charge. For one thing, Powell is skeptical about some post-crisis financial regulations. He testified recently that there is room for relaxing or even eliminating elements of newly-imposed regulations stemming from Dodd-Frank. Powell has been particularly outspoken on the need to exempt small banks from regulations designed to apply to large financial institutions. In private, Powell has also voiced concerns that even the most well-intentioned regulations can have unseen, adverse effects.

One worry about Powell is how he would handle a recession, or — even worse — another financial crisis. He is a lawyer by training and was a partner at private equity firm The Carlyle Group before coming to the Fed. Nevertheless, his former colleagues note that he devoted himself to learning macroeconomics and was quick to come to grips with the intricacies of monetary policy. Powell is also known to lean on the Fed’s staff for guidance — a detail that suggests he will lead by consensus.

That said, Powell has gone further than many of his colleagues on the subject of monetary policy rules. In a speech last February, Powell closed by discussing the usefulness of such rules. He highlighted the Cleveland Fed’s rules-based dashboard, and suggested it was the type of analytical tool the FOMC ought to use to guide monetary policy. In short, Powell sees value in using rules as benchmarks that can improve the analysis performed by the central bank. John Taylor, the father of the most famous monetary rule, has expressed support for such a strategy.

Powell ended that February speech by saying, “Policy should be systematic, but not automatic.”  If the Fed delivers on that promise under his leadership, it will be taking a step in the right direction.

[Cross-posted from Alt-M.org]

Insider trading law makes no sense.  As I have argued, the current rules are incredibly convoluted and make it difficult for individuals to be sure they are on the right side of the law.  This is a problem given the fact that an insider trading conviction can carry up to ten years in prison (and potentially more).  But one of the difficulties that leads to such convoluted lawmaking is the fact that there is no unifying justification for why some trades are permitted and others are not.  Many people have a gut reaction to insider trading, feeling that it is somehow wrong or dishonest.  And there may be something to that, but current law fails to adequately address the “why.”  Why is this trade based on material nonpublic information criminal while this other one, also based on material nonpublic information, is not? The result is a bizarre patchwork of “dos” and “don’ts.”

This confusion is illustrated beautifully by new research suggesting that an SEC rule intended to prevent conflicts of interest among staff has actually had the perverse effect of causing staff to profit from their knowledge as insiders of the SEC.  Specifically, SEC staff are required to divest themselves of holdings in companies before they begin investigations of those companies.  At first glance, this makes sense.  It is clearly unseemly for a government official to have a financial stake in a company she is investigating. 


But news of an SEC investigation can have a huge impact on stock price.  As seen in a few examples in the graphs below, regardless of what an investigation might find, the mere fact that one has been started can significantly lower the value of a company’s shares.  An undisclosed impending investigation is clearly material nonpublic information.

 

Boeing shares closed down 6.8% on news of the SEC investigation. (Chart: Yahoo Finance)

 

CBL & Associates shares fell 12.1% on news of the SEC investigation. (Chart: Yahoo Finance)

 

Hain Celestial Group shares opened down >13%, closing down 8% after news of SEC investigation. (Chart: Yahoo Finance)

For this reason, if an actual company insider dumped shares before an investigation became public, it is likely that insider would be accused of insider trading.  While there may be an argument that, for example, the CEO of a company guilty of wrongdoing should not be able to run up profits before the company goes off a cliff, it’s important to note that many “insiders” are not in control of the company at all.  For example, a lawyer can be considered to be an “insider” for the purposes of insider trading law and therefore barred from using confidential information to trade in a client’s securities.

As I have discussed elsewhere, the rationale for criminalizing insider trading is often that it undermines confidence in the market.  If investors suspect they are trading with people who have unique and otherwise unavailable information, they will be wary of entering the market at all.  But from the buyer’s perspective, what is the difference between buying from an insider who knows of an impending investigation and buying from an SEC official who is leading that investigation?

To be clear, I don’t think that any SEC staff member who divests herself of stock pursuant to this rule is doing anything wrong.  I also believe the rule itself was written with the best intentions.  At this point, I don’t even have a firm recommendation for how the SEC should handle staff stock holdings.  It’s possible that the best solution is for SEC staff to be barred from holding individual securities.  But there are other considerations at play that may weigh against such a rule.

My point is simply that the result of this SEC rule highlights the muddiness of insider trading law and its underlying rationale (or lack thereof).  I find it difficult to distinguish the effect on the market of an insider selling stock ahead of an unannounced investigation and an SEC staffer doing the same.  Our laws should criminalize only that behavior that causes a clear and substantial harm.  Unless the effects of this SEC rule can be distinguished from the effects of similar behavior by a company insider, neither should trigger criminal liability.

The alleged attacker in Tuesday’s Halloween terrorist attack in New York City that murdered eight people and injured 12 was Sayfullo Habibullaevic Saipov, an immigrant from Uzbekistan.  Saipov entered the United States in 2010 on a green card he won through the Diversity Immigrant Visa Program (also known as the diversity visa or green card lottery).  Many commenters on the attack, including President Trump, have partially blamed the diversity visa for this terrorist attack.  This post will explain some of the basics of the diversity visa, the countries-of-origin for those who enter on it, their incarceration rates, and terrorism risks.

The Diversity Visa

Congress created the diversity visa as part of the Immigration Act of 1990, in order to provide lawful immigration opportunities for Irish immigrants who were fleeing an economic crisis in their home country.  Then-Congressman Chuck Schumer (D-NY) was important in pushing for the idea to be included in the bi-partisan 1990 Immigration Act, which Congress passed by huge majorities and President George H.W. Bush signed. 

Fifty thousand green cards are awarded through the diversity lottery each year, which is run in early May.  Principal applicants for the diversity visa must have at least a high school education, two years of work experience, and not be inadmissible under U.S. immigration law in order to receive a diversity visa.  The principal applicants may bring their spouse and minor unmarried children with them, but they do not count against the 50,000 cap.  Those who enter the running for the diversity visa lottery may only be from certain countries that sent fewer than 50,000 non-diversity visa immigrants to the United States in the five years prior to the lottery.

Countries of Origin for the Diversity Visa

In 2015, about 9.4 million people entered the lottery for those 50,000 green cards.  They had about five million minor unmarried children and spouses.  Citizens from countries other than Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, China (mainland-born), Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, South Korea, United Kingdom (except Northern Ireland) and its dependent territories, and Vietnam were eligible to apply for the 2018 diversity visa.

About one million people gained lawful permanent residency status through diversity visas from 1993 through 2015 (Table 1 at end of post).  Saipov is from Uzbekistan, which has sent 29,665 immigrants on the diversity visa, which accounts for about 43 percent of the total number of green cards issued to Uzbeks since 1993.  Only Algerian, Bulgarian, and Albanian immigrants were more likely to enter on a diversity visa.  Ethiopia, Nigeria, Egypt, Ukraine, Albania, Bangladesh, Ghana, Bulgaria, and Morocco all sent more diversity visa immigrants to the United States than Uzbekistan.

Like other immigration liberalizations that Congress intended to apply to only Europeans, the composition of the diversity visa quickly morphed when it contacted reality.  Europeans won a full 91 percent of all diversity visas in 1993, the first year the program was in operation (Figure 1).  In 2015, only 24 percent of diversity immigrants came from Europe while 30 percent came from Asia and 41 percent from Africa (Figure 2).  As for the Irish, only 12,221 won the lottery in 1993 while 45 won in 2015.

Figure 1

Diversity Visa Admissions by Continent of Origin, 1993

Sources: State Department and Department of Homeland Security.

 

Figure 2

Diversity Visa Admissions by Continent of Origin, 2015

Sources: State Department and Department of Homeland Security.

The share of diversity visas issued to Europeans fell precipitously after 1994 when the Irish economy started to recover (Figure 3).

Figure 3

European Share of Diversity Visa

Sources: State Department and Department of Homeland Security.

