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In environmental circles, ocean acidification is one of the twin evils of rising atmospheric CO2 concentrations (the other being global warming). The concern is that as more and more carbon dioxide dissolves into the surface waters of the world’s oceans, the pH values of the planet’s oceanic waters will decline to such a degree that great harm – and possibly death – will be inflicted upon vast quantities of marine life in the decades and centuries to come. As a result, many are calling for immediate reductions in CO2 emissions to avoid these potential outcomes.

However, much remains to be discovered and learned about ocean acidification before any policy-related actions to address it are implemented, including a basic understanding of the natural variability of oceanic pH and its impacts on marine life across space and time. Such understanding is essential in order to prepare realistic projections of future oceanic pH, as well as the impacts of those projections on marine life. Unfortunately, as reported by Wei et al. (2015), “seawater pH has seldom been recorded owing to the nonroutine nature of its measurement, and thus continuous long-term seawater pH records are scare.” As a result, the team of nine researchers from the Chinese Academy of Sciences states that “very little is known about regional variability in ocean acidification on decadal to centennial time-scales, especially since the industrial era.”

Hoping to add at least some insight into the dearth of knowledge surrounding historic pH trends, Wei et al. set out to develop an annually-resolved long-term seawater pH record for the region of the northern South China Sea. They did this by analyzing the annual rings for 159 years in a Porites coral coral growing in Longwan Bay, 2 km off the east coast of Hainan Island (19.29°N, 110.66°E). The ratio of Boron-11 to Boron-10 (the two stable isotopes of Boron) in the growth rings is related to the acidity of the surrounding water.

As shown in the figure below, Wei et al. note their seawater pH reconstruction reveals the presence of large decadal-scale variability, with significant periodicities at approximately 18 and 5.6 years as revealed by power spectral analysis. The mean pH over the 159-year period was 8.04 and annual pH values ranged from 7.66 to 8.40. Additionally, they report an insignificant linear trend in the data of -0.00039 ± 0.00025 pH unit per year, amounting to a decline of 0.062 pH unit across the length of the record. Statistically, “Insignifcant” means the trend cannot be distinguished from zero.

Figure 1. Reconstructed pH values for the northern South China Sea over the period 1853-2011. Adapted from Wei et al. (2015).

Several important points can be made in regard to Wei et al.’s reconstruction. First, model-based reconstructions have calculated a theoretical 0.1 pH drop in oceanic seawaters in response to the CO2 that has been emitted into the atmosphere since pre-industrial times.  The changes measured in the Porites coral were not significantly different from zero, which is what  real-world data shows. This suggests the models may well be overestimating the amount of CO2 that is being dissolved into the oceans and thus inflating the potential impacts of so-called ocean acidification. Second, it is clear from viewing Figure 1 that there are numerous natural swings in pH that occur over relatively short time intervals (1-3 years) in which the pH either rises or falls by more than 0.3 unit. Indeed, it is not uncommon for the pH to rise or fall by twice this amount over a period of 1 to 2 years to a decade. The significance of this second point is noted in the fact that marine life is clearly able to survive and thrive under natural swings in oceanic pH over the course of two or three year periods that are twice as large as the pH decline that is predicted to occur by theoretical models over the course of the next century. The fact that they can successfully endure these rapidly recurring events in so short a time interval gives considerable pause to alarmist concerns that they can’t endure or adapt to the much smaller pH change predicted to occur over the next century or more.



Wei, G., Wang, Z., Ke, T., Liu, Y., Deng, W., Chen, X., Xu, J., Zeng, T. and Xie, L. 2015. Decadal variability in seawater pH in the West Pacific: Evidence from coral δ11B records. Journal of Geophysical Research: Oceans 120: 7166-7181.


Nearly all surviving Democrat and Republican presidential candidates (except John Kasich) have essentially endorsed the shared campaign theme of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders that the U.S. economy is weak because we import too many goods from foreign countries.  If only we could raise the cost of imports with tariffs, according to the Trump-Sanders theory, then the U.S. economy would supposedly have more jobs and higher real wages.   

Paying more for anything (such as Fords or iPhones) is no way to get rich.  Yet that concept somehow eludes many non-economists.  Theory aside, the idea that fewer imports are good for the economy is the exact opposite of what we have experienced.  The fact is that U.S. imports always fall when the economy slips into recession and imports rise briskly whenever the economy does.

As the graph shows, the annual percentage growth of real GDP in the United States is very closely tied to the annual growth of real imports.  Rapidly expanding U.S. businesses need more imported parts and materials and increasingly prosperous Americans can also afford more imported goods.  In recessions, we neither need nor can afford as many imports.  This is why the U.S. balance of trade on goods and services was 3.6% of GDP in 2000 when the economy grew by 4.1% but shrunk to 2.7% of GDP in 2009 when the economy shrunk by 2.8%.  U.S. GDP grew by 2.1% a year 2010-15 (lifting imports), while foreign economies did much worse (hurting exports), so the trade deficit has been 2.9-3% of GDP lately - including a surplus of $220 billion in services.

The fact that U.S. trade deficits always expand when the U.S. economy grows faster than others certainly does not mean slower economies  are “winning” and the U.S. is a loser.  As our own experience shows, the fact that imports slow or contract when the economy does hardly makes stagnation or recession more desirable than 3-4% economic growth.  Europe and Japan would surely prefer decent economic growth to the weak imports that invariably accompany such weak economies.

Japan has run big trade surpluses for decades, yet Japan’s industrial production fell 2.7% from early 2010 to late 2015, while U.S. industrial production rose 13%.  Manufacturing jobs in Japan fell from 14.4 million in 1997 to 10.4 million in 2014.  Most Hondas and a very big share of other Japanese-branded cars are now made in the USA, where auto exports topped 2.1 million in 2014, including Japanese and German vehicles exported from this country.

Campaign rhetoric about the U.S. “not making anything anymore,” or about the U.S. not “winning” some make-believe trade war, is wrong and dangerous. The U.S. is second only to China in manufacutring, and maybe not for long.  The 2016 Deloitte global manufacturing competitveness index concludes that “China is currently the most competitive manufacturing nation [with the U.S. second and Mexico eighth], but the US is expected to take over the top spot in five years.”

Yesterday’s shutdown of the Washington Metro rail system was supposed to result in horrible congestion. In fact, as reported in the Washington Post, congestion was “normal,” with a little heavier traffic than usual in some places and lighter in others.

A few people hadn’t gotten the word, but most made other plans. Some people took the bus, but many buses had empty seats. Some people took taxis, but some taxi drivers reported no more business than usual. Pedestrian and bike traffic across the Key Bridge doubled, but that just meant 1,150 more than usual. Capital Bikeshare parking slots downtown were full, indicating more people used them to commute to work than usual. 

Uber, Lyft, and ZipCar all had good days, showing that private enterprise is alive and well. Some commuters vowed to buy a car and stop taking the Metro, more because it was generally unreliable than this particular shutdown. 

The Washington Post’s architecture critic claims that the shutdown happened because “we decided to let our cities decay.” In fact, it’s because politicians decided that spending money on new construction projects, such as the Silver and Purple lines, would benefit their political careers more than spending it maintaining the existing system.

Before that, it’s because politicians decided to saddle Washington with an expensive, obsolete technology that the region can’t afford to maintain. Metro needs to spend $1.1 billion a year on maintenance to keep the system from deteriorating; it spent about a third of that in 2014, so it’s getting worse every year.

Yesterday’s lack of chaos suggests that Washington can get along without the rail system. It certainly can’t afford to keep it. It’s time to think about alternatives.

Last year, the Cato Institute held a forum on John Goodman’s latest book on health reform, A Better Choice: Healthcare Solutions for America (Independent Institute, 2015). Goodman founded and was the longtime president and CEO of the National Center for Policy Analysis. The Wall Street Journal calls him “the father of health savings accounts,” and he is currently president of the Goodman Institute for Public Policy Research and a senior fellow at the Independent Institute. Video of the book forum is available here.

I posted a lightly edited transcript of my interview of Goodman, which did a good job of highlighting the differences among ObamaCare opponents, in three parts:

For more on the three schools of ObamaCare opponents, see Cato’s previous book forum on Philip Klein’s Overcoming Obamacare: Three Approaches to Reversing the Government Takeover of Health Care (Washington Examiner, 2015).

James Madison was born 265 years ago today. His greatest essay was Federalist no. 10, a defense of the design of the government created by the new Constitution. Does Federalist no. 10 have anything to teach us today as voters choose the next president?

Madison favored republican government - government by the people - but he also saw its problems. In contrast, we are inclined to think elites, not the people, foster most shortcomings, public and private. Were the people truly empowered, all would be well.

Madison doubted both the people and the elites. Popular governments were threatened when majorities “are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.” In turn, majorities are often misled by “men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs.” Having gained the support of majority, such men “then betray the interests of the people.”

Both the people and elites could do better. Madison thought some of the flaws of popular government could be mitigated by indirect rule of the people through representatives “whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country.” The sheer size of the country, he thought, would also complicate putting together oppressive majorities. Other aspects of the Constitution - the separation and balancing of powers, the independent judiciary, and the Bill of Rights - would also constrain majorities gone wrong.

Much is different now. Our nation is quite small as measured in media space. Direct accountability to voters trumps indirect representation; the parties now select their presidential nominees through direct voting by their members. Few believe in the wisdom of representatives and sometimes representation itself seems questionable. As the economist Randall Holcombe argues, the nation has moved some way from liberty to democracy.

