Policy Institutes

I wrote only yesterday about the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (CFPB’s) regulatory overreach with regard to payday loans, and it seems the D.C. Circuit Court was on the same wavelength.  Judge Brett Kavanaugh, writing for the court, handed down a stinging condemnation of the Bureau’s structure, labeling the single-director model unconstitutional.  Although the court’s remedy is somewhat limited – changing the agency from independent to one within the executive branch, with the director serving at the pleasure of the President – the opinion itself is a full-throated indictment of the CFPB’s structure and repeated overreach.  Even given its limited application, it is a win for those who have long questioned the many defects in the CFPB’s design.

The case before the court arose out of an enforcement action brought by the CFPB against the mortgage lender PHH Mortgage.  The action was initially brought before one of the agency’s own in-house adjudicators, who imposed a fine on the company.  (Although not explicitly addressed in this case, these internal administrative proceedings, led by administrative law judges or ALJs, present their own issues, similar to those at the SEC that I have discussed here and here.)  Director Richard Cordray apparently thought the $6.4 million fine imposed by the ALJ was insufficient and added another $102.6 million to the bill.  PHH Mortgage appealed the Director Cordray’s decision to the D.C. Circuit.

The court’s decision turns principally on the magnitude of the director’s power.  Unlike the heads of agencies such as the Department of Justice or Department of the Treasury, the director of the CFPB can be removed by the President only for cause.  That is, the President could remove Cordray only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance.  In fact, the court called the Bureau’s director the “single most powerful official in the entire United States Government, at least when measured in terms of unilateral power” after the President himself.  And the President is at least accountable to the people through the democratic process.  Other powerful positions within the federal government – Speaker of the House, Senate Majority Leader, heads of other independent agencies – have greater checks on their power.  The Speaker cannot act without persuading and cajoling a large number of colleagues.  Independent agencies such as the SEC and FTC are comprised of multi-seat commissions, and no one commissioner can act alone, making the commissioners themselves the checks on each other’s power.  The director of the CFPB faces no such constraints.

The lack of constraint alone would make the CFPB’s structure a problem.  But this power has not lain idle.  Instead, the CFPB has sought to extend its reach not only beyond the bounds expressly set for it in its authorizing statute, but has also trespassed on basic principles of due process.  Despite years of precedent established by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the CFPB in this case decided it would interpret a key statutory provision differently.  It was within the CFPB’s authority to issue a new interpretation, but the Bureau didn’t take this path.  Instead, it elected to simply apply its new interpretation to PHH Mortgage, bring an enforcement action against the company, and then apply its interpretation retroactively, deeming culpable conduct that the company could not have known the Bureau would find illegal.  If Congress is constitutionally barred from passing ex post facto laws, surely an agency is similarly barred; due process forbids it.  And this is what the court found, noting that the “CFPB violated bedrock due process principles by retroactively applying its new interpretation of the statute against PHH.” (emphasis in original) 

Although PHH argued for the dissolution of the CFPB and indeed for the court to strike down Dodd-Frank in its entirety (since the Dodd-Frank Act created the agency), the court rightfully refused to take such a drastic step.  Many would welcome an end to both, but the judiciary should not strike down laws lawfully passed by the legislature unless absolutely necessary.  In this case, the court found that it could remedy the constitutional defect by requiring that the director serve at the will of the President, and that is an appropriately limited position for a court to take.  The case was therefore remanded to the CFPB for reconsideration. 

To the extent it exists, the CFPB, as others have argued, should be turned into a commission with several commissioners, from different political parties, each bringing his or her own views and insights to the regulatory process.  The CFPB’s funding should come through the appropriations process, which would impose a congressional check on its power, and not through a demand made of the Federal Reserve as is currently the case.  While Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion makes no such sweeping changes, it moves the needle a little bit closer to accountability, due process, and constitutional soundness.  For now, I’ll take it.

Beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, the federal government (as well as other governments around the world) began to adopt policies based on the idea that crime could be reduced if you somehow could make it very difficult for criminals to use the money they illegally obtain. So we now have a bunch of laws and regulations that require financial institutions to spy on their customers in hopes that this will inhibit money laundering.

But while the underlying theory may sound reasonable, such laws in practice have been a failure. There’s no evidence that these laws, which impose heavy costs on business and consumers, have produced a reduction in criminal activity.

Instead, the only tangible result seems to be more power for government and reduced access to financial services for poor people.

And now we have even more evidence that these laws don’t make sense. In a thorough study for the Heritage Foundation, David Burton and Norbert Michel put a price tag on the ridiculous laws, regulations, and mandates that are ostensibly designed to make it hard for crooks to launder cash, but in practice simply undermine legitimate commerce and make it hard for poor people to use banks.

Oh, and these rules also are inconsistent with a free society. Here are the principles they say should guide the discussion.

The United States Constitution’s Bill of Rights, particularly the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, together with structural federalism and separation of powers protections, is designed to…protect…individual rights. The current financial regulatory framework is inconsistent with these principles. …Financial privacy can allow people to protect their life savings when a government tries to confiscate its citizens’ wealth, whether for political, ethnic, religious, or “merely” economic reasons. Businesses need to protect their private financial information, intellectual property, and trade secrets from competitors in order to remain profitable. Financial privacy is of deep and abiding importance to freedom, and many governments have shown themselves willing to routinely abuse private financial information.

And here are the key findings about America’s current regulatory morass, which violates the above principles.

The current U.S. framework is overly complex and burdensome… Reform efforts also need to focus on costs versus benefits. The current framework, particularly the anti-money laundering (AML) rules, is clearly not cost-effective. As demonstrated below, the AML regime costs an estimated $4.8 billion to $8 billion annually. Yet, this AML system results in fewer than 700 convictions annually, a proportion of which are simply additional counts against persons charged with other predicate crimes. Thus, each conviction costs approximately $7 million, potentially much more.

By the way, the authors note that their calculations represent “a significant underestimate of the actual burden” because they didn’t include foregone economic activity, higher consumer prices for financial services, lower returns for shareholders of financial institutions, higher financial expenses for unbanked individuals, and other direct and indirect costs.

And what are the offsetting benefits? Can all these costs be justified?

Hardly. David and Norbert point out that we’re all paying more and getting very little in return for the higher burdens.

The original goal of the BSA/AML rules was to reduce predicate crimes, such as illegal drug distribution, rather than money laundering itself. Judged by this standard, very little empirical evidence suggests that the rules have worked as designed. In fact, even though BSA/AML rules have been expanded consistently throughout the past four decades, it remains difficult to discern any net benefit of the overall BSA/AML regulatory framework. Even though there is no clear evidence that the rules materially reduce crime, the BSA/AML bureaucracy began relentlessly expanding internationally—primarily through the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)—more than two decades ago. One comprehensive study reports that even though the FATF proceeds as if these rules have produced only public benefits, “[t]o date there is no substantial effort by any international organization, including the International Monetary Fund, to assess either the costs or benefits of” this regulatory framework. In fact, BSA/AML regulations have been sharply criticized as a costly, ineffective approach to reducing crime. …compliance costs are high for financial companies, with a disproportionate burden falling on smaller firms…, where hiring even one additional employee can lower the return on assets by more than 20 basis points. Other research suggests that the increasing compliance burden in the banking industry is at least partly responsible for the trend toward consolidation and the disappearance of smaller banks. …an American Bankers Association (ABA) publication highlights a small bank that reports it has to dedicate more than 15 percent of its employees to compliance-related tasks. An ABA survey also suggests that the cumulative cost associated with compliance has caused banks to offer fewer services and raise fees, thus harming consumers. …the BSA/AML regime has been a highly inefficient law enforcement tool. At the very least, a high degree of skepticism about further expansion of these and similar requirements is in order. Given the billions of dollars spent annually by the private sector on the existing elaborate and costly AML bureaucracy, a serious data-driven cost-benefit analysis of the existing system is warranted.

If anything, I think they’re being too nice.

The cost-benefit analysis already exists. The laws and regulations don’t work.

Let’s expand our look at the issue. The Wall Street Journal notes that the current approach has myriad negative consequences as banks sever relationships with customers (in a process called “derisking”) because they don’t want to deal with the hassle, expense, and liability of money-laundering red tape.

…financial firms, faced with strict penalties over counterterror and anti-money-laundering rules, have severed accounts of thousands of customers in recent years over fears of heightened risk. The consequences of shuttered accounts were detailed this week in a Wall Street Journal investigation showing how money-transfer firms whose bank accounts have been closed have been pushed out of the global banking system. In addition, nonprofit organizations operating in Syria and Lebanon have faced challenges after losing their bank accounts. …In February of this year, more than 50 nonprofits asked the U.S. Treasury to publicly affirm that nonprofit organizations aren’t inherently high risk. …Two studies by the World Bank in late 2015 found that money-service businesses—which include money transmitters—and foreign banks were both seeing account closures at increasing rates.


This process has made life much more difficult for people and businesses seeking to engage in legitimate commerce.

