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Earlier this week, the Trump campaign released a white paper written by senior policy adviser Peter Navarro to elaborate and quantify the candidate’s economic plan.  The goal of the paper is to explain how Donald Trump’s promises to renegotiate trade agreements and raise tariffs will promote economic growth and raise revenue for the government. 

The plan betrays embarrassing ignorance of how trade negotiations work and a farcically simplistic and erroneous understanding of economics.  In essence, the plan justifies Trump’s policies by reimagining how the world works. 

Trump’s entire view of trade and its impact on the U.S. economy is wrong.  He believes that trade is good for the United States only if we export more than we import and that trade relations are a contest between countries, which we are losing because they sell more stuff to us than we sell to them.  He claims to be the tough-guy who will the save the American economy from shrewd foreign cheaters and the inept government officials who let them beat us. 

Since that’s not how things work in the real world, he has to rely on falsehoods and bad economics to justify disastrous policies.  This new white paper is just a continuation of that tactic.

But you don’t have to take my word for it.  If you think I’m being too harsh or would like to learn more about the “Trump Trade Doctrine” and what’s wrong with it, I recommend you read lengthier condemnations from experts who have called the plan’s analysis “truly disappointing,” “not only wrong, but foolish,” “magical thinking,” “a complete mess,” and the sort of thing “that would get you flunked out of an AP economics class.”

In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court of Nevada today upheld the constitutionality of the nation’s most expansive educational choice law. However, the court ruled that the funding mechanism the legislature adopted is unconstitutional. If the legislature creates a new funding mechanism–as it could and should in a special session–then the ESA program could be implemented right away.

Enacted in 2015, Nevada’s education savings account (ESA) policy was originally scheduled to launch at the beginning of this year, but it immediately drew two separate legal challenges from the government schooling establishment and the ACLU and its allies. Nevada’s ESA provides students with $5,100 per year (plus an additional $600 for low-income students or students with special needs) to use for a wide variety of approved educational expenditures, including private school tuition, tutoring, text books, online courses, homeschool curricula, and more. Families can also roll over unspent funds from year to year. As the Heritage Foundation’s Lindsey Burke and I have explained, the ability to customize a child’s education and save funds for later are significant improvements over school vouchers:

ESAs offer several key advantages over traditional school-choice programs. Because families can spend ESA funds at multiple providers and can save unspent funds for later, ESAs incentivize families to economize and maximize the value of each dollar spent, in a manner similar to the way they would spend their own money. ESAs also create incentives for education providers to unbundle services and products to better meet students’ individual learning needs. 

Of the five existing ESA programs, Nevada’s is the most expansive. Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee restrict their ESAs to students with special needs. Arizona originally restricted ESA eligibility to students with special needs, but has since included foster children, children of active-duty military personnel, students assigned to district schools rated D or F, and children living in Native American reservations. In Nevada, all students who attended a public school for at least 100 days in the previous academic year are eligible. 

In two separate lawsuits, opponents of educational choice alleged that Nevada’s ESA violated the state constitution’s mandate that the state provide a “uniform system of common schools” (Article 11, Section 2), its prohibition against using public funds for sectarian purposes (Article 11, Section 6), and a clause requiring the state to appropriate funds to operate the district schools before any other appropriation is enacted for the biennium (Article 11, Section 10). The court found that the ESA was constitutional under the first two constitutional provisions, but the way it was funded violated the third.

“Uniform” Does Not Mean “Exclusive” 

The anti-choice plaintiffs alleged that the state constitution’s mandate that the state provide a “uniform system of common schools” means that the state may only fund that system, and not an “alternative” system that includes “non-common, non-uniform private schools and home-based schooling.” Essentially, they argued that “uniform” meant “exclusive.” The court disagreed. The plain language of the term “uniform” refers to uniformity within the system of common schools. Such schools must be free-of-charge, free of sectarian instruction, open at least six months a year, and so on. The ESA program does not change that.

The plaintiffs took great pains to explain away the previous provision of the state constitution, which explicitly authorized the legislature to “encourage” education “by all suitable means.” Although the plaintiffs argued that the term “all suitable means” is somehow limited by the “uniformity” clause, the court ruled that the two clauses operate independently. Furthermore, the court held that the expression “by all suitable means” clearly “reflects the framers’ intent to confer broad discretion on the Legislature in fulfilling its duty” to promote education. The creation of an ESA program falls within this discretion. 

ESA Funds Belong to Parents, Not the State

The plaintiffs further alleged that the ESA violated the state constitution’s Blaine Amendment, which states: “No public funds of any kind of character whatever […] shall be used for sectarian purpose.” Although even the plaintiffs conceded that the ESA has a secular purpose and that parents may expend all of their ESA funds on secular education, they contended that the potential that parents might use ESA funds to pay tuition at a religious school or purchase religious homeschool materials was a violation of the Blaine Amendment. The court disagreed:

Once the public funds are deposited into an education savings account, the funds are no longer “public funds” but are instead the private funds of the individual parent who established the account. The parent decides where to spend that money for the child’s education and may choose from a variety of participating entities, including religious and non-religious schools. Any decision by the parent to use the funds in his or her account to pay tuition at a religious school does not involve the use of “public funds” and thus does not implicate Section 10.