 

Terrorism

Many immigrants to the United States initially enter on one type of visa and then adjust their status to a green card or lawful permanent residency.  A foreigner who is lawfully present on U.S. soil can apply for the diversity visa if they are otherwise eligible.  That is exactly what the wife of Egyptian-born Hesham Mohamed Hedayet did.  He originally entered on a tourist visa, later applied for asylum, and only gained a green card when his wife won the diversity visa.  Hedayet murdered two and injured four in a terrorist attack at Los Angeles International Airport in 2002.  If he intended to carry out an attack prior to entering the United States, the diversity visa did not give him the opportunity because he was already here.  Assuming he intended to carry out an attack before arriving, and there is no evidence of that as he was here for a decade before he murdered two people, the diversity visa was not the potential weak link in the vetting system.  

Syed Harris Ahmed from Pakistan and Abdurasul Juraboev from Uzbekistan entered with diversity visas and were also convicted of planning terrorist attacks on U.S. soil.  A handful of immigrants who had diversity visas at one point were convicted of material support for terrorism or other offenses aimed at supporting foreign terrorists.  Hedayet is the only deadly terrorist who had a diversity visa at some point in his immigration history, although he did not enter on it – he murdered 2 people, or about 0.07 percent of all those killed by a foreign-born terrorist in an attack on U.S. soil from 1975-Halloween 2017.

The diversity visa is not an efficient way for terrorists to enter the country.  As mentioned above, about 9.4 million people entered the lottery for 50,000 green cards in 2015.  If a terrorist lives in a country whose nationals can apply, he or she would have had a 1 in 188 chance of winning the lottery in 2015.  The terrorist would then have to get through the normal procedures applied to every green card applicant.  Those are not attractive odds for a terrorist intent on attacking U.S. soil.  Furthermore, there is no indication that Saipov intended to commit a terrorist attack before coming to the United States.  Officials said that Saipov began planning his attack a year ago and then decided to use a truck two months ago, long after he entered in 2010.

The diversity visa is not a wise choice for foreign-born terrorists who concoct their plans overseas.  The small number of people murdered by foreign-born terrorists who actually entered on the visa, eight out of 3,037 since 1975, shows just how rarely it is used for such purposes.  Even then, betting vetting would have stopped Saipov as his terrorism plans were recent.  Based entirely on the New York Halloween terrorist attack, about 177,394 diversity visas have been granted for each person murdered in a terrorist attack on U.S. soil by someone who entered on such a visa.

Crime

Public safety also includes crime.  The American Community Survey reports the number of people incarcerated by their country of birth but not the particular visa they entered on.  The 2015 incarceration rates for immigrants from the 20 countries that sent the greatest number of diversity immigrants from 1993 to 2015 are all lower than the incarceration rate for native-born Americans (Figure 4).  The number of Uzbeks incarcerated is so small that it is statistically indistinguishable from zero.  The 2015 incarceration rate for immigrants from these 20 countries is 0.28 percent – about one-fifth of the native incarceration rate. 

Figure 4

Incarceration Rates by Country of Birth, Ages 18-54.  

Source: Author’s analysis of the 2015 1-year American Community Survey data. Special thanks to Michelangelo Landgrave for assembling these numbers.

Immigrants from the top 20 diversity visa dominant sending countries are less likely to be incarcerated than native-born Americans (Figure 5).  All of these 20 countries together have an incarceration rate of 0.20 percent – about one-eighth that of native-born Americans.  Figure 5 shows the 2015 incarceration rates for immigrants from the top 20 countries that sent the highest percentage of diversity visa immigrants relative to all who earned a green card.  Benin and the Democratic Republic of the Congo sent a higher proportion of diversity visa immigrants, relative to all immigrants they sent, than two of the countries in Figure 5, but their U.S. populations are so small that they aren’t counted in the American Community Survey.  I filled that gap by choosing countries with the next highest percentage of diversity immigrants relative to all immigrants.

Figure 5

Incarceration Rates by Country of Birth for Diversity Visa Dominant Countries, Ages 18-54

Source: Author’s analysis of the 2015 1-year American Community Survey data. Special thanks to Michelangelo Landgrave for assembling these numbers.

 

Conclusion

The diversity visa is a relatively small green card category that has allowed in about a million legal immigrant principals since 1993, or about 5 percent of the total.  As far as we know, immigrants who entered on the diversity visa are responsible for committing one terrorist attack on U.S. soil that murdered eight people.  Foreign-born people from countries that have sent many diversity visa immigrants to the United States have lower incarceration rates than native-born Americans.  Calls to end the diversity visa based on a single deadly terrorist attack are premature. 

 