Not to mention that the government abuses the enormous powers it has accumulated, as we can see from the Obama Administration’s odious “Operation Choke Point.”

Another report from the WSJ explains that the rules actually make it harder for law enforcement to monitor the people who might actually be doing bad things.

U.S. banks have closed thousands of accounts held by people and organizations considered suspicious, high-risk or difficult to monitor—including money-transfer firms, foreign banks and nonprofits working abroad. Closing accounts for fear their customers may be up to no good evicts from the financial system the innocent as well as those the U.S. government would most like to watch, a consequence not anticipated by Washington. Comptroller of the Currency Thomas Curry this month acknowledged the potential danger. “Transactions that would have taken place legally and transparently may be driven underground,” he told an international conference of bankers and regulators in Washington. …Fearing steep financial penalties for failing to spot a wayward customer, many banks now shun anyone who looks risky. That leaves ostracized companies to seek alternatives—such as toting bags of cash overseas—a practice that allows hundreds of millions of dollars to leave the global banking system… “The whole flow of money goes underground, and that becomes counterproductive to the original purpose of being able to track” it, said Dilip Ratha, head economist of the World Bank’s unit that studies remittances. “It’s a bit paradoxical.” U.S. officials said they didn’t intend banks to close whole categories of customer accounts.

So potential bad guys are harder to track.

And financial institutions waste lots of money (which translates into higher costs for consumers).

Risky accounts should be managed, officials said, not avoided altogether. …Western Union said it now spends $200 million a year watching for suspicious activity… J.P. Morgan Chase & Co….now has about 9,000 employees dedicated to anti-money-laundering and has cut off thousands of customers viewed as higher-risk. …Jaikumar Ramaswamy, a Bank of America Corp. compliance executive and former federal prosecutor, said, “I’m surprised at how much of my time is spent not focusing on the guilty but chasing the innocent.” Instead of looking for needles in haystacks, he said, the system demands banks “turn over every piece of hay.”


Here’s a novel idea. Why doesn’t law enforcement engage in actual, old-fashioned police work. In other words, instead of having costly burdens imposed on everybody, governments should use the approach which historically has successfully reduced crime - i.e., policies that increase the likelihood of apprehension and/or severity of punishment.

But don’t hold your breath waiting for that to happen.

Instead, we actually get politicians and policy makers coming up with schemes to expand the burden of money laundering laws. Some of them want to ban the $100 bill, or perhaps even ban cash entirely. All so government can more closely monitor the private financial choices of innocent people.

If you want more information, here’s a video I narrated on this topic for the Center for Freedom and Prosperity.

Last but not least, let’s return to the Heritage study, which includes this very important warning about a very risky and dangerous treaty that may be considered by the U.S. Senate.

…the willingness to impose costs on the private sector and to violate the privacy interests of ordinary people should be less in the case of information sharing for tax purposes than for the purposes of preventing terrorism or crime. Moreover, tax-information-sharing programs are quite often a veiled attempt to stifle tax competition from low-tax jurisdictions. Tax competition is salutary and limits the degree to which governments can impose unwarranted taxation. …The U.S. Senate is currently considering the “Protocol Amending the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters,” which would impose a wide variety of new information-reporting requirements on financial institutions to help foreign governments collect their taxes. A second treaty—worse than this protocol—is the follow-on OECD treaty known as the “Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information.” This follow-on treaty implements both the protocol and the 311-page OECD “Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters.” Together, the protocol, the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement, and the OECD Standard constitute the three main parts of a new automatic information-exchange regime being promoted by the OECD and international tax bureaucrats. If the U.S. ratifies the protocol and implements the new OECD standard, Washington would automatically, and in bulk, ship private financial and tax information—including Social Security and other tax identification numbers—to Argentina, China, Colombia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Russia, and nearly 70 other countries. In other words, foreign governments that are hostile to the U.S., corrupt, or have inadequate data safeguards, would automatically have access to private financial (and other) information of some U.S. taxpayers and most foreigners with accounts in the U.S.

A truly awful pact. And keep in mind it also would be the genesis of a World Tax Organization.

P.S. Since we closed by discussing the intersection of tax and money laundering, I should point out that statists frequently demagogue against so-called tax havens for supposedly being hotbeds of dirty money, but take a look at this map put together a few years ago by the Institute of Governance and you’ll find only one low-tax jurisdiction among the 28 nations listed.

P.P.S. You probably didn’t realize you could make a joke involving money laundering, but here’s one starring President Obama.

P.P.P.S. But when you look at the real-world horror stories that result from these laws, you realize that the current system on money laundering is no laughing matter.

Donald Trump always sounded just like a Bernie Sanders Democrat when talking about international trade.  “We have one issue that’s very similar,” he said, “and that’s trade.”  That Trump-Sanders hostility to trade liberalization, in turn, is identical to that of the AFL-CIO and the Economic Policy Institute, a leftist think tank created and largely financed by labor unions.

It should be no surprise that Donald Trump’s most influential adviser and spokesman on international trade, Peter Navarro, is a former unsuccessful Democrat politician who seems closer to an old-style Bernie Sanders leftist Democrat than to a Bill Clinton “New Democrat.”

The only academic among Trump 13 economic advisers, Navarro returned to being an economics professor at U.C. Irvine, after losing San Diego mayoral election to Republican Susan Golding.   In 1993 Navarro wrote the book, Bill Clinton’s Agenda for America.  

With one caveat, the book was full of glowing praise for everything Clinton promised to do – notably lots more federal spending (which, ironically, fell substantially).

Navarro’s doubts about Clinton concerned NAFTA, which Bush created but Clinton promised to change. “I thought the NAFTA agreement ought to have been more properly called ‘SHAFTA,’” says Navarro.  But he notes that “candidate Clinton later acknowledged the problems of the environment and lost jobs raised by NAFTA, and called for wage safeguards and stricter environmental regulations. It remains to be seen whether this was merely rhetoric, or a serious concern that will have policy follow-through.”

Putting NAFTA aside, giving Clinton the benefit of doubt, Navarro concluded, “if Clinton and Gore carry through with their agenda … we will become more globally competitive, our educational system will improve, better protection will emerge for our environment, our cities will be rebuilt, and, most important of all, hundreds of thousands of jobs will be created.”

Navarro dismissed Reagan’s seven years of 4.4% annual GDP growth as “The Failure of Reaganomics” and the “Trickle Down Rip-Off.” He thought Reagan spent far too much on Defense. Maybe so, but that helped dissolve the USSR which later made it easy for President Clinton to spend much less.

Navarro was almost as fearful of Japanese industrial dominance in 1993 as he now is of China. For some reason (perhaps the United Auto Workers), he even worried Japan would “locate many of their plants within U.S. borders to avoid the certain protectionism they saw coming.”

The way to beat such winners, he argued, was for the U.S. to become more protectionist and dirigiste.  “Countries like Japan, Germany, France and Taiwan have very sophisticated industrial policies,” wrote Navarro, while “Reagan and Bush Administrations… [were] clinging to a free-trade philosophy.”  Without a protectionist industrial policy and generous grants and subsidies the U.S. couldn’t possibly compete, since “Japan and Germany were devoting over 10 times what the U.S. was spending on public infrastructure and new technologies.”

“The essence of a national industrial policy,” Navarro explained, “is a full partnership between government and business… [T]he role of government is to help a nation’s businesses compete by providing technological assistance, subsidies and protectionist measure such as tariffs and quotas.”  In other words, Crony Capitalism - an open invitation to mass corruption.

Industrial policy advocate Peter Navarro may now seem a peculiar choice to advise a Republican presidential contender, but such peculiarity is not unprecedented.

Bob Dole’s adviser was the loyal Democrat, Mark Zandi.  He’s the so-called “independent expert” mentioned by Hillary Clinton in the first debate, and he’s the loyal hyper-Keynesian Democrat who predicted wondrous results from Obama’s “stimulus” scheme. Zandi is also the nameless “leading private forecasting firm” who’s most responsible for the Obama team’s infamously wrong Romer-Bernstein forecast of January 2009. 

Dole didn’t do so well by turning to a Democrat ideologue for economic advice. That lesson was apparently lost on Mr. Trump. 

Despite professing a desire for “financial inclusion,” usually understood as better access to financial products for lower income people, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has taken aim at a product used extensively by low- and moderate income Americans: the short-term, low value loans known as “payday” loans.  What is even more striking about the proposed rule, however, is the fact that it works as an end-run around an express limit on the CFPB’s power.  The CFPB has spent its short life pushing the bounds of its authority in numerous directions, going so far as to incur a slap from a federal court when it trod on the toes of another agency.  The CFPB could be excused for thinking that at least some members of Congress desired such expansion, given the broad and amorphous authority the Dodd-Frank Act grants the new agency.  But it is hard to justify evading an express prohibition.

Although the CFPB is given the authority to proscribe unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices, the Dodd-Frank Act explicitly withholds from the CFPB the authority to “establish a usury limit.”  The proposed rule does not set a rate cap, but it does make lending at any rate above 36 percent so onerous as to be infeasible.  In fact, it is not clear that it would be even be possible to comply with the rule.