This is consistent with how the courts treat other transfers of public funds to individual citizens. A person using food stamps for a religious feast, hosting regular Bible studies at a subsidized apartment, or spending Medicaid funds at a Catholic hospital with a crucifix in every room and priests on the staff likewise do not violate the U.S. or state constitutions. The mere fact that the state places some restrictions on how those funds may be spent does not, as the plaintiffs alleged, mean that they are still “public funds.” As the court ruled, “That the funds may be used by the parents only for authorized educational expenses does not alter the fact that the funds belong to the parents.”

Finding a New Funding Mechanism

Education savings accounts are constitutional. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the way the legislature funded them is not. In its current form, there is no limit to the number of ESAs that the state might issue because it depends on the number of eligible students who apply for an account. The legislature did not explicitly create a separate appropriation for the ESAs, but rather diverted the funding that the state would otherwise have spent on those students had they enrolled in a district school. This creates a Catch-22. If the court were to find that the ESA funds do constitute a separate appropriation, then it runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that the legislature fund the district school system first because the legislature passed the ESA bill before the district school funding bill. However, if it is not a separate appropriation (as the court eventually held), then the legislature did not actually appropriate funds for the ESA because the district school funding bill makes no mention of them. The state treasury therefore has no authority to use the funds appropriated in the district school funding bill to fund the ESAs.

Although the Nevada Supreme Court issued an injunction against implementing the ESA, this decision gives supporters of educational choice more reason to celebrate than not. If funded properly, ESAs are constitutional in Nevada. Now all the legislature needs to do is hold a special session to make that happen.

A recent randomized controlled trial found that the number of complaints against police fell dramatically after officers were outfitted with body cameras. It is the latest piece of research suggesting that police body cameras have a positive effect on police-citizen interactions. 

The study, headed by the University of Cambridge’s Institute of Criminology, studied complaints against police in seven sites in two countries. The departments involved in the study were in areas such as the English Midlands, Cambridgeshire, California, and Northern Ireland. Researchers examined 4,264 officer shifts over roughly 1.5 million hours. In the 12 months before the trial began there were 1,539 complaints filed against police in the seven sites. After 12 months of taking part in the trial there were 113 complaints, a reduction of 93%.

Officers involved in the study were told to adhere to two policies that are not required by many departments: 1) officers wearing body cameras “had to keep the camera on during their entire shift,” and 2) those same officers had to “inform members of the public, during any encounter, that they were wearing a camera.”

The study’s findings are similar to an often-mentioned trial that took place in Rialto, California, which also found that the outfitting of officers with body cameras was followed by a significant reduction (87.5%) in complaints. 

Speaking about the most recent study, Cambridge University’s Barak Ariel, who oversaw the Rialto trial, said, “I cannot think of any [other] single intervention in the history of policing that dramatically changed the way that officers behave, the way that suspects behave, and the way they interact with each other.” 

Interestingly, the researchers found that complaints fell for officers who weren’t wearing body cameras as well as those who did. According to the researchers this may be because of “contagious accountability”:

We argue that that BWCs affect entire police departments through a process we label contagious accountability. Perhaps naively, we find it difficult to consider alternatives to the treatment effect beyond the panopticonic observer effect when the reduction in complaints is by nearly 100%. Whatever the precise mechanism of the deterrence effect of being watched and, by implication, accountability, all officers in the departments were acutely aware of being observed more closely, with an enhanced transparency apparatus that has never been seen before in day-to-day policing operations. Everyone was affected by it, even when the cameras were not in use, and collectively everyone in the department(s) attracted fewer complaints.

As the researchers note, this “contagious accountability” effect comes with some caveats:

There is, however, a caveat associated with this conclusion, which is important for future experiments on BWCs. It is not the camera device alone that caused the contagious accountability, but rather a two-stage process. First, the treatment effect incorporated the camera as well as a warning at the beginning of every interaction that the encounter was being videotaped. We urge practitioners to acknowledge that the verbal warning, which our protocol dictated should be announced as soon as possible when engaging with members of the public, is a quintessential component of the treatment effect. It primed both parties that a civilized manner was required and served as a nudge to enhance the participants’ awareness of being observed. Without the warning, the effect might easily have been reduced or failed to materialize.

The second element to the process is the need for affirmation that the videotaped footage can be used. People may be aware of CCTV or bystanders filming the encounter but still conduct themselves inappropriately, believing the camera to either not be recording or not monitoring their demeanor. Without the actualization of the warning, transgressors may be quick to assume that the threat of apprehension and risk of sanctioning are not real. Therefore, the fact that the officially collated, recorded footage can be used against the participants moves this intervention from being a “toothless policy” (Ariel, 2012, p. 57) into an effective technological solution. 

Although the recent study and the Rialto study did reveal encouraging findings, not all cities have seen such dramatic falls in complaints following body camera deployment. Nonetheless, the recent latest findings ought to encourage citizens and law enforcement officials alike to support police body cameras. Body cameras can, with the appropriate policies enforced, provide some much-needed increase in transparency and accountability in law enforcement while also helping to exculpate officers falsely accused of wrongdoing.