Table 1

Diversity Visa Admissions by Country of Origin, 1993-2015

  All Green Cards Diversity Percent of Immigrants on Diversity Percent of Diversity Immigrants Relative to All Diversity Visas Algeria 21,728 11,175 51.43% 1.18% Bulgaria 70,332 33,898 48.20% 3.59% Albania 90,121 42,419 47.07% 4.50% Uzbekistan 68,364 29,665 43.39% 3.15% Togo 22,931 9,857 42.99% 1.05% Lithuania 26,674 11,107 41.64% 1.18% Benin 4,774 1,954 40.93% 0.21% Morocco 76,112 30,398 39.94% 3.22% Cameroon 47,951 16,297 33.99% 1.73% Tajikistan 4,867 1,644 33.78% 0.17% Congo, Democratic Republic 26,873 8,852 32.94% 0.94% Egypt 148,609 48,178 32.42% 5.11% Ethiopia 200,417 60,194 30.03% 6.38% Nepal 94,466 28,025 29.67% 2.97% Turkmenistan 3,171 915 28.86% 0.10% Congo, Republic 14,611 4,026 27.55% 0.43% Armenia 52,321 14,297 27.33% 1.52% Kenya 103,303 27,094 26.23% 2.87% Ghana 132,664 34,755 26.20% 3.69% Nigeria 214,372 56,049 26.15% 5.94% Romania 100,436 25,845 25.73% 2.74% Turkey 77,644 19,148 24.66% 2.03% Fiji 26,759 6,475 24.20% 0.69% Sierra Leone 38,890 8,969 23.06% 0.95% Belarus 45,388 10,314 22.72% 1.09% Georgia 20,966 4,583 21.86% 0.49% Kyrgyzstan 9,643 2,099 21.77% 0.22% Niger 4,845 994 20.52% 0.11% Sudan 53,311 10,695 20.06% 1.13% Burkina Faso 4,727 917 19.40% 0.10% Moldova 37,510 7,236 19.29% 0.77% Ukraine 253,865 47,554 18.73% 5.04% Sri Lanka 32,408 6,061 18.70% 0.64% Liberia 73,123 13,377 18.29% 1.42% Bangladesh 217,098 38,833 17.89% 4.12% Macedonia 17,042 2,842 16.68% 0.30% Mongolia 7,640 1,232 16.13% 0.13% Azerbaijan 19,451 3,077 15.82% 0.33% Cote d’Ivoire 20,631 3,013 14.60% 0.32% Kazakhstan 27,516 4,013 14.58% 0.43% Madagascar 1,124 161 14.32% 0.02% Eritrea 23,113 3,143 13.60% 0.33% Guinea-Bissau 1,580 211 13.35% 0.02% Switzerland 16,845 2,169 12.88% 0.23% Kosovo 4,218 538 12.75% 0.06% Libya 5,133 632 12.31% 0.07% Latvia 9,532 1,131 11.87% 0.12% Serbia 4,255 488 11.47% 0.05% Uganda 17,215 1,969 11.44% 0.21% Rwanda 6,752 762 11.29% 0.08% Ireland 29,032 3,250 11.19% 0.34% Saudi Arabia 25,323 2,831 11.18% 0.30% Tunisia 7,368 822 11.16% 0.09% Poland 202,289 22,484 11.11% 2.38% Germany 138,880 15,271 11.00% 1.62% Czechoslovakia (former) 12,752 1,327 10.41% 0.14% Qatar 2,592 267 10.30% 0.03% Mauritius 1,428 147 10.29% 0.02% South Africa 57,953 5,761 9.94% 0.61% Guinea 15,483 1,537 9.93% 0.16% New Zealand 18,383 1,797 9.78% 0.19% Russia 256,770 25,041 9.75% 2.66% Papua New Guinea 418 40 9.57% 0.00% Hungary 22,723 2,171 9.55% 0.23% Soviet Union (former) 195,502 18,299 9.36% 1.94% Gabon 1,684 156 9.26% 0.02% Iran 232,402 21,057 9.06% 2.23% Malawi 2,064 186 9.01% 0.02% Tanzania 16,922 1,524 9.01% 0.16% Senegal 17,942 1,578 8.80% 0.17% Oman 1,378 121 8.78% 0.01% United Arab Emirates 13,215 1,155 8.74% 0.12% Australia 48,126 4,167 8.66% 0.44% Austria 8,784 758 8.63% 0.08% Estonia 4,847 403 8.31% 0.04% Czech Republic 6,402 517 8.08% 0.05% Greece 20,343 1,612 7.92% 0.17% Iceland 2,005 152 7.58% 0.02% Botswana 791 59 7.46% 0.01% Chad 1,405 103 7.33% 0.01% Zambia 8,201 594 7.24% 0.06% Finland 7,022 498 7.09% 0.05% Sweden 22,971 1,622 7.06% 0.17% Djibouti 1,190 82 6.89% 0.01% Zimbabwe 13,314 893 6.71% 0.09% France 74,745 4,993 6.68% 0.53% Slovakia 3,757 247 6.57% 0.03% Indonesia 50,330 3,164 6.29% 0.34% Italy 52,046 3,197 6.14% 0.34% Curacao 49 3 6.12% 0.00% Cyprus 2,532 154 6.08% 0.02% Belgium 11,467 660 5.76% 0.07% Mali 6,722 365 5.43% 0.04% Netherlands 25,919 1,396 5.39% 0.15% Tonga 6,040 286 4.74% 0.03% Japan 133,350 5,749 4.31% 0.61% Burundi 5,842 244 4.18% 0.03% Spain 34,765 1,439 4.14% 0.15% Kuwait 20,340 831 4.09% 0.09% Burma 121,428 4,865 4.01% 0.52% Denmark 9,771 387 3.96% 0.04% Angola 2,545 100 3.93% 0.01% Namibia 872 34 3.90% 0.00% Croatia 17,749 679 3.83% 0.07% Macau 3,470 128 3.69% 0.01% Palau 136 5 3.68% 0.00% Israel 79,216 2,902 3.66% 0.31% Cambodia 55,809 2,026 3.63% 0.21% Venezuela 147,742 5,337 3.61% 0.57% Norway 6,651 226 3.40% 0.02% Peru 257,629 8,650 3.36% 0.92% Pakistan 304,020 10,179 3.35% 1.08% Luxembourg 471 15 3.18% 0.00% Slovenia 1,605 48 2.99% 0.01% Taiwan 161,568 4,639 2.87% 0.49% Montenegro 1,394 40 2.87% 0.00% Portugal 23,851 679 2.85% 0.07% Yemen 49,556 1,358 2.74% 0.14% Monaco 78 2 2.56% 0.00% Singapore 14,626 370 2.53% 0.04% Lesotho 251 6 2.39% 0.00% Somalia 99,780 2,342 2.35% 0.25% Bahrain 1,954 45 2.30% 0.00% Malta 1,001 23 2.30% 0.00% Hong Kong 83,306 1,889 2.27% 0.20% Malaysia 39,194 810 2.07% 0.09% Seychelles 195 4 2.05% 0.00% Unknown 28,065 535 1.91% 0.06% Bolivia 40,859 783 1.92% 0.08% Argentina 81,114 1,521 1.88% 0.16% Mozambique 1,112 20 1.80% 0.00% Aruba 668 11 1.65% 0.00% Brunei 429 7 1.63% 0.00% Gambia 10,282 167 1.62% 0.02% Syria 54,920 871 1.59% 0.09% Swaziland 318 5 1.57% 0.00% Jordan 73,909 1,125 1.52% 0.12% Equatorial Guinea 211 3 1.42% 0.00% Mauritania 6,089 85 1.40% 0.01% Afghanistan 52,579 732 1.39% 0.08% Lebanon 72,017 992 1.38% 0.11% Paraguay 7,584 94 1.24% 0.01% United Kingdom 234,161 2,866 1.22% 0.30% Cuba 630,056 7,571 1.20% 0.80% Brazil 205,681 2,446 1.19% 0.26% Ecuador 204,339 2,372 1.16% 0.25% Central African Republic 1,335 15 1.12% 0.00% Trinidad and Tobago 85,419 953 1.12% 0.10% South Sudan 277 3 1.08% 0.00% Suriname 3,705 37 1.00% 0.00% Bahamas 7,664 76 0.99% 0.01% Chile 36,196 343 0.95% 0.04% Cape Verde 26,687 250 0.94% 0.03% Thailand 127,313 1,004 0.79% 0.11% Canada 298,671 2,316 0.78% 0.25% Uruguay 18,691 128 0.68% 0.01% Bosnia-Herzegovina 121,026 801 0.66% 0.08% United States 3,193 20 0.63% 0.00% Costa Rica 37,479 231 0.62% 0.02% Barbados 13,235 81 0.61% 0.01% Samoa 3,753 22 0.59% 0.00% Panama 33,178 192 0.58% 0.02% Dominica 8,194 42 0.51% 0.00% Iraq 174,316 805 0.46% 0.09% Grenada 13,818 56 0.41% 0.01% Belize 16,526 66 0.40% 0.01% Saint Lucia 9,957 38 0.38% 0.00% Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 6,046 20 0.33% 0.00% Nicaragua 131,175 432 0.33% 0.05% Honduras 135,484 435 0.32% 0.05% Guyana 135,606 411 0.30% 0.04% French Polynesia 337 1 0.30% 0.00% Antigua-Barbuda 7,117 21 0.30% 0.00% British Virgin Islands 878 2 0.23% 0.00% Saint Kitts-Nevis 3,564 8 0.22% 0.00% Anguilla 463 1 0.22% 0.00% Guatemala 255,110 437 0.17% 0.05% Laos 28,649 36 0.13% 0.00% India 1,198,749 1,421 0.12% 0.15% Bermuda 1,717 2 0.12% 0.00% Haiti 396,924 292 0.07% 0.03% Bhutan 49,881 34 0.07% 0.00% China, People’s Republic 1,206,575 793 0.07% 0.08% Colombia 414,973 248 0.06% 0.03% Korea, South 152,483 68 0.04% 0.01% Dominican Republic 648,938 168 0.03% 0.02% Philippines 1,074,811 162 0.02% 0.02% Jamaica 359,859 53 0.01% 0.01% Vietnam 600,992 38 0.01% 0.00% Mexico 3,175,771 183 0.01% 0.02% El Salvador 432,535 20 0.00% 0.00% All other countries1 73 0 0.00% 0.00% Cayman Islands 704 0 0.00% 0.00% Korea, North 432 0 0.00% 0.00% Marshall Islands 586 0 0.00% 0.00% Montserrat 834 0 0.00% 0.00% Netherlands Antilles (former) 67 0 0.00% 0.00% Serbia and Montenegro (former) 232 0 0.00% 0.00% Sint Maarten 90 0 0.00% 0.00% Turks and Caicos Islands 38 0 0.00% 0.00% Total 19,101,716 943,049    

 Sources: State Department and Department of Homeland Security.

In Holland, Michigan, Susan Gray wants to house homeless teen boys in a church she bought. She bought the property first, and only later discovered there weren’t adequate support services for the vulnerable homeless teen population in her area: the closest alternative homeless shelter is around 30 miles away.

But Gray’s plan to use the church to house homeless kids is receiving pushback from the local Planning Commission, because the zoning ordinance doesn’t permit group homes in this location.

Gray’s experience is far from unusual. Just last week, in Harvard, Illinois, the city zoning commission roundly rejected a plan to build housing for elderly residents. And in St. Cloud, Minnesota, a church has undergone a lengthy legal battle because the city takes issue with its strategy of using tiny homes on church property to house the homeless.

Land use regulations might seem benign, but they affect lives in countless ways. Zoning regulations, the most common form of land use regulations, invest broad discretionary power in municipalities. But those same municipalities are subject to intense interest group pressure. It shouldn’t be surprising, then, that municipalities often use zoning and land use regulations as a weapon to block housing for low and middle income residents.

This problem continues to grow. My studies show that the quantity of annually generated land use regulations more than doubled in the United States between 1980 and 2010 alone, as measured by related appellate court cases. The quantity of zoning regulation nearly doubled during the same three-decade period. The national population only grew 37 percent during this timeframe, so regulatory growth far outpaces population growth.