Madison thought the Constitution set out a kind of republican government that would stand the test of time. But time is long, and the tests do not end, our complacency notwithstanding. On this birthday of “the father of the Constitution” we have more reason than usual to appreciate his efforts to divide and limit political power, thereby frustrating men of factious tempers and sinister designs.


Merrick Garland is the safest, least ideological nominee President Obama could have made, which means that the president wants to put pressure on Senate Republicans more than he wants to energize his base.

Chief Judge Garland is assuredly a liberal vote on the most controversial, culture-war issues, but he’s just as surely the most moderate Democratic-leaning jurist under consideration on cases that fly under the radar.  But as I said last month, in this hazy, crazy, bizarre election year, this Supreme Court seat should remain vacant until the American people can decide whether they want to swing the balance of the Supreme Court, possibly for decades.

Scalia was one of four conservatives on the Court, who, when joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy, formed a majority crucial for enforcing the First and Second Amendments, federalism, the separation of powers, and other constitutional protections for individual liberty.   If he’s replaced by a progressive jurist – or even a ‘moderate’ one – all that comes crashing down and there will be no further check on the sorts of executive abuses that have only increased under a president who thinks that when Congress doesn’t act on his priorities, he somehow gets the authority to enact them regardless.

In perhaps the greatest example of wishful thinking we’ve seen in recent times, the Consumer Financial Protection Board Administrator Richard Cordray testified before Congress last month that banks and credit unions should step up their loans to low-income workers with poor credit by creating new products that compete with payday loans. It is a notion that’s completely at odds with the actions of the CFPB as well as the capabilities of banks and credit unions.

Since its inception the CFPB has all but declared war on payday and title loan companies, the two entities that do the most lending to people with poor or nonexistent credit. The CFPB resents them because the loans are costly and in their view potentially exploitative: a typical loan would be for three or four weeks and amount to $400, with $500 to be repaid at the end of the term. A 25% interest rates for a loan of less than a month amounts to an astronomical annual percentage rate and the CFPB and Department of Justice have deemed it to be needlessly excessive. They have made a concerted effort to make it difficult or impossible for these businesses to survive via something called “Operation Choke Point. ” For instance, it is now much more difficult for these businesses to get bank accounts.

The retrenchment of the industry has created a lacuna: despite fervent wishes to the contrary by the CFPB, many low-income workers find themselves in need of credit, and it’s unclear what will fill this niche.

What is abundantly clear is that banks and credit unions will not be the ones to do this. The large banks in particular feel–rightly or wrongly–to be the government’s victims in the aftermath of the Great Recession, as Congress and the various regulatory agencies sought to assign blame for the financial crisis. The Justice Department fined several banks billions of dollars in the last decade, and not a single one of those banks came out of those negotiations feeling warm and happy thoughts about the federal government.  The notion that they would pick up a new and likely unprofitable business line because Richard Cordray asked them to is absurd when they risk being charged with exploiting these people by loaning them money, as they were with their mortgage loans.

Besides, banks have never been particularly adept at retail innovation: opening more branches has been the extent of their efforts. Retail banking is a conservative business that is ill-suited and disinclined to take risks or try new things.

In my experience banks find it difficult to change their hidebound ways. Twenty years ago I completed my Ph.D. in economics. The day I arrived at my parents’ house with my degree in hand my father made me put on a suit and accompany him to some meetings with various banks and finance companies. He was a bankruptcy attorney and one of his concerns was helping his clients establish some modicum of credit after filing. A good proportion of his clients were forced into bankruptcy by a single unforeseen incident–a health emergency, a divorce, or the short-term loss of a job.

Once these people escaped their debt and were past their crisis, he reasoned, there was no reason why a profit-maximizing business shouldn’t extend them credit, especially if it was secured by some sort of asset. So I spent the day meeting with various banks to discuss the plight of a couple of his recent clients who needed capital to buy a truck for their profitable small business.

My presence didn’t change a thing: Not a single bank would consider making a $10,000 secured loan for a $20,000 truck. They understood our point and often even agreed that these loans could very well make good business sense for them, but lending to a bankrupt is not what banks do, profits be damned.

We ultimately did find financing for his clients, from the household finance and installment loan companies in our city. These firms that were able to think creatively and understand the situation these people were in. The people there knew the community and the people who lived there and had the wherewithal to think on their feet and make decisions that can’t be easily covered by a blanket rule.

Eight percent of the population does not have a bank account and fully twenty percent of the population is considered to be “underbanked” in that they sometimes obtain financing outside of the normal bank/credit union route. Over a third of all households do not own their own home, which in today’s world can limit access to credit too.  These people need to be able to access credit outside of the banking system. Making life more difficult for entities whose business model is to lend to this cohort helps no one.

A few years ago one of my graduate school roommates, who had risen to become a vice president at a major regional bank, embarked on an ambitious plan to help his employer enter the market to provide loans to the underbanked. The effort failed miserably: their bank proved itself unable to make quick decisions on lending, and as a result few people in that market found it of any use. The default rates on their loans were acceptably low but they didn’t come close to covering their investment in this market and they abandoned their efforts within a year.

There is no doubt that there are still some bad actors that take advantage of low-income borrowers, but we are approaching a situation whereby the government considers any entity lending money to the underbanked to be exploiting them. The pendulum has swung too far: we need a government regulator to allow companies to make loans to the underbanked and make a profit in doing so, because squeezing them out, which the CFPB seems intent on doing, won’t benefit anyone.

I wish the Barack Obama Jeffrey Goldberg interviewed for the Atlantic’s April cover story had been in charge of U.S. foreign policy for the last seven years. Obama’s arguments in the article are similar to those Cato’s foreign policy department are always employing in criticizing the Obama administration.

One such argument says that U.S. military leadership promotes free-riding among allies. Another is that overthrowing Middle-Eastern dictators by arming their rebel opponents tends to promote chaos destructive to human life and liberal values and that letting in more refugees from those conflicts is a better way to promote humanitarian ends.  In the interview, Obama agrees that U.S. entanglement in the Middle’s East’s civil wars drains U.S. power and security. He sensibly applies the same logic to Russia— dismissing the idea that Russia’s meddling in the Syrian civil war strengthens it. He too is critical of Russian aggression beyond its borders but suggests that Putin is propping up friendly neighbors rather than launching an expansionist frenzy. He agrees that Russia is far weaker than the United States but also that, given our relatively limited interest in states like Ukraine on Russia’s borders, there is little sense in trying to bolster those states with aid or bluffs so that they can overcome Russian aggression.

Goldberg’s Obama is especially impressive in arguing that it is stupid to make war in the name of signaling or credibility. He rightly rejects the idea that foreign leaders start wars because Washington failed to fight in very different circumstances. He even “disdains” Washington’s foreign policy establishment for its credibility “fetish” and reflexive hawkishness.

Unfortunately the actual President Obama has sometimes taken the other side of these arguments. In Syria, he is working to overthrow a second Middle-Eastern dictator by aiding a rebellion. He kept U.S. forces in Iraq and appointed two secretaries of defense that supported the prolonged occupation there. He initially supported NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine and subsequently backed military aid for the latter, which undermines its willingness to accommodate Russia. He offered NATO’s credibility as one reason to increase troop levels in Afghanistan. He initially gave a credibility rationale for bombing the Assad regime to punish it for using chemical weapons, as Goldberg notes. Obama used credibility to argue for bombing on behalf of Libya’s rebels—not intervening, he said, would send a message to other regional dictators that they could keep power by killing their people.

What explains the difference between the policies Obama supported and the arguments he now makes? That will remain a mystery for a while, but I’ll still speculate. One possible explanation is that the President is not totally consistent on these matters, and he can make a decent case for either side. His more realist side perhaps emerged in response to his interviewer’s hawkish assumptions. Goldberg assumes, for example, that requesting congressional authorization for bombing Syria and then getting a deal where it gives up its chemical weapons is surrender rather than a successful threat. An interviewer pushing from the other side—asking, for example, if bombing seven countries is excessive—might have unearthed Obama more interventionist thinking.

Another possibility is that the President has learned substantially on the job. Whether or not he was a realist when he was elected, he has become one, arguably. Or maybe the President has struggled to impose his views on the foreign policy bureaucracy.  As Richard Neustadt tells us, Presidents have to persuade people to do their bidding because they have limited time and political capital. Obama probably exacerbated that problem through his appointments, which left him as the most dovish person in his cabinet. To be fair, the establishment’s nature makes it tough to fill cabinets with other sorts of thinkers.

Probably some combination of those explanations is at work. If so, three lessons follow. One is that things could always be worse. Those of us that dislike this president’s foreign policy record should consider the plausible alternatives. In politics you have to grade on a curve. Second, experience in national politics, while no guarantor of wisdom, improves presidential performance.  Obama could have developed some of these insights before taking office. Third, better foreign policy takes more than better leaders. Better politics could make smarter foreign policies and better presidents.

It turns out that Will Wilkinson’s latest anti-libertarian screed is actually worth a look. It’s wickedly funny in places, and you can’t tell me you haven’t heard plenty of the lines that he pins on his hapless interlocutor. Oh the silly things we get up to, whenever we start from first principles! And when the lines do ring false, well, strawmen can be funny too.