On Friday, I submitted a letter to the CFPB, expressing concern over the agency’s authority to enact the rule as proposed.  In particular, the letter notes that the underwriting process required for loans with an effective annual interest rate higher than 36 percent are not only onerous but require the lender to make determinations that may be impossible to make.  For example, under the proposed rule a lender would be required to “forecast a reasonable amount of basic living expenses for the consumer – expenditures (other than debt obligations and housing costs) necessary for a consumer to maintain the consumer’s health, welfare, and ability to produce income[.]”  This amount can be difficult for individuals to determine for their own households.  My husband and I have an estimate we use to help us save for an emergency, but I couldn’t swear to its accuracy given the vagaries of life with small children.  I couldn’t guess what the right number might be for any other household in my acquaintance.  If I am uncertain what my own family might need, it is difficult to see how a storefront lender could make this determination for a prospective borrower who walks in off the street.  Certainly this level of underwriting, which surpasses even what is required for most mortgages, is not cost-effective for a loan of only a few hundred dollars.

If the “power to tax involves the power to destroy,” the power to regulate must carry the same destructive force.  Since these heavy underwriting rules would apply only to loans made at a certain interest rate, It is difficult to view the proposed rule as anything less than an attempt to cap interest rates on short term, small dollar lending at 36 percent.  And this the CFPB may not do.

Nor is the CFPB authorized to ban payday lending altogether and yet the rule is likely to do just that.  There have been previous attempts to cap such lending at 36 percent.  And the result was a significant decrease in the availability of short term, small value loans. 

Congressional intent can be ambiguous.  But in this case, Congress spoke clearly through Dodd-Frank: the CFPB cannot set interest rate caps.  No, not even through clever rule-making.  I have argued elsewhere that concern about the dangers of payday lending are misplaced, but even those who find payday lending to be distasteful should reject such naked overreach. This regulation should be scrapped.

Until the last few minutes of last night’s debate, Donald Trump had been the only candidate to talk about trade policy during the debates.  At the first presidential debate, Clinton studiously avoided the topic even as Trump used Clinton’s past support for NAFTA and her flip-flop on the TPP to blame her for all the economic troubles he thinks trade has caused. At the vice-presidential debate, neither Mike Pence nor Tim Kaine offered any substantive remarks about trade policy. 

Most of the second presidential debate followed the same pattern.  Trump continued to complain unchallenged that America is losing because of our trade deficit and that Clinton is responsible because of NAFTA and the TPP.

But then in the second to last question of the debate, Trump finally evoked a response from Clinton when he stumbled into some remarks about China and the U.S. steel industry during a longer diatribe about coal and environmental regulations:

We have to bring back our workers. You take a look at what’s happening to steel and the cost of steel and China dumping vast amounts steel all over the United States, which essentially is killing our steelworkers and steel companies.

When it was Clinton’s turn to respond, here’s what she had to say:

First of all, China is illegally dumping steel in the United States and Donald Trump is buying it to build his buildings, putting steelworkers and American steel plants out of business. That’s something that I fought against as a senator and something I would have a trade prosecutor to make sure we don’t get taken advantage of by China on steel or anything else.

You’ll note that Clinton didn’t disagree with Donald Trump’s assessment or criticize his simplistic, zero-sum view of trade.  Instead, she accused Trump of hypocrisy and complicity with the problem and highlighted her own record and promises to protect the steel industry. 

I’ve written before about how Clinton’s own protectionist positions have made it impossible for her to refute Trump’s trade rhetoric.  When confined to specifics, Trump’s trade policy proposals are very similar to what Clinton and other Democrats have been advocating for years.

Just like Trump’s efforts to tie Clinton to NAFTA, Clinton’s remarks about Trump and Chinese steel are likely meant to convince labor unions and Rust Belt voters that she will be a more sincere protectionist than her opponent.

Clinton’s plan to create a special “trade prosecutor” position is a curious proposal she has advocated for a long time.  It was one of her trade policy talking points in 2008 and she’s mentioned it a number of times during this election cycle.  It’s not clear to me what exactly a “trade prosecutor” would do.  Bringing dispute settlement cases against foreign countries at the WTO is already a responsibility of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.  She may want to bring more cases, but she hasn’t said why USTR would not be up to the task.

It’s also confusing that she connects the trade prosecutor proposal to “dumping” which is currently handled through a sophisticated legal process at the Department of Commerce, U.S. International Trade Commission, and federal courts.  Cato scholars have written a lot about the myriad problems with America’s antidumping laws.  To say the least, more antidumping duties are not going to help the U.S. economy.

If you’d like to learn more about the problem of global steel overcapacity and what the best U.S. response would be, I recommend reading this recent Free Trade Bulletin written by my colleague Dan Pearson or watching this Cato Policy Forum from last week.  Spoiler: We don’t need more antidumping duties.

In last night’s presidential debate, policy issues were barely discussed among the conspiracy theories and scandal-mongering. But even the limited discussion of foreign policy highlighted a pretty strange fact: the Republican ticket effectively has two distinct foreign policy approaches. And though it’s hardly unusual for running mates to differ to some extent on issues – indeed, Hillary Clinton and Tim Kaine differ on some key foreign policy points – Trump’s statements last night, publicly repudiating his running mate’s proposals for Syria, were bizarre.

Despite his choice of vice presidential candidate, Trump and Pence have been largely at odds on foreign policy since day one.  Trump’s approach to foreign policy is highly inconsistent but has certainly been unconventional. The GOP nominee advocates a militaristic, ‘America First’ foreign policy, but differs from GOP orthodoxy on key topics like Russia, the Iraq War, U.S. alliances, and trade. In contrast, Pence is a hawk’s hawk, supporting the war in Iraq, increases in defense spending, and further Middle East intervention. In 2005, then-Representative Pence even introduced a House Resolution which would have declared that President Bush should not set an ‘arbitrary’ date for the removal of troops from Iraq until nation-building was complete.

The result has been a curious dichotomy in the Republican ticket’s foreign policy proposals. At last week’s vice presidential debate, Pence ignored Trump’s prior foreign policy statements, advocating for intervention against the Assad regime, the creation of safe zones in Syria, and a substantially harder line against Russia. Yet last night, when moderators pushed Trump on these differences, the Republican presidential candidate bluntly rejected Pence’s stance, noting that “he and I haven’t spoken, and I disagree.”  Trump then further contradicted his running mate, arguing for better relations with Russia, even refusing to attribute recent hacking incidents to Russia despite substantial evidence from the intelligence community on the issue.

To be sure, there are also some differences between candidates on the democratic side of the ticket. While Clinton has argued that the 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force gave President Obama the authorization to use military force in Libya and against ISIS, Tim Kaine has been an active Senate proponent of greater congressional oversight of foreign policy. In particular, Kaine has advocated for the repeal of the 2001 AUMF, and its replacement with a more narrowly tailored AUMF focused on ISIS. Yet the difference in opinion is largely procedural: Kaine supports Clinton’s proposals to create a safe zone or no-fly zone in Syria and the campaign against ISIS if properly authorized. At the same time, he has toned down his support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership to match Clinton’s newfound reticence on trade.

There has been little such accommodation on the Republican side of the contest, where Pence and Trump each seem determined to pursue their own distinct foreign policy agendas. This is concerning for several reasons.  First, it is possible that Pence may be able to exert more influence on foreign policy than a typical vice presidential candidate. Before settling on Pence as his running mate, Trump reportedly told potential running mate John Kasich that he would be the most powerful vice president in history, running both domestic and foreign policy. Second, some conservatives have suggested that Trump has little interest in actually being president, and might well step down after his inauguration in favor of Pence.

Though there are strong reasons to doubt how restrained Trump’s foreign policy would be in reality – as well as substantive concerns about his temperament, and his connections to Russia – there is no doubt that Mike Pence’s foreign policy would be far less restrained. No matter how entertaining it may be to watch, therefore, the split in the Republican ticket offers little reassurance for those concerned about foreign policy during a Trump presidency.


You Ought to Have a Look is a regular feature from the Center for the Study of Science.  While this section will feature all of the areas of interest that we are emphasizing, the prominence of the climate issue is driving a tremendous amount of web traffic.  Here we post a few of the best in recent days, along with our color commentary.

This week we feature a few smart pieces by some smart folks.

First up is an excellent post “Climate Modeling: Settled Science or Fool’s Errand?” by Competitive Enterprise Institute’s Bill Frezza in which he discusses the development of climate models and the reliability of the future that they project. But Bill’s post is really just to provide some background for his Real Clear Radio Hour interview with Arizona State University’s Dr. Daniel Sarewitz, who is the co-director of ASU’s Consortium for Science, Policy, and Outcomes. Sarewitz has a lot of interesting things to say about “Big Science” and the problems that result. Frezza summarizes his interview:

Sarewitz, who was trained as an earth scientist, is terrified that “science is trapped in a self-destructive vortex” that is endangering both science and democracy. In his blockbuster analysis mentioned above, he nails his thesis to the laboratory door, challenging Big Science to get its act together. Politicizing science, he argues, leads to debates about science being substituted for debates about politics. So we end up fighting over unverifiable forecasts about what might happen in the future, rather than wrestling with the complex tradeoffs that attend political decisions on what we should – or could – do about carbon emissions under all the potential future scenarios.