Of course, this only matters if zoning and land use regulations have a negative impact on key outcomes. The general academic consensus is that they do: whether it is racial and economic segregation or geographic mobility and economic growth, restrictive zoning and land use regulation create a problem or significantly exacerbate it. For example, a recent National Bureau of Economic Research study suggests that if just San Jose, San Francisco, and New York City adopted the median level of land use regulation, U.S. GDP would increase by 8.9%. Another study suggests that over 50 percent of the difference in levels of segregation between strictly-zoned Boston and lenient Houston can be attributed to zoning regulations.

Restrictive zoning is also associated with a reduction in multi-family housing permits, similar to the kind sought by Susan Gray in her homeless boys’ shelter. Fewer multi-family housing permits means a reduction in housing supply.

Basic economic theory suggests that constraining housing supply increases home prices. And indeed, my research indicates that zoning and land use regulation do that. The relationship between zoning and land use regulations and home prices is highly statistically significant, or in other words unlikely to occur based on random chance alone.

The academic literature on zoning and land use regulation support this view. Harvard economist Edward Glaeser estimated the cost of the regulatory burden associated with zoning regulation in markets like Manhattan, Los Angeles, and San Francisco is between 30-50% of the cost of the price of housing there. Another study indicates that each additional regulatory measure in California is associated with a 4.5% increase in the cost of owner-occupied housing.

But sometimes, the data and associated jargon obscure the true human cost of the problem: zoning regulation and discretionary permitting processes result in fewer safe houses for homeless teens, less housing for seniors and the elderly, and barriers to economic opportunity for low-skill workers.

There is hope for addressing the problem, at least if legislators and activists are willing to push for radical reform rather than middling changes. This can be done in a variety of ways, probably most effectively at the state level. For example, states can curtail their State Zoning Enabling Acts, which grant cities nearly unlimited jurisdiction over land use regulation. States can make local government responsible for compensating property owners for regulatory takings associated with zoning land for low-value economic uses, such as single-family homes.

These problems are not easy to solve, which is partly why politicians tend to look for easier solutions in addressing housing problems, like increasing housing subsidies. And in fact, twice as many federal housing subsidies per capita are concentrated in the most restrictively zoned states as compared with the least restrictively zoned states. But the human cost of zoning can’t simply be wished away with  a Band-Aid solution.

Surely homeless teens, seniors, and low-skill workers deserve our attention in addressing the problem. For them, half-measures haven’t cut it and never will.

The Environmental Working Group (EWG) has released new data reaffirming the scandal that is federal farm policy. The government pumps out billions of dollars a year in subsidies to farm businesses, and the giveaways mainly benefit the richest farmers.

The EWG found that, “Between 1995 and 2016, the top 10 percent received 77 percent of all ‘covered commodity’ subsidies … The top 1 percent received 26 percent of all subsidies, or $1.7 million per recipient.”

The top subsidy recipient was Deline Farms Partnership, which received more than $4 million in 2016. EWG notes that the median household income in Charleston, Mo., where Deline Farms is based, is just $27,000.

Farm subsidies are not only reverse Robin Hood policies, they also always seem to cost more than Congress promises. EWG notes, “the projected cost to taxpayers of farm subsidy programs from 2016 to 2018 is roughly $7.5 billion more than the CBO predicted when the current farm bill was enacted in 2014.”

What’s the solution? Bipartisan spending cuts. EWG: “Sens. Jeff Flake, R-Ariz., and Jeanne Shaheen, D-N.H., and Reps. Jim Sensenbrenner, R-Wisc., and Ron Kind, D-Wisc., have proposed legislation to cap all farm subsidies, subject all farm subsidies to a means test, and require the USDA to disclose the names of all farm subsidy recipients.”

For a discussion of the history and economics of federal farm subsidies, see this DownsizingGovernment study.

In their tax plan released today, Republicans have abandoned their effort to cut the top individual income tax rate of 40 percent. That is unfortunate, because the highest tax rates do the most economic damage. Apparently, the GOP backtracked on that reform because of revenue concerns, and because of fear of “tax cuts for the rich” complaints from liberal critics. The critics will probably make similar complaints about the new plan.

Liberals always seem to want more taxes on the rich and more redistribution, no matter how much we already have. The United States already has the most “progressive” system of household taxes in the OECD. At least, that is what the OECD found in a 2008 study, Chapter 4. Among the 24 countries they examined, they found that “Taxation is most progressively distributed in the United States.” That is probably still true today.

The table below is a compressed version of one from the OECD report. The column on the left shows the percent of taxes paid by the highest-earning 10 percent of households. The OECD includes individual income taxes and employee social security taxes. At 45 percent, the top 10 percent in the United States pay the highest tax share of any OECD country.

Partly, that is because the top 10 percent of Americans earn a large share of the income, as shown in the second column. But, it is also because our government nails high earners with high rates, which is what the third column reveals. The third column is the ratio of the first and second columns, and is one measure of how “progressive” the tax system is. A ratio of “1.00” would be proportionality, where the top 10 percent of earners pay 10 percent of the taxes, which is the case in Sweden.

The U.S. has the highest third-column ratio at 1.35, which indicates substantially more progressivity than the OECD average of 1.11. “Progressivity” sounds like a nice thing, but it means a system than penalizes people more the harder they work, and it means a system that is unfair to the most productive people in the economy.

Note that the OECD data is a decade old, but the income tax share paid by the top 10 percent is as high as ever in the United States, as shown here. Further note that the top U.S. individual income tax rate is substantially higher than the average of a group of 80 countries, as shown here.

The Cato 2017 Free Speech and Tolerance Survey finds nearly two-thirds (61%) of Clinton voters agree that it’s “hard” to be friends with people who voted for Donald Trump, while 38% disagree. However, Trump voters don’t feel a similar animus toward Clinton voters. Instead, a majority (64%) of Trump voters do not think that it’s hard to be friends with Clinton voters while 34% believe it is difficult.

Full survey results and report found here.

 

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The Cato Institute 2017 Free Speech and Tolerance Survey was designed and conducted by the Cato Institute in collaboration with YouGov. YouGov collected responses online August 15-23, 2017 from a national sample of 2,300 Americans 18 years of age and older. The margin of error for the survey is +/- 3.00 percentage points at the 95% level of confidence. 

Last month, Secretary of Defense James Mattis urged Congress to allow the Pentagon to reduce its excess overhead. Mattis has requested this authority before – as have at least four of his predecessors (Carter, Panetta, Hagel and Gates) – but the latest request accompanies a new Pentagon report that assesses the military’s infrastructure needs based on a much larger force structure than the one it has today. Even if the military, and especially the Army, were to grow back to the levels seen when the United States was actively fighting wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq (2012), the DoD is carrying 19 percent excess capacity. Such waste clearly impacts military effectiveness. As Mattis explained in a letter accompanying the report, “every unnecessary facility we maintain requires us to cut capabilities elsewhere.”

Although the leading Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee, Adam Smith (D-WA), and a handful of other lawmakers, agree with Mattis’s assessment, and would allow the Pentagon to cut such obviously wasteful spending, many others in Congress remain opposed to a new round of base closures. Kay Granger (R-TX), chairwoman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense said in May that she had “never seen [BRAC] save much money.” Sen. Jim Inhofe (R-OK) called plans for base closure “disappointing” and “dangerous.” “Clearly, base closure rounds,” Inhofe wrote in September, “cost the American taxpayers an exorbitant amount of money upfront and take years to recoup the initial investment.”

This is incorrect. The closure of hundreds of unnecessary military bases in five successive BRAC rounds have saved American taxpayers billions of dollars. Even the much-maligned fifth and final BRAC round, initiated in 2005, is expected to deliver net savings in 2018. Secretary Mattis explained in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in June that a “properly focused base closure effort” could generate $2 billion or more annually.

But we shouldn’t assess the benefits of base closures solely on the basis of possible savings to the Department of Defense; that amounts to looking through the wrong end of the telescope. Although BRAC does generate real savings, the greater economic benefits accrue to communities near affected bases when they put underutilized facilities to more productive uses. In that sense, military bases aren’t closed, they’re opened.