I have to wonder, though, about Will’s purportedly realistic, hard-nosed, no-first-principles-here political strategy: Is it really a good idea to scrap libertarian theory altogether, because it’s just not paying off too well in state dismantlement? Should we really work to shore up the welfare state as a means of reining in the regulatory state? Is this the jiu-jitsu we’ve been looking for?

[I]f we patched up the already existing, already very large American welfare state so that it did a better job of preventing people from falling through the cracks, that might make the zero-sum thinking of economic nationalist politicians like Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders less attractive, and an agenda of economic liberalization might be more feasible.

Now, the dialogic format means a lot of elision, and as a result, “patch up” could mean nearly anything. This to me seems a bit too carefully calculated to please nonlibertarians, and among them particularly the wonkier sort, who love patching up existing anythings whenever they’re found in the government and leaking. “Take us seriously,” these lines seem to say, “because we’re a whole lot like you are!”

Yet there’s a politically popular reason why (1) the U.S. welfare state is so expensive and (2) so many people fall through the cracks anyway. Both of these can be explained with reference to the U.S. middle class, which receives a very large share of the total benefits, on much flimsier than the usual Rawlsean justifications. But hey, they vote! Every once in a while, a left-leaning pundit will notice this fact, feel ashamed, and be forced to make a discreet retrograde maneuver. Almost nothing ever comes of it, policy-wise.

In layman’s terms, patching up the welfare state – which I charitably take to mean “helping real poor people, instead of pretend poor people” – would require scrapping a whole bunch of middle class tax breaks. Give Bernie Sanders credit for honesty, I suppose, although even he’s understandably reticent about the kinds of taxes that would be necessary for his proposed programs.

Apart from the details of tax policy, it also seems to me that Will’s approach risks growing the U.S. welfare state while leaving the regulatory state completely untouched. If we both agree that the regulatory state is the real problem, then we ought to attack it directly, rather than attacking it in the most oblique way imaginable, by praising an extensive welfare state.

A more modest political strategy might concede that we don’t actually know the consequences of a prominent, welfare-skeptical political faction, like libertarians, collectively changing their minds about welfare policy. It’s not entirely unreasonable to think that it will lead to a larger (but neither juster nor more efficient) welfare state. And that it won’t do anything else at all.

As Will’s own stand-in says, “I believe the social world is too complicated and unpredictable to see more than one or two steps down any path. I think you believe that, too.” And I do believe that!

So let’s attack the regulatory state in one step, shall we? At this point, were it anyone other than Will Wilkinson, and were it any institution other than Cato’s impish kid brother, I would introduce both the author and the institution to… those brave, fire-eating, first-principles libertarians over at the Institute for Justice. IJ works directly to roll back the regulatory state. No mucking about with the welfare state for them! IJ just finds one appalling regulation after another, and it sues the pants off the regulators. Often, IJ wins. (So, for that matter, does Cato’s own legal affairs team.)

Our success in challenging the regulatory state directly is a big part of the reason why I’m not so interested in abandoning first principles. I just don’t see first principles necessarily getting in the way of effective activism. The two can work well together, even if sometimes they don’t, and even if, when they don’t, it can make for some amusing dialogue.

Translating first principles into effective activism is, agreed, actual work. Like, about messaging and priorities and stuff. But I think we can do it, and that it’s likely easier than performing a massive two-step with the welfare state.

And finally, I do agree that first principles can make you seem like a loon at times, even just on their own terms. And that can make for a pretty lonely life, and a frustrating one, in a city that doesn’t much care for first principles of any sort at all.

Still, it’s worth considering how really, truly weird libertarianism is, by the lights of Wonktown, and how much we’d have to give up to fit in here: The establishment adores the surveillance state. It wants to keep the war on drugs, even if it doesn’t quite look to expand it for now (whew). The establishment views eminent domain as just another fun and totally legitimate thing the state can do, for whatever reason it thinks might be good. The establishment doesn’t flinch at imprisoning millions. The establishment wants to spend, by our lights, insanely too much on defense, and it’s now debating whether the solution to all of America’s foreign policy problems is to bomb not-necessarily-identified people whose cell phone usage fits a statistical profile.

I have to wonder how, let alone why, I would choose to be cozy with the defenders of these policies, rather than holding them in a well-regulated and professional disdain (which need not, of course, preclude a working relationship, when such is required).

Do note: Wonktown gives no credit whatsoever for a theoretical willingness to use the state to help poor people: “Can we please,” the Wonks will immediately ask, “can we please keep delivering our help in the inefficient, signal-y, vote-getty ways that we’re used to? I mean, it’s charming that you care about the poor, my dears, but really… Did you think that that’s the reason why we were doing it? And – anyway – enough about helping people: Can we talk about all the ways that you plan to hurt people? Because if you want to pass for serious in Wonktown…”

The Washington Metrorail system is completely shut down for a safety inspection today after having suffered another fire on Monday. As Metro’s new general manager, Paul Wiedefeld, wants people to know, “Safety is our highest priority.”

The Washington Post says that this decision confirms that Metro is “a national embarrassment.” In fact, the shutdown appears to be a classic Washington Monument strategy, in which bureaucrats try to make budget shortfalls as painful as possible in order to get more money out of Congress or other legislators. Instead of shutting the entire system down, Metro could have done the necessary inspections between midnight and 5 am, when the trains aren’t running. If the full inspections will take the 29 hours the trains won’t be running Wednesday and Thursday morning, then doing them at night would take just six days.

There is no doubt that fires are serious; one in January, 2015, killed someone and hospitalized scores of others. But the fact that these two fires were more than fourteen months apart suggests that there isn’t a major risk of another one in the next few days.

Metro’s fundamental problem is that it uses an expensive, obsolete technology. The federal government paid to build the system, and local governments pay to operate it, but no one ever budgeted for maintenance costs. These costs become especially high after the infrastructure reaches about 30 years of age. The earliest parts of the Metro system will be 40 years old this year, and they have steadily deteriorated over the past decade.

A one-day inspection is not going to solve Metro’s problems. Metro did plenty of inspections since the January, 2015 fire, but that didn’t stop the March, 2016 fire from taking place. Moreover, fires are only a small part of Metro’s problems.

Other problems include worn-out railcars; replacement cars that are late because they are “beset with problems”; an unreliable automatic train operating system that Metro has been slow to restore since the 2009 accident that killed nine people; old rails that are prone to cracking; unreliable elevators and escalators; and a workforce that has so little concern for safety that train operators risk collisions by running red lights at least once a month, plus many more. No wonder Wiedefeld admitted, several months after becoming general manager, that problems are “worse than I thought.”

Fixing these problems is going to require around $10 billion, several years of work, and an overhaul of Metro’s bureaucracy to restore the safety ethic that ought to be, but isn’t, a part of Metro’s culture. That’s billions of dollars that won’t be available to relieve traffic congestion, repave Washington’s crumbling streets, provide safer bicycle and pedestrian facilities, and improve the bus service that is used by more than one out of three of the region’s transit commuters.

Lots of federal workers take the Metro. But the Census Bureau says that less than 10 percent of commuters in the Washington urban area (which includes parts of southern Maryland and northern Virginia) take Metro subway and elevated trains to work. (Another 6.6 percent take buses and a small percentage take Maryland or Virginia commuter trains.)

Instead of spending all that money on just 10 percent of commuters, it’s time for Metro to seriously consider replacing its worn-out rail system with economical and flexible buses. For a little more than $1 billion, Metro could buy enough buses to replace all of its railcars, leaving several billion dollars left over to spend on other transportation improvements that will benefit bus riders along with everyone else in the region, not just those who take Metro rail to work. It sounds radical, but at some point Metro will have to admit that it can’t afford to maintain its high-cost rail system, and buses are the low-cost alternative.

The shouting down of speakers at public meetings, a well established phenomenon at universities, seems to be making a comeback in American political culture generally. Last Friday, I and perhaps 100 others attended a speech given by veteran Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) before the Washington, D.C. lawyers’ chapter of the Federalist Society at Tony Cheng’s restaurant in Chinatown. Sen. Hatch spoke on current legal controversies, and as he approached his discussion of the current vacancy on the Supreme Court, about eight persons, evidently at a prearranged signal, rose to their feet and began chanting slogans at the top of their lungs. The disrupters went on drowning out the senator for some time, refusing to stop or leave on request. (A news account is here.)

In the age of social media it was unlikely those taking part would remain anonymous, and indeed within hours the group responsible was boasting of having shut down a senior GOP Senator at one of his events. That group, whose staffers talked on Twitter of their role in the episode, turned out to be Generation Progress, a group whose Wikipedia entry notes that respectables such as Pres. Barack Obama, Sens. Elizabeth Warren and Tammy Baldwin, the League of Women Voters, and Ambassador Samantha Power have cooperated in its activities. Indeed, Gen Progress is a 501(c)(4) affiliate of the very well established left-leaning Center for American Progress with its 2013 budget of $40 million. Call it a new model think tank.

The big national story, of course, is that the disruption of political events is rapidly spiraling toward a prospect of serious violence, especially at the rallies of presidential contender Donald Trump, who has been widely criticized for comments that might encourage some backers in rough behavior. A few points about that: 

1) If Side A rents a hall for a rally and Side B comes in and shouts down A’s speaker, what has happened is better described as “mob rule” than as “free speech.”