But rather than get discouraged, Sarewitz believes there is a way out of this conundrum. His advice is, “Technology unites while science divides.” He recommends that science “abdicate its protected political status and embrace both its limits and its accountability to the rest of society.” Despite calling long-range climate forecasting “a fool’s errand,” he thinks dumping too much CO2 in the atmosphere will make anthropogenic global warming a long term problem that will eventually require the decarbonization of our energy industries. But he sees this as a process taking many decades, one that can be best addressed not with politicized science, but by letting adaptation, innovation, wealth creation, and economic growth lead the way.

If you have a free 20 minutes or so and are interested in how the quest for policy has derailed the pursuit of science, listening to Frezza’s full Sarewitz interview will be time well spent.

Next up is a post in which Institute For Energy Research economist Robert Murphy takes a look at a new report from R Street—a “A carbon bargain for conservatives”—in which R Street tries to tell conservatives that “[a] properly designed revenue-neutral price on carbon will improve economic efficiency, promote better environmental outcomes than existing policy and allow market forces to determine the course to a lower-carbon future.”

To which Murphy bluntly asks “What is the point of this exercise?” He elaborates:

It’s not as if President Obama or Gina McCarthy are making a substantive offer here. Rather, R Street’s proposal (and others like it) are fantasy land bargains from people with no political power in order to get conservatives and libertarians to abandon their opposition to a massive new tax. What is the point of this exercise?

…The typical progressive activist, and the typical administrator at the EPA, do not share [a] general admiration for the market economy. It is not as if the people of Greenpeace toss and turn at night, lamenting the Pareto inefficiencies in our economy and the fact that industry produces a bit above the “optimal” level of pollution. No, these people do not like capitalism, period, and think Americans are consuming too much.

…I’m glad to see that R Street’s energy analysts are admitting all of the tremendous problems with a carbon tax (such as leakage, the tax interaction effect, and the arbitrariness of the “social cost of carbon”), but they valiantly throw all of those concerns aside and still assume they can strike a deal with groups who are saying, in print, that they are not going to make such a deal. In closing, I simply repeat my initial reaction: I honestly don’t know what the point of these reflections is, except to weaken conservative and libertarian resistance to a massive new tax that R Street admits could bring in more than $1 trillion in the first ten years.

Murphy’s full rebuttal is both thoughtful and entertaining.

And finally, the Bipartisan Policy Center last week hosted a panel discussion which reviewed the Clean Power Plan’s recent day in court, including insightful commentary from participants from both sides of the argument.  The discussion was moderated by Wall Street Journal energy reporter Amy Harder with panelists including David Doninger from National Resources Defense Council, Christophe Courchesne, chief of the Environmental Protection Division of the Massachusetts Attorney General’s office, Jeff Holmstead, former Assistant Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency for Air and Radiation, and Allison Wood, attorney at Hunton & Williams, and who presented arguments in the case before the DC Circuit Court.

The panelists offered interesting thoughts about the issues which may decide the case and how they perceived that the judges received the arguments and what decision they may ultimately come to. We found the comments to be informative and to well-summarize (including key details) this important case.

The discussion was recorded by C-SPAN, which has made it available here. It’s long (at over an hour and a half) but is a good place to hear what those in the trenches are saying about the case. You ought to have a look.



Peter Navarro, a Professor at U.C. Irvine, is Donald Trump’s most influential adviser/spokesman on international trade, and the only academic among his 13 economic advisers.   

After a losing campaign to become mayor of San Diego as an anti-NAFTA Democrat running against Republican Susan Golding, Navarro wrote a 1993 book, Bill Clinton’s Agenda for America. It provides intriguing clues about the sort of policy advice he now offers Mr. Trump.

Navarro begins by saying, “if Clinton and Gore carry through with their agenda … we will become more globally competitive, our educational system will improve, better protection will emerge for our environment, our cities will be rebuilt, and, most important of all, hundreds of thousands of jobs will be created.”

He goes on to write of “The Failure of Reaganomics” and the “Trickle Down Rip-Off.” The complaint is mainly about the U.S. spending too much on defense, with Japan financing the resulting budget deficits and aiming to “locate many of their plants within U.S. borders to avoid the certain protectionism they saw coming.”

“Countries like Japan, Germany, France and Taiwan have very sophisticated industrial policies,” wrote Navarro, while “Reagan and Bush Administrations… [were] clinging to a free-trade philosophy.”  Without a protectionist industrial policy the U.S. couldn’t possibly compete, particularly since “Japan and Germany were devoting over 10 times what the U.S. was spending on public infrastructure and new technologies.”

“The essence of a national industrial policy,” Navarro explained, “is a full partnership between government and business… [T]he role of government is to help a nation’s businesses compete by providing technological assistance, subsidies and protectionist measure such as tariffs and quotas.”

Inequality and the “one percent” have generated an inordinate amount of media coverage recently, despite the fact that these topics barely register when people are asked to name the country’s most important problem. The rhetoric often portrays the wealthy as a homogenous group that inherited its wealth, and those that do work operate almost exclusively in the financial sector. A recent study published in Intelligence this year that was highlighted by Tyler Cowen delved into the characteristics of wealthy individuals. The findings run contrary to the commonly held perception that this is a stagnant, homogeneous group. There is a significant amount of diversity when it comes to which industries these people work in, and a much higher share of the wealthy Americans in this sample are self-made compared to some European peers.

In their study, David Lincoln from Wealth-X and Jonathan Wai from Duke University use the Wealth-X database to analyze a sample of more than 18,000 ultra high net worth (UHNW) people, which they define as having a net worth greater than $30 million. Their findings help us get beyond the rhetoric to see how the wealthy got to that position.

Compared to some of the European countries most-often cited as models of equity, the United States has a significantly higher share of UHNW people whose wealth is primarily self-made: 75 percent in the United States compared to just 31.3 percent in Sweden, 42.5 percent in Norway, or 43.6 percent in Denmark.

In fact, only 12.6 of the American individuals analyzed derived most of their wealth from inheritance, a lower share than any European country in the sample besides Finland (9.1 percent, but with a much higher share with their primary source of wealth being a mix between inheritance and self-made) and the United Kingdom (12.5 percent).

Unlike the common portrayal, it is the European countries that has a more stagnant and stultified elite class, while the United States has one of the higher shares of self-made men and women in the study’s sample.

Ultra High Net Worth Individuals by Primary Source of Wealth, Select Countries

Source: Wai and Lincoln (2016), Appendix F. 

There is also a surprising amount of variation when it comes to the industries where UHNW people work. While the highest share is in finance and banking at just over 18 percent, a significant number of the people in the sample work in other industries like real estate, media, or IT services.

The composition of industries has changed over time and will continue to do so. This reflects another way that this group is ever-changing, especially in places like the United States, where there are more opportunities for founders, innovators, and entrepreneurs to reach the highest levels. 

Industries for Ultra High Net Worth Individuals 

Source: Wai and Lincoln (2016), Appendix G.

Note: Labels excluded for industries with smaller shares due to space constraints. A full list can be found in Appendix G of the paper.

The wealthy people in this sample are not a homogenous group, and there are significant variations when it comes to family composition, political affiliation, generosity, and religion, among other things. UHNW people take a number of different paths to attain their wealth, such as working in media, in manufacturing, or in tech companies. Compared to some of the European countries that are typically viewed as more egalitarian, more UHNW Americans acquired wealth that was self-made. In short, the issue is not as simple as the rhetoric often implies.

My colleague Michael Tanner recently released a paper looking at more of the common myths that surround the discussion of inequality, which can be found here.

An exchange in last night’s debate revealed the deep divide in this country over who should be allowed in the country. Audience member Gorbah Hamed posed a question to Donald Trump:

There are 3.3 million Muslims in the United States, and I’m one of them. You’ve mentioned working with Muslim nations, but with Islamophobia on the rise, how will you help people like me deal with the consequences of being labeled as a threat to the country after the election is over?

Trump responded:

Well, you’re right about Islamophobia, and that’s a shame. But one thing we have to do is we have to make sure that — because there is a problem. I mean, whether we like it or not, and we could be very politically correct, but whether we like it or not, there is a problem. And we have to be sure that Muslims come in and report when they see something going on. When they see hatred going on, they have to report it.


And [Clinton] won’t even mention [radical Islamic terrorists] and nor will President Obama. He won’t use the term “radical Islamic terrorism.” Now, to solve a problem, you have to be able to state what the problem is or at least say the name. She won’t say the name and President Obama won’t say the name. But the name is there. It’s radical Islamic terror. And before you solve it, you have to say the name.