I visited such a place on Wednesday: the former Glenview Naval Air Station, about 20 miles northwest of Chicago. During World War II, the Navy trained pilots to land on aircraft carriers, in this case two converted passenger steamers on Lake Michigan. The Navy didn’t have actual aircraft carriers to spare. More than 17,000 naval aviators underwent training at Glenview, including George H.W. Bush.

But the naval air station was included in the 1993 BRAC list, and Glenview took charge of clearing some 1100 acres, funded infrastructure improvements, and subdivided and sold parcels to private developers. About 400 acres were preserved as open space and parkland.

To the untrained eye, few would realize that there was ever a naval base here. I’ve been aware of Glenview for years, even though I had never visited before. I knew what to look for. The street names betray the area’s storied past. Independence and Constitution Avenues are pretty common, and one even encounters the occasional Patriot Boulevard. But one doesn’t often find Nimitz Drive, Kitty Hawk Lane, or Admiral Court in a typical American subdivision. The beautiful homes, many with three-car garages, and backing to golf courses and open space, command top dollar on the real estate market. A review of a few of the listings for the houses with For Sale signs on their front lawns found asking prices between $760,000 and $875,000. Phoebe Co, a realtor with Berkshire Hathaway, explained that condos in the area go for as low as $300,000, but some of the newer townhomes sell for $800,000 or more. Single family homes selling for more than $1 million are not atypical.   

Glenview is a coveted location not merely for its pleasant neighborhoods, and ample green space with bike and walking paths. It is also in close proximity to the headquarters of a number of Fortune 500 companies (we drove past Allstate’s sprawling campus on the way back to O’Hare), and an easy commute to downtown Chicago – about 40 minutes by train during rush hour.

The centerpiece of Glenview’s redevelopment of the former base property is The Glen Town Center, which includes retail shops at street level, and apartments above them for rent. These properties are ringed by attractive brick rowhomes. Here one finds the most visible remaining remnant of the former base: the air station’s control tower is now home to a Dick’s Sporting Goods, a Carter’s children clothing store, and a Von Maur department store. Three statues – a pilot, a sailor, and a ground crewman – stand around a fountain across the street. Painted plaques by the store fronts celebrate the many units that served at the base.

Jeanne Fields, assistant property manager for the Aloft apartments, explained that renters value the convenience of living so close to shopping and dining.

The Glen is “very unique,” Fields said. “You don’t usually have urban style living in the suburbs.” People who want city living without the city can get it at The Glen. And they’re willing to pay: rentals start at $1600 for a 1 bedroom, and go as high as $5000 for the largest two-bedroom unit. Fields reported that more than 90 percent of the units are currently occupied.

I strolled around The Glen with my colleague Harrison Moar, stopped in at the ubiquitous Starbucks, and ate lunch at the Yard House (allegedly home of the “World’s Largest Selection of Draft Beers”). The sprawling restaurant can accommodate 250 diners, and seemed surprisingly busy for a Tuesday at Noon. The many families with young children probably weren’t there for the 100+ beers on tap, but Harrison and I might have tried one. Alex at the front told us that this was a pretty typical lunchtime crowd, and that the restaurant was even busier later in the week, and on weekends.

Those who believe that base closures will devastate a local economy need to be aware of cases like Glenview (and Philadelphia, and San Francisco, and San Antonio, and Brunswick). To be sure, some places will take longer to recover (e.g. Brooklyn), and a few might never see economic activity comparable to when the nearby bases boomed (e.g. Limestone, Maine).

But those who would keep unnecessary military bases open in order to shield local communities from the possible negative economic impacts are saying, in effect, that their parochial concerns should outweigh the needs of the nation. And elected officials who doubt that their base will ever be successfully converted betray a curious lack of faith in their own constituents’ ability to make productive use of valuable real estate.

Student protesters at the College of William and Mary recently shut down a campus speaker from the ACLU invited (ironically) to speak about “Students and the First Amendment.” Students explained their shut down was in retaliation for the ACLU’s defense of white nationalists’ free speech rights in Charlottesville, Virginia where a white nationalist rally recently took place. What motivated the students?

The Black Lives Matter of William and Mary student group wrote on their Facebook page, where they live-streamed their shut down of the event: “We want to reaffirm our position of zero tolerance for white supremacy no matter what form it decides to masquerade in.” From these students’ perspective, the ACLU supporting someone’s right to say racist things was as bad as being a racist organization.

The Cato 2017 Free Speech and Tolerance Survey helps shed light on these students’ reasoning. First, nearly half (49%) of current college and graduate students believe that “supporting someone’s right to say racist things is as bad as holding racist views yourself.” This share rises to nearly two-thirds among African Americans (65%) and Latinos (61%) who agree. Far fewer white Americans (34%) share this view.

Next, a majority (55%) of current students and nearly three-fourths of African Americans (75%) and Latinos (72%) believe that hate speech is an act of violence. Conversely, 53% of whites believe it is not.

In addition, 62% of current students and 7 in 10 African Americans and Latinos believe that “our society can prohibit hate speech and still protect free speech.” White Americans are evenly divided on this question.

Taking these results together, it becomes clearer why the William and Mary students reacted as they did. From the students’ perspective, society is capable of protecting our First Amendment rights and curbing hate speech. If that’s true, why protect hate speech? Next, they believe hate speech is itself a violent act. Why would one want to enable violence against others? Consequently, many may conclude that anyone who tries to protect another’s right to engage in hate speech has nefarious intentions or is at least as bad as those espousing the hate. According to this view, protecting hate speech seems unnecessary and damaging. Thus, such a defense of free speech does not appear to be grounded in principle but rather a lack of empathy or even malice.

Understanding the assumptions behind the students’ logic allows for a more productive conversation. For instance, one might ask these students: is it really true that society can simultaneously ban hate speech and protect free speech? If so, how does society decide what speech is hateful and thus should be banned? Additional results from the survey demonstrate that Americans cannot agree what speech is hateful and offensive, which would make it difficult to regulate. This raises the next question: if society can’t agree what speech should be off limits, who gets to decide what speech is hateful and should be banned?

Answers to these questions are complicated and demonstrate why efforts to censor and regulate speech and expression are significantly problematic.

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The Cato Institute 2017 Free Speech and Tolerance Survey was designed and conducted by the Cato Institute in collaboration with YouGov. YouGov collected responses online August 15–23, 2017 from a national sample of 2,300 Americans 18 years of age and older. The margin of error for the survey is +/- 3.00 percentage points at the 95% level of confidence.

When it comes to individual taxes, key Republican legislators seem to think “reform” is mainly about limiting or eliminating certain itemized deductions, rather than about raising revenue in ways that do the least damage to the economy (by minimizing tax distortions and disincentives).

This emphasis on curbing itemized deductions is often compared with the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86), which supposedly “paid for” cutting the top tax rate from 50% to 28% by slashing several itemized deductions. In reality, however, most extra revenue from repealing itemized deductions after 1986 was devoted to raising the standard deduction, leaving total deductions unchanged. This is apparent in the graph below, which shows total deductions – both itemized and standard – as a percentage of Adjusted Gross Income. 

Deductions averaged 23.1% of AGI from 1976 to 1984, and deductions also averaged 23.1% of AGI from 1989 to 1995. In between, the reform merely shifted the timing of deductions. Deductions were pushed forward into 1985-86 to take advantage of those that were about to expire (e.g., the tax-deduction for credit card interest). Moving deductions forward held down deductions briefly in 1987–88 before they climbed back up again.

Note that total deductions were also unaffected by the fact that the maximum marginal benefit of itemized deductions (the amount saved per dollar) had fallen to 28–31% from 1988 to 1992. President Obama proposed to limit itemized deductions to 28% of the amount spent, but we already tried that in 1988–90, without success. Whatever the effect of the 1986 law eliminating several itemized deductions, plus the deep reduction in the marginal tax benefit, both were overwhelmed by the larger standard deduction.  

Standard deductions doubled – from $151 billion in 1986 to over $309 billion in 1989. The only reason that is called “reform” is that politicians only define itemized deductions as “loopholes,” although the standard deduction obviously has the same effect on taxable income. Tax exemption and tax credits are far more valuable than deductions, yet (like the standard deduction) are commonly not described as “loopholes” as a matter of semantic convention (or confusion).   