2) On the question of what constitutes incitement and solicitation to violence, Eugene Volokh sorts out a range of basic legal issues. Some will probably be new to many readers; for example, whether it is unlawful to physically tackle or drag hecklers who disrupt a meeting is a question that varies from one state’s law to the next, not a constitutional question. (And yes, the rules change somewhat when rallies are held in public spaces such as parks, but since even the freedom to hold rallies in private spaces is under challenge at the moment, that’s what I’ll discuss here.)

3) There is no contradiction between saying that a certain candidate or cause is a menace to public liberty that we should vote against or oppose, and saying that supporters of that candidate or cause deserve the right to rally in rented halls without attempts to disrupt or shout down their proceedings. Honoring an adversary’s right to engage in political assembly unmolested is not the same as supporting his cause, and contrariwise criticizing irresponsible things that a candidate may say does not somehow condone efforts to shout him down. 

4) It would probably have been helpful to start earlier on having a debate over the harms caused by mob political action and excuse-making for it in high places. For example, beginning last year, activists claiming to speak for Black Lives Matter and similar groups took over stages or otherwise disrupted events by Democratic candidates Bernie Sanders, Hillary Clinton, and Martin O’Malley, leading to a round of celebratory reflection in many quarters about how the tactics had worked.     

5) “Disrupting political events is OK when we do it to them, but unacceptable when they do it to us” isn’t a principle conducive to peace, stable domestic equilibrium, or intellectual coherence – assuming peace, stability, and coherence are goals. The better course is to recognize rally disruptions as wrong when done by either or both sides, and deplore a permission-giving tone toward mob action across the board - from local activists and foundation grant officers all the way to sitting and would-be presidents. 

America’s political traditions are broadly classical-liberal, and over many successful periods of domestic tranquility these principles of physical forbearance toward political adversaries were widely observed among large groups of Americans whether they happened to call themselves progressives, conservatives, or something else. Will this broadly libertarian center now hold, or fail?


Donald Trump is weighing in on anti-dumping. He is in way over his head. This is from an op-ed he wrote:

foreign countries … even engage in a tactic known as “product dumping” — where foreign competitors will dump huge quantities of underpriced goods into U.S. markets for the sole purpose of driving American factories out of business.

In fact, as the anti-dumping law stands now, anti-dumping tariffs can be imposed in situations where even small quantities of imported goods are sold at prices that are slightly lower than those in other countries.  Also, the purpose of the pricing is not taken into account.

So if Trump wants to reform our anti-dumping system to only address situations where there are “huge quantities” sold for the “sole purpose” of putting U.S. factories out of business, that would seriously constrain the anti-dumping law, and would actually be a huge improvement!

But of course, his writings on this topic are just his usual rhetoric, and that’s not what he wants at all. From the rest of the op-ed (and all of his other trade rhetoric), it is clear that what he really wants is more restrictions on trade. And as much as I’d like to hold him to his word on anti-dumping, doing so on just about any other issue is scary to think about, so probably best to let this one go.

We’ve been fighting over the Common Core national curriculum standards for years now, and at this point the people who “fact check” ought to know the facts. Also, at this point, I should be doing many other things than laying out basic truths about the Core. Yet here I am, about to fact-check fact-checking by The Seventy Four, an education news and analysis site set up by former television journalist Campbell Brown. Thankfully, I am not alone in having to repeat this Sisyphean chore; AEI’s Rick Hess did the same thing addressing Washington Post fact-checkers yesterday.

Because I have done this so many times before – what follows are relatively quick, clarifications beneath the “facts” the “fact check” missed.

FACT: It was the states — more specifically the Council of Chief State School Officers and National Governors Association — that developed the standards. During the Obama administration, the Education Department has played no specific role in the implementation of those standards, and the classroom curriculum used to meet the broad goals set out in Common Core is created by districts and states, as it always has been. Further, states have made tweaks to the Common Core standards since their initial adoption and, in some cases, have decided to drop the standards entirely.

  • The Council of Chief State School Officers (CCSSO) and National Governors Association (NGA) are not states. They are, essentially, professional associations of governors and state superintendents. And they are definitely not legislatures, which much more than governors represent “the people” of their states. So no, it was not “states” that developed the standards.
  • The CCSSO and NGA explicitly called for federal influence to move states onto common, internationally benchmarked standards – what the Core is supposed to be – writing in the 2008 report Benchmarking for Success that the role of the federal government is to offer “incentives” to get states to use common standards, including offering funding and regulatory relief. See page 7 of the report, and note that the same information was once on the Common Core website but has since been removed.
  • The Common Core was dropped into a federally dictated system under the No Child Left Behind Act that required accountability based on state standards and tests, so Washington did have a role in overseeing “implementation” of the standards. And since what is tested for accountability purposes is what is supposed to get taught, it is very deceptive to say, simply, curriculum “is created by districts and states.” The curricula states create is supposed to be heavily influenced by Core, and especially the math section pushes specific content. Indeed, the Core calls specifically for instructional “shifts.” Oh, and the federal government selected and funded two consortia of states to create national tests – the Partnership for the Assessment of Readiness for College and Career (PARCC) and the Smarter-Balanced Assessment Consortium (SBAC) – which the Department of Education, to at least some extent, oversaw.
FACT: States competing for Race to the Top funds in 2009 got more points on their application for the adoption of “internationally benchmarked standards and assessments that prepare students for success in college and the workplace.” Adopting those standards won a state 40 points out of 500 possible, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures.

Congress has not funded Race to the Top grants in the annual appropriations process for several years, and several states – notably Oklahoma and Indiana – have dropped the Common Core.

  • The $4.35 billion Race to the Top was the primary lever to coerce states into Core adoption, and it did far more than give 40 out of 500 points for adopting any ol’ “internationally benchmarked standards and assessments.” It came as close to saying Common Core as possible without actually saying Common Core, which, by the way, reporting by the Washington Post’s Lyndsey Layton suggested the Obama administration wanted to do, but was asked not to because the optics would be bad. So instead the regulations said that to get maximum points states would have to adopt standards common to a “majority” of states – a definition only met by the Core – and went to pains to make sure the adoption timelines suited the Core. Read all about it here, with special attention to page 59689. And note that maximum points were 50 for adopting standards and aligned tests, and 70 for doing that and supporting transition to the new standards and tests.
  • It is true that the Race to the Top pushing Core implementation only happened once – though in multiple phases – but the Obama administration later cemented it by only giving two choices of standards to get waivers out of the most dreaded parts of the No Child Left behind Act: either have standards common to a “significant number of states,” or a public university system certify a state’s own standards as “college- and career-ready.” And all of this happened after states had promised to use the Core in Race to the Top; it would have been tough for state officials to suddenly say they would not use the Core because, well, they only promised to do so for the federal money.

FACT: Federal law already prohibits the government from forcing states to adopt Common Core. 

The Every Student Succeeds Act, which Obama signed into law in December, includes 13 references to the Common Core – all limitations on federal power to meddle in curriculum.

Specifically from the law: “No officer or employee of the federal government shall, through grants, contracts, or other cooperative agreements, mandate, direct, or control a state, local education agency, or school’s specific instructional content, academic standards and assessments, curricula, or other program of instruction…including any requirement, direction, or mandate to adopt the Common Core State Standards.”

To the contrary, ESSA specifically protects states’ rights to “enter into a voluntary partnership with another state to develop and implement” challenging academic standards.

  • This “fact” was invoked to counter promises by Republican presidential candidates to end Common Core if elected. And it is correct that the ESSA singles out the Core as something that cannot be specifically coerced. But, of course, that has already essentially happened, and it is worth noting that federal law has had paper prohibitions against federal influence over curriculum for decades. Precious good they did, not that forcing states to dump the Core would be any more constitutional than the original coercion.

FACT: The federal government already has a limited role in K-12 education. Particularly in the wake of the passage of the Every Student Succeeds Act, the primary federal roles are providing supplemental funds for the education of children in poverty (the Title I program), setting standards for the education of children with disabilities and helping fund those services (the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act), and ensuring children don’t go hungry (the school lunch program, which is run through the Agriculture Department.)

The monetary role is small, too. According to federal data, between 1980 and 2011, between 7 and 13 percent of total annual education funding came from federal sources. And only about half of that funding in 2011 came from the Education Department. Another quarter of that funding came from the Department of Agriculture for the school lunch program. The Defense Department (junior reserve officers’ training program and their own school system for students of military members), Health and Human Services (Head Start pre-school) and about a half-dozen other departments for smaller programs made up the rest. 

  • The federal government has taken on a largely unlimited role in education – everything from funding to coercing curriculum standards – which is why we saw anger on both the left and right spur passage of the ESSA. But it is not clear that the ESSA reduces the federal role to simply providing supplemental funds, standards for children with disabilities, and stopping hunger. The new law requires that states send standard, testing, and accountability plans to Washington for approval; requires uniform statewide testing; and demands interventions in the worst performing schools, among other things. And this is before the regulations – which some groups are pushing to be very prescriptive – have been written.
  • Oh, the school lunch program? It is also about pushing what Washington deems to be proper nutrition and balanced diets on schools, not just “ensuring children don’t go hungry.”
  • It is true that the monetary role as a percentage of total spending is kind of small, but roughly ten percent of funding isn’t nothing, and federal funding was in much demand during the nadir of the Great Recession, when Race to the Top was in effect. And it is very hard to be a politician in any state and say, “I’m going to turn down this $100 million, or that $1 billion, because it’s not that big a percentage of our funding.” This is something of which federal politicians are well aware, and spending roughly $80 billion on K-12 is not chump change, even by federal standards.