Moderator Martha Raddatz asked Clinton to respond, and she launched into a predictable critique of the “divisive, dark things said about Muslims” during the campaign and concluding “we’re not at war with Islam.”

Raddatz then turned to Trump and asked him to explain whether his pledge in December to ban all Muslims from coming to the United States was still in effect. “Your running mate [Indiana Governor Mike Pence] said this week that the Muslim ban is no longer your position. Is that correct? And if it is, was it a mistake to have a religious test?”

Trump answered as follows:

The Muslim ban is something that in some form has morphed into a extreme vetting from certain areas of the world….We are going to areas like Syria where they’re coming in by the tens of thousands because of Barack Obama. And Hillary Clinton wants to allow a 550 percent increase over Obama. People are coming into our country like we have no idea who they are, where they are from, what their feelings about our country is, and she wants 550 percent more. This is going to be the great Trojan horse of all time.

We have enough problems in this country. I believe in building safe zones. I believe in having other people pay for them, as an example, the Gulf states, who are not carrying their weight, but they have nothing but money, and take care of people. But I don’t want to have, with all the problems this country has and all of the problems that you see going on, hundreds of thousands of people coming in from Syria when we know nothing about them. We know nothing about their values and we know nothing about their love for our country.

I predicted on Twitter that both campaigns would use Donald Trump’s answer to this question in advertisements. Trump’s response appeals to his hard-care supporters who were never troubled by the prospect of a Muslim ban, and who likely believe that “extreme vetting” is the same thing. Trump supporters, the latest polling clearly shows, believe that immigrants (including refugees) pose a “critical threat” to U.S. security. That this belief is utterly erroneous will not be rectified by facts. Some go so far as to wonder why there are any Muslims in the United States in the first place.

Though Hillary Clinton doesn’t revere the Constitution as much as Trump claims to – she notably didn’t mention respect for the Constitution as a key factor in judging potential Supreme Court nominees (h/t Matthew Feeney) – she presumably interprets Trump’s “extreme vetting” as synonymous with a religious test, which the Constitution explicitly forbids.

In a campaign marked by divisive rhetoric, Trump and Clinton’s answers mainly revealed the very deep chasm separating the people in this country, one that will not be healed after November.

Something striking happened last week: the Obama White House released its Housing Development Toolkit and Obama’s economic advisor, Jason Furman, wrote a follow-on op-ed about land use regulation’s negative consequences. While White House reports tend to be geared toward partisan political objectives, these two publications could have been written by non-partisan economists. Nevertheless, although the honest application of economic theory is welcome, libertarians will still find points of disagreement.

What’s good? The report highlights zoning policies’ influence on increasing housing prices, immobilizing workers in job deserts, creating costly uncertainty for developers, increasing inequality and racial segregation, and suppressing economic growth. These negative outcomes were attributed to “excessive barriers,” “unnecessarily slow permitting processes,” and “arbitrary or antiquated” zoning and land use regulations.

The White House even went so far as to say that “even well-intentioned land use policies” can have negative impacts. So far, so good.

What’s bad? The worst part of the report is the declaration that the President’s 2017 HUD budget includes a $300 million proposal for grants to help cities “modernize their housing regulatory approaches.” Since when does it cost $300 million to reduce regulation, which is all the “modernizing” that needs to be done?

The report also gets it wrong with some of its specific policy prescriptions. In order to increase housing supply, it not only suggests a range of deregulatory measures, but also various reregulations. For instance, the Toolkit recommends that vacant land be taxed at a higher rate, and that local governments require developers to build affordable units in exchange for development approvals.

In this way, the authors fall back into the original trap: they think that city officials know better than private citizens what should be built and where. But if the last century taught us anything, it should have taught us that officials are not more capable of guiding urban development than private citizens are. In fact, that brand of overconfidence is what got us into this housing supply crisis to begin with.

Finally, the authors seemingly approve of states dictating zoning and land use policies to their cities. This mentality overlooks the fact that cities often resort to zoning in order to protect their own interests when they feel threatened by intrusive state policies. Consequently, the worst thing state governments can do is squeeze their cities with more requirements, thereby providing more incentive for cities to assert local control through work-around policies.

So if the state or federal government can’t impose their will on cities, what can be done? If federal and state governments step aside, local community advocacy groups will step in. For example, in San Francisco, one of the most expensive and constrained urban markets, GrowSF and other groups are educating voters, canvassing neighborhoods in support of pro-growth policy, building a political coalition between democrats, conservatives, and libertarians, and filing lawsuits against burdensome regulations. This grassroots approach is how civil society is built, how consensus is built, and where lasting policy change occurs.

Paradoxically, the Toolkit even acknowledges the preeminent role that local preferences should play: “regions are better able to compete in the modern economy when … housing development is allowed to meet local needs” it declares. Who better to determine local needs than property owners and concerned citizens themselves?

(For more on the Toolkit, please see my colleague’s work here.) 

The rapid rise of the U.S. trade deficit with China after 1995 is often blamed on China joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.  But the WTO is a simply a forum for arbitrating trade disputes, not a trade agreement (which must be legislated among countries).  

Yet according to Peter Navarro, Trump’s trade adviser, “The defining moment in American economic history is when Bill Clinton lobbied to get China into the World Trade Organization. It was the worst political and economic mistake in American history in the last 100 years… .The problem, right off the bat, was that China had much higher tariffs than everywhere else, so the U.S. and Europe in particular got the short end of that stick.”

In reality, China joining the WTO had zero effect on U.S. tariffs against Chinese imports. But it forced China to lay off 36 million workers in state enterprises, then cut industrial and agricultural tariffs by at least half by 2005 and more by 2010.  

U.S. tariffs were unchanged by China’s entry into WTO, remaining 2-3% on a weighted average. Since 1980 the U.S. has extended “normal trade relations” or “Most Favored Nation” status to China – as it does for every other nation but two (Cuba and North Korea).  MFN status simply means exemption from the infamous 1930 Smoot-Hawley tariffs, not exemption from the 3670-page U.S. Tariff Schedule.

To be accepted by WTO members (now 164), China had to shut down state industries after 1995 and greatly reduce its tariffs.  This was difficult and painful.  

In the China Economic Review, Michigan economists John Giles and Albert Park, with Juwei Zhang of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, investigated China’s True Unemployment Rate.  They found, “China’s … aggressive restructuring led to the layoffs of 45 million workers from 1995 to 2002, including 36 million from the state sector.”  If that was about “stealing jobs,” it certainly got off to a bad start.

John Hopkins economists Robert Moffitt and Yingyao Hu, with Shuaizhang Feng of Shanghai University, used detailed regional employment surveys, recently estimated the unemployment rate in China “averaged 3.9% in 1988-1995, when the labor market was highly regulated and dominated by state-owned enterprises, but rose sharply during the period of mass layoff from 1995- 2002, reaching an average of 10.9% … from 2002 to 2009.” 

Mass layoffs of 36 million workers at state enterprises were essential, despite the 10.9% unemployment for 8 years after joining WTO.  Such bloated tax firms could not possibly survive after China slashed tariffs, letting foreign goods compete.  Weighted average Chinese tariffs fell from 32.2% in 1992 to 19.8% in 1996, according World Bank estimates, then to 13.8% in 2000 and 4.6% by 2014.  

Exposing socialist enterprises to capital competition eventually paid off in higher productivity, lower costs and rising quality.  China’s exports then began to soar in the late 1990s largely as a result of this arduous 1995-2002 preparation for WTO trade standards, rather than from WTO membership per se.

Before joining WTO, China’s exports to the U.S. jumped from $38.8 billion in 1994 to 81.8 billion in 1999 and China’s global exports (in dollars) increased 14.2% a year.

One frequently misquoted source of the mistaken impression that China’s industrial gains were due to WTO membership is “The China Shock” by MIT economist David Autor and his colleagues David Dorn and Gordon Hanson.  A Wall Street Journal feature about China Shock said, “Imports from China as a percentage of U.S. economic output doubled within four years of China joining the World Trade Organization in 2001… . By last year, imports from China equaled 2.7% of U.S. gross domestic product.” 

That quote may appear to suggest U.S. imports surged after 2001, but it was Chinese imports that exploded. U.S. imports did recover modestly from 13.1% of GDP in the recession of 2001 to 15.5% in 2005, but imports always rise after recessions.  Contrast the U.S. cyclical uptick with China’s imports, which jumped spectacularly from 18.3% to 29.2% of GDP in those same years. China’s imports from the U.S. doubled from $24.8 billion in 2001 to $50.6 billion in 2005, before reaching $167.2 billion in 2014.  

In 2015 U.S. imports were still 15.5% of GDP – the same as 2005.  The fact that China’s share of U.S. imports was up and Japan’s down did not mean the U.S. was importing more – just importing from different countries.

The previous Wall Street Journal quote about what happened “after joining the World Trade Organization” gives the wrong impression that Autor, Dorn and Hanson attribute China’s export growth to joining the WTO. On the contrary, they attribute China’s export growth to proliferation of Special Economic Zones with freer markets. Autor says his study “strongly confirmed” that China’s success was driven by “falling costs and rising quality”.