If the standard deduction soon rises to $24,000 per couple, as the GOP proposes, even couples with a $100,000 income would automatically have higher than average deductions.

The graph also shows that the ratio of deductions to income is clearly cyclical – rising in recessions like 1975 and 2009 because income fell more than deductions, then falling during the 1997–2000 stock boom as incomes (including capital gains and stock options) grew faster than deductions.  

Reynolds’ Law of Taxes says the individual income tax will always hover around 8% of GDP, give or take one percentage point, regardless whether the top tax rate is 28%, 39.6%, 70% or 92%. Now, let’s add Reynolds’ Law of Deductions: Deductions will always hover around 23% of AGI, give or take one percentage point, regardless of whether itemized deductions are expanded, limited, or repealed.

Laws to limit itemized deductions, unlike booms and busts, have never had a noticeable lasting impact, largely because of Congressional fondness for raising standard deductions (and refundable tax credits, a super-loophole not counted here).

The Bush 41 Pease limitation on deductions was an anti-affluence political stunt making little noticeable difference. Revived in 2013, the Pease limits reduce the value of a taxpayer’s itemized deductions by 3% for every dollar of taxable income above $313,800 on a joint return. This adds about a percentage point to the top two marginal rates (and so does the PEP phase-out of personal exemptions). The Pease limits first began to phase-out itemized deductions of “the rich” in 1991, yet total deductions rose to 23.4–23.6% of AGI in 1991–93. The Pease phase-out was reinstated in 2013, yet total deductions remained the same as in 2012. Itemized deductions went down by $50.1 billion in 2013 and standard deductions went up $51.2 billion.

Doubling the standard deduction to $24,000 per couple appeared to be the primary revenue-losing objective of the GOP Big Six plan (losing $890 billion over 10 years by one estimate).  Meanwhile, there have been reports of backpaddling on trial-balloons about ending property tax deductions and curbing contributions to 401(k) plans.  It is not difficult to imagine the end result being that any revenue gained from limiting deductions barely offsets revenue lost by expanding the standard deduction, leaving deductions still stuck around 22–23% of AGI.

That would be like 1986 but with one big difference. In 1986, the top tax rate was cut by 22 percentage points, leaving a nearly-flat 15–28% rate structure. This year, by contrast, high-income taxpayers are not giving up big deductions and personal exemptions for a lower-rate, since the top rate is apparently to stay at 39.6%. Itemized deductions go down, personal exemptions completely vanish, yet targeted tax credits get larger (e.g., for children under age 17) and the standard deduction goes up. Tax-deferred contributions to retirement savings plans may be deeply slashed.  

By rejiggering exemptions, deductions, and credits with essentially no change in the highest, most damaging tax rates, the individual side of the Republican “tax cut” is shaping up as a sizable tax increase for well-educated two-earner couples with college-age kids living in high-cost metropolitan areas, among others.

A study that examined the effects body worn cameras (BWCs) have on police officers in Washington, D.C. has been making the rounds recently. The study’s findings have reinvigorated discussions about BWCs, not least because of its counterintuitive finding that BWCs did not have a statistically significant effect on officers’ use of force or civilian complaints against the police. This finding is worth considering, but the study shouldn’t deter local officials from mandating police BWCs. Even if they don’t change police officers’ behavior, BWCs can, with the right policies in place, provide a much-needed increase in police accountability and transparency.

During the study, officers with the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia were randomly assigned BWCs. Researchers with The Lab @DC, a study team in the D.C. mayor’s office, and Yale University examined use of force incidents and complaints against police officers.

The study did not seek to measure the impact of BWCs’ other benefits such as accountability, transparency, and protection for officers, but rather narrowly measured their impact. In addition to examining how often police officers use force and are the subject of complaints, researchers also studied police discretion and the judicial outcomes related to police charges.

You might expect that officers improved their behavior when they were wearing BWCs. After all, if you know that you’re being filmed you have plenty of incentives to be on your best behavior, whether you’re an officer or a resident. And yet, the recent D.C. body camera study showed that BWCs had no statistically significant effect on officers’ behavior.

This may strike many as odd. But we shouldn’t forget the limitations that restrict researchers looking into the effects of BWCs. Researchers cannot, for instance, insist that when an officer wearing a BWC calls for backup that only officers also wearing BWCs respond. In a situation where two officers are interacting with a resident and only one of the officers is wearing a BWC there is a good chance that the BWC will influence the behavior of the officer not wearing the BWC.

The researchers do not think, however, that this spillover effect affected the results of the experiment. The study notes that there was no statistically significant difference between officer behavior pre- and post-BWC deployment, as the two graphs from the study below show:

If officers not wearing BWCs improved their behavior in the presence of other officers wearing BWCs, we’d expect to see a reduction in use of force and complaints filed after the study began. However, Figure 4 and Figure 5 above show no significant difference.

Thus, even given the limitations of the study design, it appears that BWCs do not at a mass scale reduce the amount of force police officers use or the number of complaints officers receive.

The Washington, D.C. study raises an obvious question: if BWCs have no statistically significant effect on officers’ use of force or complaints, should officers be wearing them?

The answer to that question is “yes.”

First, even if body cameras do not reduce the frequency with which police officers use force, they nonetheless help provide accountability for the minority of officers who engage in serious misconduct, such as the Baltimore police officers caught planting drugs and “re-creating” a crime scene.

Second, BWCs are a tool for increased transparency in American law enforcement. Residents deserve to know how police officers behave, whether their behavior is changed by BWCs or not. At a time when cell phones are ubiquitous and BWCs are a regular feature of police misconduct debates, residents will be increasingly skeptical when a contentious fatal police encounter is not filmed. Even if a bird’s eye view of a police department reveals that BWCs don’t have a statistically significantly effect on police officers’ use of force, that doesn’t mean that same department won’t one day hire a bad police officer who will engage in illegal and deadly misconduct.

Third, BWCs can also protect police officers by  minimizing time spent on baseless complaints against officers by providing clear exculpatory evidence, as was the case when a young woman falsely accused an Albuquerque Police Department officer of sexual assault during a 2014 DWI stop.  

All of these BWCs benefits can only be realized with the appropriate policies in place. Without policies that protect privacy and allow residents to view body camera footage of public interest, body cameras could be used as a surveillance tool.

The authors of the Washington, D.C. study state that their results “suggest that we should recalibrate our expectations of BWCs’ ability to induce large-scale behavioral changes in policing.” But even if BWCs don’t prompt significant changes in police officers’ behavior they are worth mandating anyway. A police department with BWCs governed by the right policies will increase transparency and accountability—a welcome result even if it’s not accompanied by better-behaved police officers.

Sayfullo Saipov, an Uzbek national, killed at least eight people with a truck in New York yesterday. Uzbekistan is a central Asian country north of Afghanistan of almost 30 million people88 percent of whom are Muslim. President Trump did not include Uzbeks in his travel ban released last month, but he is already sounding bellicose, writing that he will not allow ISIS to “enter our country” and that he “ordered Homeland Security to step up our already Extreme Vetting Program,” a phrase which he sometimes uses as shorthand for the travel ban.

But adding Uzbekistan to the travel ban would be unwise for a president whose administration has guided him toward adopting a very specific strategy to defend the ban: that the governments of the banned nationalities fail to meet certain criteria relating to identity management, information sharing, and terrorist activity in their country. As I explained in a post last month, the president did not apply the criteria in any objective way, banning some countries that meet the criteria while not banning many other countries that fail them. But adding yet another country that he himself said just a month ago meets the criteria would further expose the travel ban criteria as the sham that they are.

Uzbekistan does not fail the travel ban criteria that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) created to justify the ban. Here are the nine travel ban criteria grouped into the three DHS categories:

Category 1: Identity management

1) Use of electronic passports embedded with data: Uzbekistan does use an electronic passport. But four travel ban countries—Venezuela, Somalia, Libya, and Iran—also use an e-passport. The president banned Somalia despite its meeting this requirement because some countries fail to recognize Somalia’s electronic data chip. But that’s not the case for Iran’s passport, which meets the International Civil Aviation Organization standards. Uzbekistan’s passport does as well, and it “plans to convert all [older] passports to the new biometric version by July 1, 2018.”