FACT: Abolishing the federal Education Department would also wipe out the Office of Innovation and Improvement, which oversees the very initiatives Cruz wants to promote: federal efforts to spur more charter schools and magnet schools; the DC Opportunity Scholarship Program, the only federal school voucher program; and the Office of Non-Public Education.

  • Ironically, after downplaying federal influence in education, The Seventy Four tweaks Presidential candidate Ted Cruz for saying he wants to get rid of the U.S. Department of Education and expand school choice. So while suggesting overall federal spending is kind of puny at 7 to 13 percent of the total, apparently Department of Education spending on charter school grants is too big to kill. But it is only $333 million dollars, or about $147 per charter student. That is a princely 1 percent of what the U.S. spends, on average, per K-12 student. Meanwhile, the DC voucher program is constantly under threat of destruction. And none of these justify keeping the Department which does way, WAY more than these few things.

So there it is, as fast as I could get it out. No doubt I missed some things. But hopefully this is enough for the fact checkers to get things closer to accurate next time. And now, on to other things…

As the number of people enrolling in ObamaCare Exchanges is falling below the Obama administration’s targets, Hillary Clinton faced a tough question at a town hall meeting in Ohio on Sunday night. Theresa O’Donnell, a Democratic-leaning voter complained that ObamaCare caused her family’s health insurance premiums to double from $5,880 per year to $12,972 per year. “I would like to vote Democratic, but it’s costing me a lot of money,” O’Donnell pleaded. “I am just wondering if Democrats really realize how difficult it’s been on working-class Americans to finance ObamaCare.” The audience applauded O’Donnell, showing once again that, really, not even Democrats like ObamaCare.

CNN Ohio Town Hall 3/13/16: Hillary Clinton asked about ACA Premiums

Clinton’s answer was confident, lucid, and totally incoherent. It amounted to this: (1) shop around on the Exchange for a better deal, which might not make a difference; then elect me and I’ll (2) reduce your copays and your deductibles and your premiums; and (3) encourage more non-profit health insurance companies to compete in the Exchanges.

Clinton acknowledged her first solution might not help. She implicitly recognized that ObamaCare may indeed be just as bad as O’Donnell described. Worse, under ObamaCare’s perverse rules, the more people shop around, the worse the coverage gets.

Her second solution was no better. As anyone who knows anything about health insurance can tell you, reducing deductibles and copayments increases the cost of health insurance. In all likelihood, it would also increase the cost of medical services, including the prescription drugs whose prices Clinton decries.

Clinton also seemed to acknowledge that her third solution is no solution, either. ObamaCare tried inject competition into the Exchanges by giving billions of taxpayer dollars to help launch non-profit “co-ops” run by people with no experience running a health-insurance company. Unsurprisingly most of the ObamaCare co-ops failed. Many patients lost their coverage all over again. Taxpayers will never get that money back.

The party that gave us ObamaCare doesn’t even like it. Still they seem to have learned nothing from its failures.

So far as some people are concerned, when it comes to bashing economists, any old stick will do.

That, at least, seems to be true of those anthropologists and fellow-travelers who imagine that, in demonstrating that certain forms of credit must be older than either monetary exchange or barter, they’ve got some of the leading lights of our profession by the short hairs.

The stick in this case consists of anthropological evidence that’s supposed to contradict the theory that monetary exchange is an outgrowth of barter, with credit coming afterwards.  That view is a staple of economics textbooks.  Were it nothing more than that, the attacks would hardly matter, since finding nonsense in textbooks is easier than falling off a log.  But these critics have mostly directed their ire at a more heavyweight target: Adam Smith.

In The Wealth of Nations, Smith observes that

When the division of labour has been once thoroughly established, it is but a very small part of a man’s wants which the produce of his own labour can supply.  He supplies the far greater part of them by exchanging that surplus part of the produce of his own labour, which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men’s labour as he has occasion for.  Every man thus lives by exchanging, or becomes in some measure a merchant, and the society itself grows to be what is properly a commercial society.

But when the division of labour first began to take place, this power of exchanging must frequently have been very much clogged and embarrassed in its operations.  One man, we shall suppose, has more of a certain commodity than he himself has occasion for, while another has less.  The former consequently would be glad to dispose of, and the latter to purchase, a part of this superfluity.  But if this latter should chance to have nothing that the former stands in need of, no exchange can be made between them.  The butcher has more meat in his shop than he himself can consume, and the brewer and the baker would each of them be willing to purchase a part of it.  But they have nothing to offer in exchange, except the different productions of their respective trades, and the butcher is already provided with all the bread and beer which he has immediate occasion for.  No exchange can, in this case, be made between them.  He cannot be their merchant, nor they his customers; and they are all of them thus mutually less serviceable to one another.  In order to avoid the inconveniency of such situations, every prudent man in every period of society, after the first establishment of the division of labour, must naturally have endeavoured to manage his affairs in such a manner as to have at all times by him, besides the peculiar produce of his own industry, a certain quantity of some one commodity or other, such as he imagined few people would be likely to refuse in exchange for the produce of their industry.

What’s wrong with that?  In the words of Cambridge anthropologist Caroline Humphrey, as quoted in a recent article on the subject in The Atlantic  (the appearance of which inspired the present post), what’s wrong is that “No example of a barter economy, pure and simple, has ever been described, let alone the emergence of money… . All available ethnography suggests that there has never been such a thing.”

Now, the mere lack of historical or anthropological evidence of past barter economies is itself no more evidence against Smith’s account than it is evidence in favor of it:  after all, if barter tends to get as “clogged as embarrassed” as Smith maintains, we should not be surprised to find no evidence of societies that relied on it.  That lack might only mean that societies either came up with money quickly, or perished equally quickly.  Instead of refuting Smith’s theory, in other words, the lack of evidence of barter may simply reflect survivorship bias.  Julio Huato, in his astute review of Graeber’s book, makes the point most cogently: “Graeber’s attitude,” he writes,

is like that of a chemist rejecting the idea that unstable radioactive isotopes of a certain chemical element exist and tend to evolve into stable isotopes because the former are only exceptionally found in nature, while the latter are common.

But the problem with Smith’s understanding, according to Graeber, isn’t merely that anthropologists can find no evidence of barter societies.  It is, rather, that those same anthropologists have plenty of evidence of societies that subsisted, if they didn’t thrive, despite neither having money nor relying upon barter.  Instead of relying on “quid-pro-quo” exchanges, whether direct or indirect, they managed by resorting to subtle forms of credit, if not outright gift-giving.

As our Atlantic correspondent explains:

If you were a baker and needed meat, you didn’t offer your bagels for the butcher’s steaks.  Instead, you got your wife to hint to the butcher’s wife that you two were low on iron, and she’d say something like, “Oh really?  Have a hamburger, we’ve got plenty!”  Down the line, the butcher might want a birthday cake, or help moving to a new apartment, and you’d help him out.

Far be it for me to deny that trade of this sort happens, even in modern societies, or even that entire communities have at various times depended on it.  Heck, I once taught a short course on economic anthropology an entire section of which was devoted to gift giving and other sorts of “ceremonial exchange.”  What I do deny, and vigorously, is anthropologist David Graeber’s claim that the existence of gift economies undermines, not just Adam Smith’s account of money’s origins, but “the entire discourse of economics.”

Hear our correspondent once again:

According to Graeber, once one assigns specific values to objects, as one does in a money-based economy, it becomes all too easy to assign value to people, perhaps not creating but at least enabling institutions such as slavery…and imperialism… .

There you have it.  By claiming that societies could thrive only by means of monetary exchange, Adam Smith is supposed to have given shape to an “economic discourse” according to which all things, including people, are bound to be valued in terms of money, thereby “enabling” slavery and imperialism and…well, the whole capitalist catastrophe.

That nothing could be more grotesquely unjust to Adam Smith than Graeber’s attempt to paint him as an enabler of slavery and imperialism is (or ought to be) painfully obvious.  But if fair play is not Professor Graeber’s forte, neither is a solid, or even a more than exceedingly superficial, understanding of the tenets of modern economics.  Had Graeber’s purpose been, not to document  economists’ ignorance of anthropology, but to show that at least one anthropologist doesn’t know the first thing about economics, I dare say that he could have done no better than to write Debt: The First 5000 Years.

Consider the opening passage of “The Myth of Barter,” Graeber’s second chapter, and the one in which he sets-out his central claim that Smith, by getting the story of money wrong, took a fateful wrong turn:

What is the difference between a mere obligation, a sense that one ought to behave in a certain way, or even that one owes something to someone, and a debt , properly speaking?  The answer is simple: money.  The difference between a debt and an obligation is that a debt can be precisely quantified.  This requires money.

“A history of debt,” Graeber observes two paragraphs later, “is thus necessarily a history of money.”

This is simple, all right.  But a moment’s thought reveals that it is also simply wrong.  One can incur a debt by borrowing some non-monetary good or goods, just as well as by borrowing money, where repayment is also to be made in goods, and is no less precisely quantified than a monetary obligation might be.  To say, “Give me a hamburger today and I’ll repay you two hamburgers on Tuesday,” is to offer to go into debt to the tune of (precisely) two hamburgers.  That money is both fungible and relatively (though in practice not infinitely) divisible makes it an especially convenient object of debt contracts.  But that is a difference in degree rather than in kind.