When talking excitedly about trade deficits and trade deals, both Presidential candidates have been marching voters down a dark dead-end street. Trump and Clinton both claim larger imports or trade deficits are associated with weaker economic growth, which is the opposite of our experience.  And both attribute U.S. trade deficits to bad “trade deals” with a few smaller countries (while remaining curiously silent about Germany). Yet the largest trade deficits are with countries with which the U.S. has not yet negotiated any trade agreements.  

Before peddling risky solutions to a misperceived trade problem – such as threatening huge tariffs on countries or U.S. companies – the candidates might first take more care to understand, define and explain what problem they are hoping to fix.

In the first Presidential debate, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump managed to agree on one thing.  Unfortunately, they were both wrong.

What they agreed about is that trade deficits are due to “bad trade deals.”  Clinton said “we need to have smart, fair trade deals” and “hold people accountable.” Trump said, “We have to renegotiate our trade deals.”  Hillary voted against CAFTA, while Trump hates NAFTA.  Both dismissed the Trans-Pacific Partnership as just another foolish trade agreement.  

The trouble is our largest trade deficits are with countries with which the U.S. has no trade agreements – namely China ($334.1 billion in 2015) and the European Union ($102.9 billion).  We also have no trade deal with Japan, which is tied with Mexico for a poor third place ($55-58 billion) far behind Germany ($77.3 billion)

In other words, three of our four biggest trade deficits have nothing to do with trade agreements because such agreements don’t exist. Trump can’t “renegotiate” trade deals that were never negotiated.

The U.S. also has trade surpluses.  We ran a $31.7 billion trade surplus with Hong Kong last year, which is obviously part of China.  We ran a $6.1 billion surplus with Canada, $10.4 billion with Singapore, $12 billion with the U.K., $30.9 billion with OPEC countries, and $87 billion with South and Central America, plus $28.9 billion with various “other countries.”  Although a few trade surplus partners have Free Trade Agreements with the U.S. (Singapore, Canada and CAFTA), it would be incongruous if not ridiculous to attribute both surpluses and deficits to trade agreements.

In short, this entire bipartisan hullabaloo about some alleged link between trade deals and trade deficits is simply false – political fiction.           

In 2015, Nevada lawmakers passed the most ambitious educational choice law in the nation: a nearly universal education savings account (ESA) program. The program was scheduled to launch this year, but it immediately drew two separate lawsuits from opponents of educational choice. Last week, the Supreme Court of Nevada upheld the constitutionality of the ESAs, but ruled that the program was improperly funded. Choice opponents were quick to declare that the ESA program is dead, but as Tim Keller of the Institute for Justice noted, the program is only mostly dead, which means it is slightly alive.

Whether the program is fully revived depends entirely on the lawmakers who won plaudits for enacting it in the first place. On Monday, the legislature will meet in a special session to consider whether to subsidize the construction of a football stadium for the Raiders. Fixing the ESA funding would be a much more productive and beneficial use of their time. Sadly, Governor Brian Sandoval announced this week that ESAs would not be on the agenda:

Passage of Education Savings Accounts (ESAs) set a national precedent for school choice and symbolized a significant step toward education equality for every student. I recognize the magnitude of this sweeping policy measure and consider it a major component of the reform package ushered in during the last legislative session. Protecting this program is a top priority for me. There is simply not enough time to add it to next week’s Special Session with full confidence that a rushed outcome will pass constitutional muster.

Instead, the governor is launching a working group to fix the funding issue at a later date and he pledges to include the ESAs in his final budget recommendations for the upcoming biennium. There’s only one problem with this plan: the new legislature next year might not be as supportive of educational choice as the present one. If Gov. Sandoval and legislative leaders fix the funding issue now while they have legislative support for the program, they will cement their legacies in the history of education reform. If they fail to do so and the next legislature blocks efforts to fix the funding issue, their legacy will be a massive squandered opportunity.

There’s no need to roll the dice. There are various constitutional ways the legislature could fix the funding issue through existing or new funding streams while still saving the state money. The state supreme court barred the legislature from diverting funds that it had already committed to meet the basic funding requirements of the district school system, but otherwise left the door open to various funding possibilities.

At the very least, the legislature could fund the accounts via tax credits. As Jonathan Butcher and I described in a report we published earlier this year, the state could offer tax credits to individuals and corporations who donate to nonprofit scholarships organizations that could manage the ESAs, similar to tax-credit scholarship programs already in effect in 17 states. Florida’s ESA program is already managed by the scholarship organizations that participate in the state’s tax-credit scholarship program, and Nevada has a similar tax-credit scholarship program that has been in effect for more than a year. 

If the Nevada legislature has the time to waste on subsidizing football stadiums for billionaires at taxpayer expense, then surely they can find the time to fund ESAs for children who want a better education while saving the taxpayers money.

If I asked you whether Americans were more likely to name immigrants and refugees a critical threat to the United States in 1998 or in 2016, which year would you guess? Most people, I think, would quickly choose 2016. Most people, however, would be wrong.

According to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, in 1998 53% of Americans did so, compared to 43% in 2016. The error would be understandable, of course, given the homegrown terrorist attacks in Europe and the U.S. over the past year, Trump’s tough talk about Muslim immigrants, and the vigorous debate about Syrian refugees. Indeed, at first glance the numbers are puzzling.

When we break down the responses by political affiliation, however, we get our first clue about what is going on. As it turns out, in 1998 Republicans and Democrats were closely aligned in their assessments – 56% of Republicans and 58% of Democrats saw refugees and immigrants as a critical threat, a difference smaller than the margin of error in the survey. But by 2016 67% of Republicans did so compared to just 27% of Democrats.

The next piece of the puzzle is the timing of several major shifts in opinion. Republican and Democratic opinions remained closely aligned in 2002, with 62% of Republicans and 58% of Democrats naming refugees and immigrants as a critical threat. The first significant partisan gap emerged in 2004. At that point 62% of Republicans still identified refugees and immigrants as a critical threat but only 49% of Democrats did so. The second pivot point was 2010, when Democrats threat assessments began a steady drop: down to 41% in 2010, 30% in 2012, and just 21% in 2014. Over the same period Republican concerns waned somewhat as well, dropping from 62% to 55%. From 2014 to 2016 Republican concerns ramped sharply upward, to 67%, while Democrats grew somewhat more concerned, with 27% identifying refugees and immigrants as a critical threat.

The timing of these shifts in opinion is not coincidental. These threat perceptions reflect the fact that American foreign policy has become increasingly polarized since September 11, 2001. The emergence of the partisan gap on refugees and immigrants in 2004 followed the invasion of Iraq. The second shift appeared in 2010 in the first poll taken after the election of Barack Obama. Neither of these events, of course, have anything to do with the threat posed by refugees and immigrants. They both, however, produced massive levels of partisan rancor. By mid-2004, nearly 80% of Republicans still supported the war, but roughly 80% of Democrats opposed the war. Returning the favor, Republicans have blasted Obama’s approach to foreign policy at every turn. Republicans have blamed Obama for losing Iraq, for not standing up to China and Russia, and more generally for a failure of leadership on issues from the Syrian civil war to ISIS.

Since 9/11, in short, when pollsters call Americans to ask them how they feel about refugees and immigrants, their responses increasingly reflect the widening gap between Democrats and Republicans rather than a cold-eyed assessment of the actual threat they perceive.

Nor is this an isolated case. The same pattern can be seen if we look at how Americans assess the threat of Islamic fundamentalism. As the same Chicago Council report reveals, in 1998 there was a ten-point gap between parties, with 42% of Republicans and 32% of Democrats identifying it as a critical threat. After 9/11 those figures jumped to 70% for Republicans and 59% for Democrats. By 2016, however, the partisan gap had grown to 30 points, with just 49% of Democrats calling Islamic fundamentalism a critical threat to the United States compared to 75% of Republicans.

The upshot is that the next president, whether Trump or Clinton, will not be able to rely on the public for stable, majority support for foreign policy. Though Americans will coalesce around direct threats to the homeland, partisan lenses color their views of the rest of the world. There are few issues from immigration to intervention that will not quickly become polarized. Given that the platforms of both candidates have already engendered so much debate, the next four years of foreign policy promise to be heavily contested on all sides.

The release of a snippet of Donald Trump’s tax return from 1995 showing a net operating loss of nearly $1 billion, potentially allowing him to legally avoid paying taxes for an 18 year period, has given us another reason to condemn Donald Trump and the complicated provisions in the tax code pertaining to real estate that allow Trump and others like him to pay much less in taxes than the rest of us. One tax professional told me that there’s no reason for a big real estate concern to ever pay income taxes of any kind to the government if they have an accounting firm that knows what it’s doing.

A few people have expressed a hope that, should Trump lose, Congress would begin to look at some of the various real estate tax loopholes that allow such legal tax evasion. I would wholeheartedly agree with such sentiments, and humbly suggest that the purge begin with the most egregious and expensive real estate tax break of them all–the mortgage interest deduction. 