2) Reports lost and stolen passports: INTERPOL reports that only 174 of 190 countries share lost or stolen passport information with its database (on which the United States relies). Unfortunately, it doesn’t report country-by-country compliance. However, INTERPOL praised Uzbekistan this month for cooperating with it on identifying fraudulent and stolen passports. That said, INTERPOL has also called Iranian cooperation on passport theft and abuse “very strong,” and Iranians are banned.

3) Makes available upon request identity-related information: This criterion is vague, but Uzbekistan cooperates with INTERPOL on passport information. According to the U.S. Department of State, Uzbekistan “has actively participated in the C5+1 regional framework of cooperation between the United States and the Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), which includes a program related to countering violent extremism (CVE).”

Category 2: National security information

4) Makes available terrorist and criminal information upon request: Uzbekistan does make available this information. The State Department reports: “Uzbek law enforcement maintains its own terrorist watchlist and contributed to INTERPOL databases.” Further, it reports, “Uzbekistan has worked with multilateral organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime on security issues.”

5) Provides identity document exemplars: There is no public information on this, but given the evidence on passport cooperation, it seems likely that Uzbekistan do provide documents.

6) Allows U.S. government’s receipt of information about passengers and crew traveling to the United States: Uzbekistan encourages this information sharing. The State Department writes, “state airline collects and disseminates advance passenger information. The U.S. Transportation Security Administration conducted several inspections of the Tashkent airport in 2016.” Compliance by other countries with sharing this information was in 2013 “close to 100 percent.”

Category 3: Risk indicators

7) Is a known or potential terrorist safe haven: According to the U.S. Department of State, Uzbekistan is neither a terrorist safe haven nor has it ever been a terrorist safe haven. Terrorist safe havens are defined by the inability or unwillingness of the country’s government to control its territory to prevent terrorist groups from having a safe space to form. This description does not apply to Uzbekistan, which goes to great lengths to prevent terrorist groups from having safe haven and does control its territory. Chad, North Korea, and Iran are not terrorist safe havens either, but are travel ban countries.

8) Is a participant in the Visa Waiver Program that meets all of its requirements: Uzbekistan is not a participant in the VWP, so this criterion likely does not apply to it. None of the other travel ban countries are participants in the VWP.

9) Regularly fails to receive its nationals subject to final orders of removal from the United States: As of May 2017, Uzbekistan did not regularly refuse to receive its nationals subject to final orders of removal, according to federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement. In September, the U.S. government sanctioned four countries for failure to receive its deportees, but Uzbekistan was not on that list either. Of course, of the travel ban countries, only Iran was on the list from May.

The president could always add additional criteria to try to justify including Uzbeks in the travel ban, but any additional criteria would result in the failure of even more countries—many of whom meet the DHS criteria and are allies of the United States. For example, if President Trump added a requirement that no nationals of the country in question have killed anyone in the United States in a terrorist attack, then at least a dozen other countries would have to be added to the travel ban list. Of course, none of the current travel ban countries have nationals that have committed deadly terrorist attacks in the United States since 1975.

Uzbekistan fails none of the requirements outlined by the Department of Homeland Security. If President Trump chooses to add them to the list, it would further expose the travel ban as an arbitrary exercise of the executive whim, not an objective list.

Early in his presidential tenure, Donald Trump tweeted that the national news media is “fake news” and that it is an enemy of the American people. Nearly two-thirds (64%) of Americans do not agree with President Trump that journalists today are an “enemy of the American people,” finds the Cato 2017 Free Speech and Tolerance Survey. Thirty-five percent (35%) side with the president.

However, nearly two-thirds (63%) of Republicans agree that journalists are an enemy of the American people. Such a charge is highly polarizing: 89% of Democrats and 61% of independents do not think journalists are the enemy.

52% of Democrats Say Media Is Doing a Good Job Holding Government Accountable

While Republicans stand out with their negative view of the media, Democrats have uniquely positive evaluations of it. A slim majority (52%) of Democrats say the national news media is doing a good or even an excellent job “holding government accountable.” In contrast, only 24% of independents and 16% of Republicans agree.

Full survey results and report found here.

 

Among all Americans, only a third (33%) agree the news media is doing its job holding government accountable. More than two-thirds (67%) say it is not.

The more a person identifies as liberal, the more likely they are to say the media is doing a good job. Among strong liberals, 59% say the national news media is doing a good or excellent job holding government accountable. In contrast, 87% of strong conservatives say it’s doing a poor or fair job.

Most Americans Perceive Media Bias

Why do Republicans lack confidence in the national news media while Democrats view it positively? Perhaps because most Americans perceive a liberal bias among most major news organizations.[1]

 

Fifty-two percent (52%) of respondents say that the New York Times allows a liberal bias to color its reporting. Fifty percent (50%) feel CNN also succumbs to a liberal media bias. Fifty-nine percent (59%) say that MSNBC also has a liberal bias. Of all the top news organizations included on the survey, only Fox News was perceived to have a conservative bias (56%).

Americans feel their local news stations and broadcast news channels do a better job than cable news in providing balanced reporting. A majority (54%) say their local news station is balanced, without a liberal or a conservative bias. A plurality (42%) also believe that CBS is balanced. Nevertheless, respondents were four times as likely to say CBS has a liberal bias than a conservative bias (40% vs. 10%), and almost twice as likely to say their local station has a liberal bias (23% vs. 14%).

Democrats Believe Media Is Balanced; Republicans See Liberal Bias

Majorities of Democrats believe most major news organizations are balanced in their reporting, including CBS (72%), CNN (55%), the New York Times (55%), as well as their local news station (67%). A plurality (44%) also believe the Wall Street Journal is balanced. The two exceptions are that a plurality (47%) believe MSNBC has a liberal bias (37% believe it’s unbiased) and a strong majority (71%) say Fox has a conservative bias.

Republicans, on the other hand, see things differently. Overwhelming majorities believe liberal bias colors reporting at the New York Times (80%), CNN (81%), CBS (73%), and MSNBC (80%). A plurality also feel the Wall Street Journal (48%) has a liberal tilt. Only when evaluating their local TV news station do most Republicans—but not a majority—perceive balanced reporting (42%). Similar to Democrats’ perceptions of MSNBC, a plurality of Republicans (44%) believe Fox News has a conservative bias; 41% believe it provides unbiased reporting.

The news outlets that Republicans find most objective are their local news station (42%), Fox (41%), and the Wall Street Journal (28%). The media organizations Democrats find most objective include CBS (72%), their local news station (67%), CNN (55%), and the New York Times (55%).

70% Say Government Should Not Be Able to Shut Down News Stories

Despite Democrats and Republicans’ different perceptions of news media, they agree that government should not shut down news stories—even if biased or inaccurate.

Strong majorities of Republicans (63%), independents (71%), and Democrats (76%) agree that “government should not be able to stop a news media outlet from publishing a story that government officials say is biased or inaccurate.”

Among all Americans, 70% say government should not shut down news stories regardless of whether officials think the story is inaccurate. A little more than a quarter (29%) think government should have the authority to stifle stories authorities say are inaccurate or biased.

Full survey results and report found here.

Sign up here to receive forthcoming Cato Institute survey reports

The Cato Institute 2017 Free Speech and Tolerance Survey was designed and conducted by the Cato Institute in collaboration with YouGov. YouGov collected responses online August 15–23, 2017 from a national sample of 2,300 Americans 18 years of age and older. The margin of error for the survey is +/- 3.00 percentage points at the 95% level of confidence.

[1] Percentages in this section have been calculated among Americans with an opinion of the news source. The following were not familiar with each of these news sources: CNN: 16%, Fox: 13%, MSNBC: 22%, CBS: 19%, Local TV News Station: 18%, New York Times: 24%, Wall Street Journal: 29%.

As Republicans press ahead with major tax reforms, politicians and pundits are debating the effects of tax cuts on economic growth. This 2012 study by the former Tax Foundation chief economist took a detailed look at the academic literature on the issue.