Far from being innocuous, the error with which Graeber’s chapter opens is but one crack in the severely-flawed foundation upon which his entire critique of both modern economics and commercial society rests.  That foundation consists of the view that money is, not only uniquely (and precisely) quantifiable, but something capable of precisely measuring the value of other things:

What we call “money” isn’t a “thing” at all; it’s a way of comparing things mathematically, as proportions: of saying one of X is equivalent to six of Y.

Monetary exchange, in turn,

is all about equivalence.  It’s a back-and-forth process involving two sides in which each side gives as good as it gets. …[E]ach side in each case is trying to outdo the other, but, unless one side us utterly put to rout, it’s easiest to break the whole thing off when both consider the outcome to be more or less even.

In other words, monetary exchange, being but an “impersonal” matter of mathematics, is a contest that must result either in a stalemate, with neither side winning, or in a bargain by which one side rips the other off.  Gift exchange, on the other hand, “is likely to work precisely the other way around — to become a matter of contests of generosity, of people showing off who can give more away.”

I leave it to the reader to imagine how, by means of repeated appeals to this sort of reasoning, Graeber manages to paint Adam Smith (and most economists since) as an apologist for slavery, imperialism, and pretty much every ungenerous and unkind activity under the sun.

There’s just one problem.  Just as money is in truth no more “quantifiable” than hamburgers, so, too, is it the case than money is no more a “measure” of value than a hamburger is.  By that I mean, not that a hamburger is also capable of measuring the value of other things, but that neither it nor any sort of money is capable of doing so.

The idea that money is a “measure of value,” like the related idea that exchanges are necessarily exchanges of equivalents, is among the hoariest of economic fallacies.  It plays a prominent part in Aristotle’s economics — and, not coincidentally, in Aristotle’s condemnation of all sorts of “capitalist” activity.  Smith himself, in subscribing to a modified labor theory of value,  was unable to break free of it.  It is more than a little ironic that Graeber, in flinging all sorts of undeserved criticism at Smith, cleaves to him when it comes to his one indisputable mistake.

The notion that money is a “measure of value” is but a particular instance — albeit one that has managed to linger on in some economics textbooks — of the mistaken belief that economic exchanges are exchanges of equivalents.  In his book Money: The Authorized Biography, Felix Martin, like Graeber, takes the “measure of value” notion seriously, and attempts to build from it a critique of both modern economics and modern monetary economies.  In reviewing that work, I explained Martin’s mistake by observing that when a diner sells me bacon and eggs for $4.99, “that doesn’t mean that bacon and eggs are worth $4.99, ‘universally’ or otherwise.  It means that to the diner they are worth less, and to me, more.”

Grasp this little strand of truth.  Pull on it.  Keep on pulling.  And watch Martin’s critique unravel. Graeber’s critique, with its fatuous dichotomy of generous credit transactions on one hand and antagonistic monetary transactions on the other, rests on the same fallacy, and is no less gimcrack.

My concern, though, isn’t with Graeber’s sweeping condemnation of modern economics, or of the  economic arrangements for which modern economists are supposedly to blame.  It’s with his particular claim that there’s no merit in Smith’s account of the origin of money, or in the later  accounts of other economists, including Carl Menger.  Despite what these economists have argued, money couldn’t have grown out of barter, Graeber insists, because the “fabled land of barter” that these accounts posit never existed.  Instead, credit came first, sometimes in subtle and elaborate forms that made it indistinguishable from gift-giving; then came money, in the form of coins.  Barter, finally,

appears to be largely a kind of accidental byproduct of the use of coinage or paper money: historically it has mainly been what people who are used to cash transactions do when for one reason or another they have no access to currency (my emphasis).

So, how true is Graeber’s account, and just how fatal is it to the “fable” that economists like to tell?  For answers, we need look no further than the evidence Graeber himself supplies.  For on close inspection, that evidence itself suffices to show that, notwithstanding the fact that credit is older than barter, Smith’s theory is, after all, not all that far removed from the truth.

A paradox?  Nothing of the sort.  The simple explanation is that, while subtle forms of credit or outright gift giving may suffice for affecting exchanges within tightly-knit communities, exchange within such communities hardly begins to take advantage of opportunities for specialization and division of labor that arise once one allows for trade, not just within such communities, but between them, that is, for trade between or among strangers.  One need only recognize this simple truth to resuscitate Smith’s theory from Graeber’s seemingly fatal blow.  Simple forms of credit may come first; but such credit only goes so far, because it depends on a repeated interaction, and the trust that such interaction both allows and sustains.  That affection and other such “moral sentiments,” to use Smith’s own term, also play a large part is evident from the fact that, within families even today,  monetary exchange and barter play hardly any role: every family is, if you like, a vestigial “gift” economy.

It’s absurd to suppose that Smith himself failed to recognize that credit (or something like it) functions in place of either barter or money in families; and hardly more so to suppose that he denied that it might do the same in somewhat larger but still tightly-knit communities.  Little Adam Smith did not, presumably, bargain with his mother over bed and board, or find his efforts to secure those and other necessities “embarrassed and choked” for want of either double coincidences or cash.  Nor could anyone aware of passages like the following, from Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, suppose that he considered mutual aid unimportant except within nuclear families:

In pastoral countries, and in all countries where the authority of law is not alone sufficient to give perfect security to every member of the state, all the different branches of the same family commonly chuse to live in the neighbourhood of one another.  Their association is frequently necessary for their common defence.  They are all, from the highest to the lowest, of more or less importance to one another.  Their concord strengthens their necessary association; their discord always weakens, and might destroy it.  They have more intercourse with one another, than with the members of any other tribe.  The remotest members of the same tribe claim some connection with one another; and, where all other circumstances are equal, expect to be treated with more distinguished attention than is due to those who have no such pretensions.  It is not many years ago that, in the Highlands of Scotland, the Chieftain used to consider the poorest man of his clan, as his cousin and relation.  The same extensive regard to kindred is said to take place among the Tartars, the Arabs, the Turkomans, and, I believe, among all other nations who are nearly in the same state of society in which the Scots Highlanders were about the beginning of the present century.

If Smith recognized, at least implicitly, that, in families and other tight-knit communities, “credit” serves in place of either barter or money, Graeber for his part is forced to admit that, when it comes to trade between strangers, credit won’t serve:

Now, all this (meaning the lack of evidence of a “fabled land of barter”) hardly means that barter does not exist — or even that it’s never practiced by the sort of people Smith would have referred to as “savages.”  It just means that it’s almost never employed, as Smith imagined, between fellow villagers.  Ordinarily, it takes place between strangers, even enemies (my emphasis).

Later Graeber writes,

What all … cases of trade through barter have in common is that they are meetings with strangers who will, likely or not, never meet again, and with whom one certainly will not enter into any ongoing relations. …

…Barter is what you do with those to whom you are not bound by ties of hospitality (or kinship, or much of anything else).

No doubt.  But how big a problem is this for Smith?  Let pass the silly remark about “savages.”  (An anthropologist ought, one would think, to be capable of resisting the temptation to pass judgement on an 18th-century Scotsman’s choice of words according to 21st-century notions of political correctness.)  The question is, what did Smith really “imagine”?  His story of the butcher and the baker notwithstanding, his reference to pastoral societies makes it perfectly evident that he understood the difference between conduct among “villagers” and conduct among strangers.  His theory of the origins of money ought to be understood accordingly.  It is a theory of how, when opportunities for trade arise among strangers, bringing with them further scope for the division of labor, trade will be “choked and embarrassed” if it must occur by means of barter, but will cease to be so once barter gives way to the employment of money.  In portraying such cases as exceptions to the rule that “credit” proceeds barter, Graeber simply fails to understand that such “exceptions” are all that matters in assessing Smith’s theory.

Nor will it do to suggest that Smith’s understanding of money’s origins confuses what happens within societies or communities with what happens between them.  Such a view depends on arbitrarily rigid definitions of “community” and “society” that overlook these concepts’ inherently elastic nature:  formerly separate communities cease to be so precisely to the extent that commerce takes place between them.  Smith, for his part, recognizes this.  Moreover he understands that the rise of commerce, meaning commerce among strangers, serves in turn to reduce the relative importance of ties of kinship and such, further increasing thereby the importance of monetary exchange.  Here is the passage from the Theory of Moral Sentiments that immediately follows the previously-quoted one on pastoral societies:

In commercial countries, where the authority of law is always perfectly sufficient to protect the meanest man in the state, the descendants of the same family, having no such motive for keeping together, naturally separate and disperse, as interest or inclination may direct.  They soon cease to be of importance to one another;  and, in a few generations, not only lose all care about one another, but all remembrance of their common origin, and of the connection which took place among their ancestors.  Regard for remote relations becomes, in every country, less and less, according as this state of civilization has been longer and more completely established.  It has been longer and more completely established in England than in Scotland;  and remote relations are, accordingly, more considered in the latter country than in the former, though, in this respect, the difference between the two countries is growing less and less every day.  Great lords, indeed, are, in every country, proud of remembering and acknowledging their connection with one another, however remote.  The remembrance of such illustrious relations flatters not a little the family pride of them all; and it is neither from affection, nor from any thing which resembles affection, but from the most frivolous and childish of all vanities, that this remembrance is so carefully kept up.  Should some more humble, though, perhaps, much nearer kinsman, presume to put such great men in mind of his relation to their family, they seldom fail to tell him that they are bad genealogists, and miserably ill-informed concerning their own family history.  It is not in that order, I am afraid, that we are to expect any extraordinary extension of, what is called, natural affection.