The MID costs the government $80 billion a year in lost revenue and is one of the most expensive tax breaks in the code. It may also be the least effective–because it’s a deduction (as opposed to a credit, or direct subsidy) that means that only the wealthiest homeowners (the top 30% or so) can actually take the deduction.

And a progressive tax code it means that the higher is a household’s income, the higher the rate they pay and the more they save from each dollar they deduct, so benefits go up disproportionately with income. Compounding the inequality of the MID is that tax savings also goes up when the mortgage size goes up. Taken together it means that a family in Moline making the median area income that buys an average-priced house will save about ten percent of what the median earner in San Francisco does when he uses a mortgage to buy the median house where he lives. 

But it gets worse. The reality is that the effects of the mortgage interest deduction are already priced into houses, so literally no one buying a home gets any benefit from it: they have already accrued to existing homeowners. In effect, it is a tax break that rewards existing homeowners and no one else. 

If we’re ever to achieve some modicum of tax reform–which I take to mean lowering rates and eliminating various deductions, credits and exclusions–the mortgage interest has to go. That’s implicit in some of the tax plans issued by the various candidates: Donald Trump’s plan would induce many more people to avail themselves of the standard deduction and eschew itemizing their returns, a necessary step to take deductions like the mortgage interest deduction. If the proportion of people who used the MID fell from 30% to 10%, it might become politically feasible to phase it out, a thought that strikes terror in the hearts of Big Housing–agglomeration of home builders, realtors, mortgage bankers and the like whose incomes go up with housing prices. 

A recent Morgan Stanley report released this week analyzed the impact of eliminating the deduction and it was illuminative: it sees only temporary housing price declines from such a step and even smaller short-term impacts on the broader economy. 

Brookings Scholar Richard Reeves suggested that liberal attempts to reduce income inequality always target the top one percent, and that this target is incorrect: The bigger problem in his estimation is the top twenty percent that are skating away from the rest of the hoi polloi, and he suggests we stop pretending that they aren’t rich. Taking away one of their biggest tax breaks–that does precisely nothing for the economy and goes almost entirely to the top quintile—is a necessary step if we’re ever to achieve any semblance of reform.

By all means let’s fix the tax code and eliminate the complex tax breaks for real estate that allow the Donald Trumps of the world to evade paying taxes. But while we’re at it let’s get rid of the mortgage interest deduction as well—the most egregious real estate tax break of them all. 

In September, the UK government gave the green light for the construction of the Hinkley Point power plant through a French-Chinese consortium. The project—which has received wide international attention after being very nearly relegated to the protectionist dustbin—has been agreed to after much hemming and hawing. It has been mired in controversy mainly over security concerns related to foreign ownership, viewed by some as smacking of protectionism.

It is no secret that there has been a worrying trend toward protectionism in the global markets. The appetite for international trade agreements and foreign investment has been consistently listless. In the United States, and globally, some politicians have been banking on this by flaunting protectionist rhetoric in an effort to garner support. But while protectionism may win votes in the short-term, domestic economic growth will lose out in the long-term. Ultimately, politicizing the global economic rut will only make matters worse.

A Global Trade Alert by the independent London-based think-tank, the Centre for Economic Policy Research, shows that between January 1 and October 31 2015 a total of 539 governmental measures adopted worldwide “harmed foreign traders, investors, workers, or owners of intellectual property” followed by a sobering observation that “in no previous year have we found so many trade distortions so quickly.”

According to the study, the three countries subjected most often to foreign protectionism have been China, the European Union and the United States, in order of ranking. Settling in to this new protectionist normal, however, will have dire economic consequences for all countries and not just developed ones.

Protectionism and an over-reliance on quantitative easing (QE) measures are key contributing factors toward the “new mediocre” which has set hold of the global economy. In this “new mediocre”, global growth is stuck at barely 3 percent a year, with the United States, the European Union, and Japan as the poorest performers. Relying on QE as a long-term solution as opposed to a short-term “fix” following the Financial Crisis of 2008 has had a hampering effect, lengthening rather than stemming the impact of the Financial Crisis – especially for countries that combined QE with austerity measures. Likewise, governments are exacerbating the situation by raising roadblocks on trade and investment opportunities.

The global economic outlook and mood has been gloomy. However the passage of the Hinkley Point deal, once security concerns were addressed, offers a light at the end of this clogged-up tunnel. In the post-Brexit world, the UK government’s decisions on investment and trade will come up against the current popular sentiment towards protectionism. The Hinkley Point deal bucks this protectionist trend, possibly signaling a shift in attitudes towards trade and investment.

Prime Minister May has announced that she would like to turn Britain into a “global leader in free trade,” even though barriers against doing so are going up. In the United States, both presidential candidates seem to be putting up the barriers themselves, shunning trade and investment opportunities and riding the wave of popular protectionist rhetoric instead. President Obama, in a new piece penned for The Economist, instead argues that trade helped the U.S. economy much more than hurt it. There is a choice, he continues: “retreat into old, closed-off economies or press forward, acknowledging the inequality that can come with globalization while committing ourselves to making the global economy work better for all people.”

Regardless of who takes office in the White House come January 2017, economic growth should not be held up or held back by congressional impasse or politicized protectionism. Jump-starting the global economy will require less reliance on federally enacted economic measures and more restraint from protectionist and nationalist tendencies instead. Only then can domestic and global economies stand the best chance of awakening from this prolonged slumber of stagnation. 

The outcome of Sunday’s vote in Colombia—where a slim majority of voters rejected a peace agreement with the FARC guerrillas—was definitely a stunner. No one saw it coming, not even the most enthusiastic opponent of the deal. But a closer inspection of the peace negotiations reveals that the writing was on the wall.

The main reason why nobody expected the NO campaign to win was the entirely one-sided coverage of the peace deal by the local media, something that was largely echoed by their international peers. For many years, the most important domestic outlets in Colombia have been under the government’s sway, downplaying the hardline adopted by the FARC during the negotiations and portraying the opponents of the deal as “far-right” or “enemies of peace.” There was little coverage of the real grievances that a significant number of Colombians had with the concessions given to the FARC and the low popularity of President Juan Manuel Santos.

On top of the biased media coverage, the government spent millions of dollars in publicity and in what Colombians commonly call “mermelada” (the outright use of public funds to get votes through pork and political patronage)—a practice that Santos is very fond of. Moreover, the YES campaign had the strong support of international actors, from the Cuban and the U.S. governments to the United Nations. Even Pope Francis promised to visit Colombia if the deal was backed by voters.

Despite all the odds, when faced with the biased question “Do you support the final accord to end the conflict and to construct a stable and lasting peace?” 50.24% of those who went to the polls said NO. Why?

Since negotiations began in Havana in 2012, poll after poll showed that even though a majority of Colombians wanted a successful peace process, they weren’t willing to grant the FARC significant concessions. You can’t blame them. For over 50 years the Marxist guerrilla terrorized the Colombian people, engaging in crimes against humanity, as well as hideous acts that not only targeted the government, but also innocent civilians: from massacres of peasants, car bombings, kidnappings and extortion, child recruitment, forceful abortions performed on female soldiers, to prolonged imprisonment and inhumane treatment of hostages, some of whom were held for over a decade.

During the four years of the negotiations, the FARC leadership showed little remorse for its crimes. When its Commander in Chief “Timochenko” formally “apologized” to the Colombian people during the signing ceremony of the peace deal, he said that his organization was sorry for all the pain it “may have caused” to the victims of the conflict. The half-apology didn’t go unnoticed by many Colombians.

Colombians were also suspicious of President Santos. A poll in March showed that his popularity stood at only 13%, the lowest point of any president in the history of Colombia. Many believed that Santos was mostly driven by his vanity and desire to win a Nobel Peace Prize. Thus, he was willing to compromise beyond what was palatable to many of his countrymen. The FARC seemed to have realized this. What was supposedly going to be a negotiation “of months, not years,” dragged on in Havana for almost 4 years. The FARC leadership played its hand well, knowing that the clock was ticking for a president whose only legacy depended on signing a deal.