Here is what Will McBride found:

So what does the academic literature say about the empirical relationship between taxes and economic growth? While there are a variety of methods and data sources, the results consistently point to significant negative effects of taxes on economic growth even after controlling for various other factors such as government spending, business cycle conditions, and monetary policy.

In this review of the literature, I find twenty-six such studies going back to 1983, and all but three of those studies, and every study in the last fifteen years, find a negative effect of taxes on growth. Of those studies that distinguish between types of taxes, corporate income taxes are found to be most harmful, followed by personal income taxes, consumption taxes and property taxes.”

These results support the neo-classical view that income and wealth must first be produced and then consumed, meaning that taxes on the factors of production, i.e., capital and labor, are particularly disruptive of wealth creation. Corporate and shareholder taxes reduce the incentive to invest and to build capital. Less investment means fewer productive workers and correspondingly lower wages. Taxes on income and wages reduce the incentive to work. Progressive income taxes, where higher income is taxed at higher rates, reduce the returns to education, since high incomes are associated with high levels of education, and so reduce the incentive to build human capital. Progressive taxation also reduces investment, risk taking, and entrepreneurial activity since a disproportionately large share of these activities is done by high income earners.”

This review of empirical studies also establishes some standards by which a tax system may be judged. If we apply these standards to our national tax system, the U.S. has probably the most inefficient tax mix in the developed world. We have the highest corporate tax rate in the industrialized world. If it came down 10 points—still higher than most of our trading partners—it would add 1 to 2 points to GDP growth and likely not lose tax revenue, because the tax base would expand from in-flows of foreign capital as well increased domestic investment, hiring, and work effort.

McBride’s study, with a nice summary table, is here.

On Halloween, Uzbek-born Sayfullo Habibullaevic Saipov allegedly murdered eight people and injured 12 with a rented truck in New York City.  The details of the attack, the number of victims, and Saipov’s personal information could change over the next few days.  However, based on the information that we have so far, Saipov entered the United States in 2010 as a lawful permanent resident with a green card.  He obtained his green card through the Diversity Immigrant Visa Program, which awards 50,000 green cards annually to those who enter the running from select countries. 

Uzbekistan has not been a major source of terrorists.  From 1975 through the end of 2016, three terrorists born in Uzbekistan attempted attacks on U.S. soil.  They killed or injured zero people in their attempted or threatened attacks.  Ulugbek Kodirov was convicted in 2012 of threatening to assassinate President Obama after entering on a student visa.  Abdurasul Hasanovich Juraboev entered on a green card that he won in a diversity lottery and also threatened to kill President Obama.  Fazliddin Kurbanov entered as a refugee and was convicted of possessing an unregistered explosive device.  Threats to assassinate the president are farfetched, but we count assassinations of politicians as terrorism just as the Global Terrorism Database does. 

If the death toll from the New York attack doesn’t rise, a total of 3,037 people have been murdered on U.S. soil by 182 foreign-born terrorists from 1975 through October 31, 2017.  Of those 182 foreign-born terrorists, 63 initially entered with green cards.  Including Tuesday’s attack, those who entered on a green card killed 16 people, or about 0.53 percent of all people murdered in terror attacks on U.S. soil committed by a foreigner.  If the number of injuries stays at 12, terrorists who entered on green cards have injured about 203 people during this period in attacks.  

The annual chance of being murdered in a terror attack on U.S. soil committed by a foreign-born person stands at 1 in 3,808,094 per year from 1975 through October 31, 2017. 

Saipov’s alleged attack stands apart from other Uzbek terrorists in terms of its brutal effectiveness and the tragedy of so many innocent lives murdered.  The 50 foreign-born terrorists who murdered somebody in a terrorist attack on U.S. soil from 1975 through October 31, 2017, including the 9/11 attackers, killed an average of 61 people each.  Excluding the 9/11 hijackers and their victims, 54 people were murdered in attacks for an average of about 1.7 murders per attacker.  Tuesday’s vehicular attack killed more people than the 1993 World Trade Center bombing that used a 1,336 pound bomb

Vehicle attacks are not the norm in the United States where firearms are more readily available, but they are rising in frequency, as we saw in Charlottesville earlier this year.  ISIS recently encouraged its followers to use trucks in lone wolf terrorist attacks and Saipov allegedly left a note declaring allegiance to that wannabe-Caliphate. 

RAND Corporation terrorism expert Brian Michael Jenkins remarked that airplane hijackings were the norm for 1970s terrorist attacks while suicide bombers were the norm for the 1980s.  Today, vehicle attacks are increasingly common around the world.  Jenkins identified approximately 40 vehicle attacks around the world from 2000 through 2016 that resulted in 167 deaths, approximately four per attack.  That total also includes the terrorists who died carrying them out. 

Automobiles are ubiquitous in a modern society and our lives would be unrecognizable without them.  Vehicle barriers can defend against vehicular attacks in crowded areas, but they’d more commonly be used to prevent accidents.  Simply put, there are too many roads, sidewalks, pedestrians, and automobiles to make defenses against these types of terror attacks feasible or cost effective.  Furthermore, the foreign-born terrorist threat is difficult to predict, largely because there are so few of them who successfully attack U.S. soil. 

More details will unfold surrounding this terrible attack in coming days.    

 

If you have followed the tax debate, you know that the United States has one of the highest corporate tax rates in the world. Most other nations have slashed their rates to attract investment, while U.S. policymakers have been in denial about global tax competition until recently.

You may be less familiar with the cuts to top individual income tax rates around the world since the 1980s. Those reforms have been driven by international competition for skilled workers, and by growing recognition of the damage caused by penalizing the highly productive people who are top earners.

How much have top individual tax rates been cut? The Economic Freedom of the World report publishes tax rate data for more than 100 countries as far back as the 1970s, but with numerous data points missing. I found 80 countries that had data back to 1985, and below I chart the average top individual income tax rate for that group. For countries with subnational income taxation, the EFW report includes a range of rates reflecting the varying taxes in states and provinces. For the chart, I chose the highest subnational rates for those countries. For the United States, the U.S. rate for 2015 is the federal rate plus California.

The average top individual tax rate for 80 nations plunged from 60 percent in 1985 to 35 percent by 2010, and then edged up to 36 percent in 2015. The U.S. federal-state rate was slashed sharply in the 1980s, falling from 59 percent in 1985 to 42 percent in 1990.

Our top rate went back up in the 1990s, then down in the 2000s, then up again in recent years reaching 51 percent by 2015, as both the federal and California rates increased. Meanwhile, rates continued to fall around the world in the 1990s and 2000s until the tax-cutting trend tapered off in recent years.      

 

 

Note: The EFW dataset has 159 countries with individual income tax data for 2015. The overall average top rate was just 30 percent for those countries. For the subset of 80 countries, I took out countries with zero rates, such as Bahamas, and countries that did not have data for 1985.

There is no more powerful person in the federal legal system than the federal prosecutor. Charging decisions and plea bargains effectively remove judges and juries from decisionmaking in most cases, and electing to fight a prosecutor rather than take the plea bargain most often results in dramatically longer sentences. This is how our system operates, and even if all the prosecutors are acting lawfully, defendants are at a massive disadvantage.

But what if the prosecutor cheats a system that’s already rigged in his favor?

This is not a hypothetical question. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has proven itself incapable of holding prosecutors accountable for misconduct. Regardless of which party is in power, the DOJ has let prosecutors get away with inexcusable behavior that costs people their livelihoods, their reputations, and their freedom. Next week, we’re holding an event to look at several high-profile cases in which the DOJ ran roughshod over individual rights, violated legal obligations and ethical norms, and ultimately held no one to account for their misdeeds.

Join us Tuesday, November 7 at 4 p.m. for Prosecutor Fallibility and Accountability, featuring Rob Cary, author of Not Guilty: The Unlawful Prosecution of U.S. Senator Ted Stevens; Howard Root, author of Cardiac Arrest: Five Heart-Stopping Years as a CEO on the Feds’ Hit-List; and Michael J. Daugherty, author of The Devil Inside the Beltway: The Shocking Exposé of the U.S. Government’s Surveillance and Overreach into Cybersecurity, Medicine and Small Business. The event will be hosted by my colleague Clark Neily.

You can sign up for the event here. You can also stream it online at cato.org/live and join the conversation on Twitter with #CatoCJ

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