In short, a generous reading of Smith, far from making him out to be a right bungler when it comes to matters ethnographic, yields a relatively sophisticated view, according to which kinship and “credit” first predominate, but then give way, as strangers meet, first to barter, but eventually to monetary exchange, which in turn allows for the growth of commerce, which ends up reducing the role of kinship and kin-based credit relationships.

If Graeber’s reading of Smith is ungenerous, his reading of Carl Menger is…well, it’s obvious that Graeber hadn’t read Menger at all, for if he had he could not possibly have written that Menger improved upon Smith’s theory mostly “by adding various mathematical equations” to it, or that Menger “assumed that in all communities without money, economic life could only have taken the form of barter.”  (Nor, for that matter, could he have failed to note that the senior Menger, unlike his mathematician son, spelled Carl with a “C.”)  Instead, Graeber would have had to admit that Menger understood perfectly well that “credit,” in Graeber’s loose sense of the term, is older than either monetary exchange or barter.

Menger’s appreciation of the importance of what he sometimes referred to as “no-exchange” economies is especially evident in his 1892 article, “Geld,” in the Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften, from which his more well-known article “On the Origins of Money” is extracted.  According to Menger,

Voluntary as well as compulsory unilateral transfers of assets (that is, transfers arising neither from a ‘reciprocal contract’ in general nor from an exchange transaction in particular, although occasionally based on tacitly recognized reciprocity), are among the oldest forms of human relationships as far as we can go back in the history of man’s economizing.  Long before the exchange of goods appears in history, or becomes of more than negligible importance…we already find a variety of unilateral transfers: voluntary gifts and gifts made more or less under compulsion, compulsory contributions, damages or fines, compensation for killing someone, unilateral transfers within families, etc.*

Far from exemplifying Graeber’s claim that economists “begin the story of money in an imaginary world from which credit and debt have been entirely erased,” Menger explicitly recognizes that

people had probably tried to satisfy their wants, over immeasurable periods of time, essentially in tribal and family no-exchange economies until, aided by the emergence of private property, especially personal property, there gradually appeared multifarious forms of trade in preparation for the exchange proper of goods. …Only then, and hardly before the extent of barter and its importance for the population or for certain segments of the population had made it a necessity, was the objective basis and precondition for the emergency of money established.

In light of such evidence — which, bear in mind, comes from a work published several decades before Mauss’s pathbreaking work on gift exchange — the attention given to Graeber’s critique, and the fact that even some economists saw merit in it (if only temporarily), tells us that there is, after all, at least one impulse among humans that’s more deep-seated than their “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange.”  I mean, of course, their propensity to let themselves be thoroughly bamboozled.


*From the English Translation “Money,” by Leland Yeager (with Monika Streissler).  In Michael Latzer and Stefan W. Schmitz, eds., Carl Menger and the Evolution of Payments Systems: From Barter to Electronic Money (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar), pp. 25-108.

[Cross-posted from]

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is America’s first $1 trillion bureaucracy. HHS will spend $1.1 trillion in 2016, which is one $1 million repeated one million times.

You are paying for it, so you might want to know that:

  • The department spends more than $8,800 a year for every household in the United States.
  • It runs 528 different subsidy programs for state and local governments, businesses, and individuals.
  • The largest HHS subsidy program is Medicare at $589 billion in 2016, followed by Medicaid at $367 billion.
  • HHS has 73,000 employees.
  • Real, or inflation-adjusted, HHS spending has exploded ten-fold since 1970, as shown in the chart below.
  • At the 1965 signing ceremony for Medicare, President Lyndon Johnson said “No longer will young families see their own incomes, and their own hopes, eaten away simply because they are carrying out their deep moral obligations to their parents.” But since there is no Santa Claus, that is exactly what is happening today as government health spending is imposing huge debt burdens on young families.
  • HHS programs have huge fraud and abuse, which costs taxpayers tens of billions of dollars a year. The programs also distort the health care industry in serious ways because of their top-down structure and masses of regulations. The way to fix the mess is to slash federal spending and move toward a consumer-directed health care system.

By the next president’s fourth budget, annual HHS spending will have grown another $300 billion or so to $1.4 trillion. That is another $300 billion the government will have to borrow from Wall Street, China, and other places that presidential candidates are abusing on the campaign trail. Along with exploding Social Security spending, rising HHS spending is not making America great again, but pushing us into a financial crisis. What are the candidates proposing to do about it?  

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) recently announced that it would start accepting consumer complaints about marketplace lending.  Marketplace lending, previously known as “peer to peer” or “P2P” lending, emerged in the aftermath of the financial crisis.  A combination of tightening credit markets and low-interest rates created a perfect marriage between consumers looking for loans and investors looking for profit.  In its first incarnation, peer to peer lending served as an online matchmaking service, allowing prospective borrowers to post requests for loans to be reviewed by individuals willing to make those loans.  “Peer to peer” referred to the fact that the lenders were ordinary people, just like the borrowers.  The loans are non-recourse, meaning that if the borrower fails to repay, the lender is simply out of luck.  Although these would appear to be risky loans, in fact, the default rate has been surprisingly low: 4.9 percent at market-leader Prosper as of the end of 2014, and 5.3 percent at the other leader, Lending Club, during the period between Q1 2007 and Q1 2015.

The loans have performed so well that the market quickly attracted institutional investors and more sophisticated business models.  As the two leading providers of marketplace loans today, Prosper and Lending Club use the same (somewhat complex) model.  The companies issue notes to investors that are obligations of the issuing company. Simultaneously, WebBank, a Utah-based FDIC-insured bank, originates a loan which is sold to the company. The company pays for the loan with the proceeds from the sale of notes to investors. The loan is disbursed to the borrower. The borrower repays the funds in accordance with the terms of the loan. And the payments from the borrower are used to pay the purchasers of the company’s notes. The payment of the notes is explicitly dependent on the borrower’s repayment of the loan.

Since marketplace lending has gained momentum, there have been concerns about its regulation – expressed both by those who worry that it’s completely unregulated (not true, but there have been no new regulations specifically targeting the industry), and by those–like me–who worry that its innovation will be smothered while the industry is still in its infancy.

Although the CFPB has not announced any plans (yet) to write new regulations specifically aimed at marketplace lending, and although there is an argument that much of the industry actually falls under the SEC’s jurisdiction, the move to solicit complaints certainly seems to signal an interest in regulation down the road.  Aside from general concern about regulating an industry still in the process of defining itself (how do you know what problems may work out on their own through better solutions that regulation could provide?), there is a specific problem with using customer complaints as a foundation for regulation.  It’s the same problem supporting the general argument in favor of regulation: There is clear self-selection at play. 

Who is more likely to seek out the CFPB’s complaint portal: the happy borrower who has secured a loan at a favorable rate, or the disgruntled borrower?  While the American public has always been free to “petition the government for a  redress of grievances,” actively seeking out those unhappy with an industry smacks of a regulator looking for a reason to regulate.  If the CFPB is concerned about marketplace lending, a more sound approach would be to hold old fashioned hearings which, while sometimes more a performance than an inquiry, at least tend to include representatives from both sides of an issue.

One law firm has dubbed the CFPB’s announcement the establishment of  a “beachhead” in the marketplace lending industry, planting a flag signaling new regulation ahead.  I, unfortunately, tend to agree.

Many in the Bitcoin community seek increased financial privacy. As I wrote in a 2014 study of the Bitcoin ecosystem, “Bitcoin can facilitate more private transactions, which, when legal in the jurisdictions where they occur, are the business of nobody but the parties to them.” That study identified “algorithmic monitoring of Bitcoin transactions” as a rather likely and somewhat consequential threat to the goal of financial privacy (pg. 18). It was part of a cluster of similar threats.

Good news: The Bitcoin community is doing something about it.

The Open Bitcoin Privacy Project recently issued the second edition of its Bitcoin Wallet Privacy Rating Report. It’s a systematic, comparative study of the privacy qualities of Bitcoin wallets. The report is based on a detailed threat model and published criteria for measuring the “privacy strength” of wallets. (I’ve not studied either in detail, but the look of them is well-thought-out.)

Reports like this are an essential, ecosystem-building market function. The OBPP is at once informing Bitcoin users about the quality of various wallets out there, and at the same time challenging wallet providers to up their privacy game. It’s notable that the wallet with the highest number of users, Blockchain, is 17th in the rankings, and one of the most prominent U.S. providers of exchange, payment processing, and wallet services, Coinbase, is 20th. Those kinds of numbers should be a welcome spur to improvement and change. Blockchain is updating its wallet apps. Coinbase, which has offended some users with intensive scrutiny of their financial behavior, appears wisely to be turning away from wallet services.

Bitcoin guru Andreas Antonopolis rightly advises transferring bitcoins to a wallet you control so that you don’t have to trust a Bitcoin company not to lose it. The folks at the Open Bitcoin Privacy Project are working to make wallets more privacy protective. Kudos, OBPP.

There’s more to do, of course, and if there is a recommendation I’d offer for the next OBPP report, it’s to explain in a more newbie-friendly way what the privacy threats are and how to perceive and weigh them. Another threat to the financial privacy outcome goal—ranked slightly more likely and somewhat more consequential than algorithmic monitoring—was: “Users don’t understand how Bitcoin transactions affect privacy.”