Sensing the fine line he had to walk, Santos repeatedly said that in order to reach a successful agreement with the FARC, the Colombian people would have to swallow several bitter pills. These bitter pills were seldom reported by the foreign media, but many Colombians were very aware of them:

  • Immunity: As José Miguel Vivanco of Human Rights Watch put it, “With the agreement as it stands, ‘Timochenko’ and the guerrilla fighters under his command could avoid spending a single day in prison if they confess their war crimes. Instead, they would be subject to modest and short restrictions on certain rights while being required to carry out community service projects.” Vivanco described the deal as “a facade of justice that guarantees impunity for atrocities in Colombia.”
  • Political power: The deal allowed the FARC to become a political party. There is nothing wrong with that. Other peace agreements also allowed former insurgencies to become political actors. The problem is that the Havana deal went beyond that: it guaranteed the political party that would come up from the FARC 10 seats in Congress (5 in the House of Deputies, 5 in the Senate) for two constitutional terms of 4 years. It also created 16 temporary “Special Districts for Peace” for the House of Deputies in territories formerly controlled by the FARC that could only be contested by social movements. Many believed that this was a way to guarantee the FARC 16 extra seats in disguise.
  • Compensation to victims: The deal stipulated the compensation to the victims would be paid by Colombian taxpayers (the victims themselves), and not by the FARC—whose assets are estimated to be worth around $10.5 billion. Santos signaled that once the agreement was ratified, he would push for a tax increase to pay for it.
  • Generous support for FARC politics: As my colleague Ian Vásquez pointed out in a previous post, “The agreement ensures that the government will finance the political party of the FARC and the dissemination of its ideas. In addition, the state will pay for a ‘center for thought and political education’ of the FARC, a TV channel and 31 radio stations.” Rafael Nieto Loaiza, a former vice minister of Justice, said that the new party formed by the FARC “will receive an annual contribution proportionately higher than that of the other parties.”

The day that the peace deal was signed in Cartagena, The Economist’s Michael Reid tweeted that in 2001, Alfonso Cano, back then one of the FARC top commanders, told him that the guerrilla wouldn’t give up arms in exchange for “houses, cars, scholarships and seats in Congress.” Reid added, “This is what they’re doing now.” However, in 2001 the FARC was a mighty military force with approximately 16.000 troops. It controlled large swathes of the country and surrounded Colombia’s main cities, Bogotá included. By 2012, when the peace process began, the FARC had been decimated and demoralized. Most of its historic leadership, Cano included, had been killed. The latest official tally of the number of FARC troops stood at less than 5,700. Many Colombians believed that the costly concessions given to the FARC in terms of impunity, political power and economic support didn’t reflect the relative strength of the guerrilla when it decided to enter peace negotiations.

Instead of blaming those who voted NO as war-mongers, foreign analysts should make an effort to understand the reasons why a majority of Colombians rejected this peace deal. It’s not that they don’t want to live in a peaceful country. They do. But they also aspire to live in a nation with justice and rule of law. 

Freedom House simply categorizes Uganda as “not free.” Transparency International ranks it among the 30 worst countries for perceived public sector corruption. And the American Federation of Teachers—the second largest teachers union in the United States—is outraged a for-profit company is daring to provide low-cost education to Ugandan children against the wishes of the government.

From the AFT press release hailing a new study attacking Bridge International Academies (BIA) by an outfit the AFT helps bankroll:

The report…documents in distressing detail BIA’s disregard for legal and educational standards established by the Ugandan government….

Randi Weingarten, president of the American Federation of Teachers, an EI member organization, said: “This report serves as a warning about what happens when private education providers put profits above people. BIA’s shameful abuses, cookie-cutter curriculum and cost cutting make for distressing reading but sadly aren’t in the least bit surprising.”

That’s right: The AFT will apparently side with even one of the world’s worst governments if, it seems, doing so could hobble for-profit schooling.

But what about those horrible abuses Weingarten bemoans? If you read the report, you’ll get the sense that the most egregious is that BIA schools use a scripted curriculum delivered electronically, which is apparently excruciating torture for teachers and children. How they have any employees, and over 100,000 students, is a mystery.

The schools also don’t seem to follow rules and regulations set forth by Uganda’s education ministry, such as building and curriculum standards. But if you have ever read James Tooley’s revelatory writing on education in countries like Uganda, you’d understand why people who want to get education to poor children don’t comply with rules and regs: complying would make delivering affordable education at scale extremely difficult, and the regulations often exist to protect the public sector, including government inspectors who expect to get paid in both salaries and bribes.

At the very least, though, we know that the “cookie-cutter curriculum” is awful because the free public schools are using something very different and are clearly succeeding at better educating huge swaths of Ugandan children. Right?

If they are, you wouldn’t know it from this report. Unlike Tooley’s work on for-profit schooling among the world’s poorest people, this report offers no concrete comparisons between BIA and public schools except when it comes to teacher salaries. There public schools clearly win: They pay more, which may reveal why the AFT finds this report so powerful. But do they get better educational outcomes? That’s apparently irrelevant; only how BIA schools stack up against progressive schooling ideals, and the dictates of the Ugandan government, seem to matter.

This report provides basically nothing to seriously assess how Bridge International Academies is doing in Uganda. But it sure says a lot about the AFT.

Since Germany first accepted more than a million asylees into its country, the successes and failures of the decision were bound to reverberate around the world. Yet despite this openness at the borders, Germany remained stubbornly closed inwardly, delaying the integration of the people it chose to accept. Most importantly, it retained employment restrictions that prevent asylum seekers from obtaining the jobs they need to survive. Fortunately, America has a much better system with much greater success.

In 2015, Germany waited the longest of any country in Europe to restrict the flow of asylum seekers from the Middle East. Yet once they arrived, the asylees who immediately sought work in Europe’s largest economy were greeted by bureaucracy. The law initially forbade asylees from seeking work for 9 months after their arrival, but was reduced to 3 months in November 2014. Then, inexplicably, at the height of the inflows, the German government banned working if the asylee was forced to stay a reception center, which could be up to 6 months.

After the initial waiting period, asylees did not receive unrestricted employment authorization. Instead, they would have to find a “concrete” job offer—i.e. a firm must promise to hire them if the permit is granted—then apply for authorization. Even then, companies can only hire them during the first 15 months if the jobs are offered first to EU residents, and the federal labor department agrees that no one was willing to take. They also set asylee wages, which can price out low-skilled workers.

The hoops don’t end there. Asylees still have to get the approval of the immigration office at the municipal level. Under the law, it would take four years before they could compete equally with EU citizens.

On top of all these refugee-specific regulations, skilled workers are then tasked with proving that they can work in certain occupations. In order to obtain an occupational license, documentary proof of training—proof that’s often buried under bombed-out homes in Syria—is required. Some states in Germany allow asylees to demonstrate their skills in order to receive licensing, but others do not. “I am a dentist and could work, but what am I supposed to do? I am not allowed to work here!” one asylee told DW News.

Low-skilled immigrants haven’t avoided being targeted either. Germany introduced its first ever minimum wage in 2015—which disproportionately hits lower skilled migrants—and a study by the German government in August 2016 found that it had already cost 60,000 jobs.

The Cologne Institute for Economic Research in Germany produced a report in September 2015, calling for loosening the labor regulations, but it wasn’t until July 2016 that Germany passed a new law that suspended for three years the requirement that firms must offer jobs to EU residents first. Yet even so, the suspension will only apply in areas with low unemployment, and states and localities can still require discrimination against the asylee job seekers. They can also tell asylees where they must live—which could prevent them from following economic demand.

It is no surprise that this system has produced extremely high unemployment among the asylees in Germany—now almost a year after the bulk of the arrivals. Refugees generally in Germany show very slow economic integration, with less than half working after 5 years. Naturally, Syrians face many hurdles beyond bureaucracy in finding work, especially language and skill acquisition. But it’s clear that the restrictions play an important role in preventing employment.

“I’ve been waiting one year and three months for permission to work, everything is slow here. I was expecting it to go a little bit faster,” one Syrian engineer told the Financial Times, saying that his problem was “red tape, not language.” Robert Barr, co-founder of Jobs4Refugees, agreed with this assessment, telling the paper that the bureaucracy was “definitely too complicated,” and that “the sheer amount of paper work and the complexity of it is even difficult for Germans to understand.”

By comparison, the United States rapidly incorporates refugees into the labor market. U.S.-bound refugees have no restraints on employment and can compete equally with U.S. citizens, except that certain states can limit occupational licenses for noncitizens and refugees for 1 year, although they may have difficulty getting recognition of their credentials even after that. They also face a crop of new state-level minimum wage laws that can make low-skilled employment scarcer.

Figure: Employment Rates in United States and Germany for Refugees (Ages 16+) By Years Since Arrival   


Sources: Office of Refugee Resettlement, Directorate General for Internal Policies European Parliament

Despite these restrictions, after just one year, the majority of U.S. refugees were participating in the labor force, and after just three years, a majority had has jobs. As Figure 1 demonstrates, they significantly outperform refugees in Germany in this regard. The employment rate after 5 years was much higher for male refugees than refugee women in both countries, which makes the overall better U.S. performance all the more surprising, given that Germany’s asylees are overwhelmingly young men while the United States flow is evenly divided.

In the long-term, the U.S. model proves successful. During the 2009 to 2011 period, all refugees in the United States were more likely to be employed than the overall population, according to a 2015 study by the Migration Policy Institute. Two-thirds of all refugee men were employed compared to only 60 percent for all U.S. men. Refugee women had the same employment rates as all U.S. women.

U.S. policymakers cannot base their estimates of how refugee flows will impact the labor market on the situation in Germany. Labor market institutions in the United States are better equipped to handle an influx of new workers. While Germany is attempting to improve its laws to better integrate asylees, much work remains. The United States can continue to accept and integrate refugees with the knowledge that we have the experience and markets to handle the flow.