You Ought to Have a Look is a feature from the Center for the Study of Science posted by Patrick J. Michaels and Paul C. (“Chip”) Knappenberger.  While this section will feature all of the areas of interest that we are emphasizing, the prominence of the climate issue is driving a tremendous amount of web traffic.  Here we post a few of the best in recent days, along with our color commentary. 

More and more, harsh reality is stacking up against our ability to achieve the cuts in our national emissions of greenhouse gases that President Obama promised the international community gathered in Paris last December at the UN’s climate conference. In that regard, here some items we think you ought to have a look at.

A couple of weeks ago, we reported that it was looking as if the EPA’s methane emission numbers were a bit, how should we say it, rosy. We suggested that emissions of methane (a strong greenhouse gas) from the U.S. were quite a bit higher than EPA estimates, and that they have been increasing over the past 10 years or so, whereas the EPA reports that they have been in decline. Factoring in this new science meant that the recent decline in total greenhouse gas emissions from the US was about one-third less than being advertised by the EPA and President Obama— imperiling our promise made at the UN’s December 2015 Paris Climate Conference.

Goings-on during the intervening weeks have only acted to further cement our assessment.

EPA has come around to admitting its error—to at least some degree. Wall Street Journal’s energy policy reporter Amy Harder tweeted this from EPA Chief Gina McCarthy:


The details behind McCarthy’s statement can be found in a new report from the EPA—a draft of its 2016 edition of the annual US Greenhouse Gas Inventory Report.  In the new draft, the EPA reports that they are in the process of reworking their previous estimates of methane emissions from “natural gas systems” and “petroleum systems.”  They put out a call for public input on their new mythology, which, as a provided example, results in 27% more emissions from those sources in 2013 than the EPA had determined previously.  EPA promises to apply the new methodology to all of its methane emissions from 1990 to the present and notes that:

Trend information has not yet been calculated, but it is expected that across the 1990-2013 time series, compared to the previous (2015) Inventory, in the current (2016) Inventory, the total CH4 emissions estimate will increase, with the largest increases in the estimate occurring in later years of the time series.

Larger increases later in the time series will act to lessen the decline or perhaps even switch the sign of the overall trend.

And even without including the new calculations for natural gas and petroleum systems, the EPA requantified the reported decline in US methane emissions. In last year’s report, they wrote “[m]ethane (CH4) emissions in the United States decreased by almost 15% between 1990 and 2013.” This year, its “[o]verall, from 1990 to 2014…total emissions of CH4 decreased by 37.4 MMT CO2 Eq. (5.0 percent).” The changes arise largely as a result of new examinations and recalculations involving methane release from landfills.

More and more, the EPA’s methane picture is looking, how should we say it, less rosy.

It seems the closer folks look, the more it appears that Obama’s proud accomplishments and promises are proving to be little more than smoke and mirrors.

Take the Clean Power Plan. Almost every analyst alive knew that the plan was a big stretch of the Clean Air Act and that it was going to face legal challenges that were not going to be resolved until the Supreme Court had its say in June, 2017.  A 5-4 decision is almost certain, with the outcome hinging on November’s election, after which the President will nominate a justice to replace Antonin Scalia who will actually be reviewed by the Senate.   Knowing his Plan was in legal hot water, Obama nonetheless told the Paris assembly “we’ve said yes to the first-ever set of national standards limiting the amount of carbon pollution our power plants can release into the sky.” Barely two months later, the Supreme Court said “not so fast” and stayed the Clean Power Plan pending the outcome of all the challenges.

And then, as we mentioned, there’s the methane issue. The EPA said emissions were declining, when in fact they are almost certainly rising. So much so, that the total decline in greenhouse gas emission from the U.S. has likely been overestimated by as much as a third. This situation is a bit grimmer than what President Obama said in Paris: “Over the last seven years, we’ve made…ambitious reductions in our carbon emissions.”

Also, it looks as if the pathway to our promise was rigged.  In a series of recent reports by David Bailey and David Bookbinder for the Niskanen Center, the authors show that the Obama Administration is employing some creative accounting to work the numbers to make it look like there is a clear path towards meeting our Paris target.

From their January report “The Administration’s Climate Confession … and New Deception” comes this assessment:

In the little-noted Second Biennial Report of the United States of America Under the United Nations Framework submitted to the U.N. climate process on December 31, the Administration impliedly admitted that the measures it listed in the INDC would leave us short, by about 500 -800 MMT. The Report itself is a masterpiece of obfuscation in the name of transparency. It includes emission reductions dating back to the 1990s in its list of current measures, and for the majority of measures does not list any reductions numbers. But, not to fear, because “additional measures” of up to 700 MMT, plus a new, secret ingredient [a rapid expansion of US carbon sinks from forestry] worth about another 300 MMT, will still get us to the 2025 target.

And, after having a look at the new EPA draft report, Bailey and Bookbinder responded with “New EPA Data Casts More Doubt on Obama’s Climate Promises,” where they concluded:

The new estimates of carbon sinks are particularly significant. We discussed before how the Administration’s Second Biennial Report to the IPCC indicated that the U.S. is relying on an implausibly large increase in absorption of GHGs in sinks to meet the Paris target, from 912 MMT absorbed in 2005 to over 1,200 MMT absorbed by 2025. The revised estimate for 2005 sinks is now 636 MMT, or less than 70% of what the Biennial Report stated only two months ago. Thus, one of the Administration’s main compliance tools now requires not a 30+% increase to 2025, but nearer to a 100% increase.

The biggest impact of these revisions will be (once again) on the credibility of our Paris commitment to reduce 2005 emissions by 26% by 2025. 

The effect on Obama’s Paris promise of all of the above (and more) is well-summed in this story from Inside Climate News:

New data this week showing how little progress the United States has made in cutting greenhouse gas emissions since President Obama took office is the latest evidence to undercut the pledges the United States made in negotiating the Paris climate treaty.

The Clean Power Plan’s crackdown on coal-fired power plants is on hold, thanks to the Supreme Court. Methane emissions are turning out to be higher than previously thought, as natural gas booms. People are buying more gas-guzzling cars, thanks to low prices at the pump.

And now, in a draft of its annual greenhouse gas emissions tally, the EPA reported that emissions in the year 2014 climbed almost 1 percent from 2013 to 2014. That brought emissions back above the level of Obama’s first year in office, 2009.

In negotiating the Paris treaty, signed in December, the U.S. pledged to cut emissions 26 to 28 percent by 2025, below the level of 2005.

The new data shows that from 2005 to 2014 emissions went down just 7.5 percent, leaving most of those promised reductions off in the distance, like a hazy mirage.

Most of that decline is due to the nosedive in emissions that came with the Great Recession of 2008 and 2009.

In a quarter-century, through Democratic and Republican administrations alike, U.S. greenhouse gas emissions have marched mostly in the wrong direction.


All the while, President Obama is leading the push to get countries to sign the Paris Agreement  at a big press event to be held at the United Nations headquarters in New York City on April 22—Earth Day.  The Agreement must be ratified by at least 55 countries representing at least 55 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions before coming into effect. 

Lest some countries become worried that Obama’s Paris emissions pledge was but a well-orchestrated sham and start to get cold feet about signing the Agreement, the President, this week, did manage to slip $500 million into the U.N.’s  Green Climate Fund.  Perhaps that’ll be enough hush money to keep the complaints muted. A rich-to-poor money transfer more so than climate change mitigation is, after all, arguably the most attractive part of the Paris Agreement for most countries.

            An article in the March 14th issue of the New Yorker describes the negative effects of sex offender laws on juveniles who get caught up in a legal system designed to protect children from adult sexual predators.  Adolescent sexual experimentation, especially when accompanied by age mismatch, and child misbehavior have become criminalized in ways that those interviewed in the article see as unintended, mistaken, and counterproductive.

            The unanalyzed premise of the article, however, is that the public labeling of adult sex offenders is good public policy.  The logic underlying public notification laws for adults would seem to be sound: if a known sex offender is looking for a new victim, isn’t it useful if the offender’s neighbors know the person is a threat and can take measures to reduce their own risk of victimization?

In an article in Regulation Professor J. J. Prescott of the University of Michigan Law School examines the separate effects of police registration and public notification requirements on the incidence of sexual attacks.  He concludes that “each additional sex offender registered per 10,000 people reduces the annual number of sex offenses reported per 10,000 people on average by 0.098 crimes (from a starting point of 9.17 crimes). This sizeable reduction (1.07 percent) buttresses the idea that we may be able to use law enforcement supervision to combat sex offender recidivism.”  But the reduction is confined to friends and neighbors and has no effect on sex offenses against strangers.

In contrast public notification deters those who are not already registered but increases recidivism among those who are.  “… for a registry of average size, instituting a notification regime has the aggregate effect in these data of increasing the number of sex offenses by more than 1.57 percent, with all deterrence gains more than offset.”  “… the more difficult, lonely, and unstable our laws make a registered sex offender’s life, the more likely he is to return to crime—and the less he has to lose by committing these new crimes.”  “…if these laws impose significant burdens on a large share of former offenders, and if only a limited number of potential victims benefit from knowing who and where sex offenders are, then we should not be surprised to observe more recidivism under notification, with recidivism rates rising as notification expands.”